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CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION 
1. De£inition of the problem ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• l 
i. To discover the use or uses of the concept 
nsoul" in the thought of S~ren .Kierkegaard 
and of S igmu.nd. Freud. 
ii. Where the concept, or a meaning of the oon-
eept has been rejected by either of these, 
to understand the reason or reasons for the 
rejection. 
iii. Understanding nsouln to be an important 
entity in and perhaps part of the processes 
of human life, to see whether or not other 
oanoepts, suoh as ego, self or person have 
been used in plaoe of soul, 
2. Requests to be made and questions to be oonsidered •••••••• 4 
i. What would be the attitude of each of these 
thinkers to the concept of the soul put for-
ward by the other? 
ii. If it were found to be possible, in what way 
oould eaoh inalude the aoul-ooncept of the 
other in his system of thought? 
iii. If the concepts are found to be different, 
which of the two is the more acceptable and 
why? 
iv. If the concepts are found to be different, 
what would be the signi:fioanoe., :for man and 
for his institutions, if the one rather than 
the other were accepted? 
3. Area to be studied •••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
i. The uobristian anthropologyn of .Kierkegaard, 
with special reference to the soul in its 
total pattern of relationships. 
ii. The naturalistic anthropology of Freud, with 
special reference to the natural and the non-
natural man, and to the part which religion 
and the soul-concept play in keeping man from 
being natural. 
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men, and the contemporary events, as it may 
be necessary £or a c~ear understanding o~ 
the usages o~ terms. 
ii. A study o£ the autobiographical and biograph-
ical statements as a preparation £or under-
standing the nuances o~ their thought. 
iii. A study o£ previous research in this special 
~ield and a summary o~ the conclusions which 
have been reached. 
iv. A study of the writings o£ each o£ the two 
men, and a presentation, in systematic £orm, 
o~ the ~indings and convictions o~ each about 
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v. A comparison o£ these statements,. showing 
similarities and contrasts, and the relation 
o£ the ~indings to the questions which have 
been asked. 
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i. It is not our primary concern to relate in 
any detail the thinking o£ Kierkegaard or 
Freud in this matter o~ the soul to the long 
history o£ the concept of the soul which has 
preceded them. 
ii. In comparing the £indings o£ the two men we 
shall recognize but not deal exhaustively with 
the variable whioh might be called the thought-
climate in which each lived and worked. 
iii •. We shall not study the continuing develop-
ment o£ the soul-concepts o£ these two by 
their respective £ollowers or by other 
students of their teaching. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1. Definition of the problem. 
The purpose of this study is to discover in the writ-
ings of s;ren Kierkegaard and Sigmund Freud what each has 
to say about the concept "soul". To do this it will be 
necessary to examine the biographical, historical and geo-
graphical context in which the term appears and the findings 
and opinions of others who have directed their attention 
to this samet selected field of inquiry. 
When this part of the study has been completed the 
definitions provided by the two writers will be brought 
into a dialectical relationship in order to point up dif-
ferences and to see if it is possible to resolve them. And 
in so far as this is found to be impossible we shall seek 
to show the broader implications of these definitions and 
these differences for man as an individual and as a social 
being. 
It was on February 20, 1843, and in Oopenhagent that 
Kierkegaard, "the melancholy Dane", published his first 
work. He named it Either/Or, an alternative which was to 
find a place in all of his writings. Before his early death 
.in 1855 he had completed some twenty volumes. 
In 1939, another thinker, Sigmund Freud; rounded his 
long, fruitful life with the publication of Moses and 
Monotheism. His collected writings are contained in thir-
teen vol'Ullle.s. 
Eaeh o~ these men, though Xierkegaard somewhat tard-
il~, ha~-h~ ~-i~or~a~;ng_in~u~nee u:pon wea~ern thought, 
and eapeeiall~ ~pon th~ae thinkers who have sought to nuder-
- . .. . .. - -
stand,_ beth ~n the ~1~1~ of theology and of :payohology, the 
tensi~ns of modern life. 
At times the in~uence of these authors has been direct; 
their theories have been aooe:pted almost in full or with very 
little modification. At other times opponents have remained 
opponents, but none the leas haVe found it necessar~, because 
of these authors, to sharpen their own statements and to olar-
ify their positions. Ani more than is realized, except :per-
haps by students ill the field~ these two writers, in the cen-
tury of their in~uenoe, have given ordinary, Western man a 
different climate of thought from any that he has ever known 
before. 
In their ability, their sinaerity, then' courage and 
in one ~ea of research, namely, the hidden side of the life 
of man, these writers are much alike. And in many cases 
they have made similar discoveries. But their differenoes, 
both in the data which they have discovered and in their in-
terpretation of those data, must also be noted. Indeed, these 
differences may be of more import~oe than their area of agree-
ment. 
Our purpose, as we have stated it, is to discover what 
eaeh has had to say about the concept nsouJ.rr; a concept whieh 
has .. been ehos.en.be~anse .Qf .. .th~ ·."'entral plaee .. whi~h it. ha~ 
occ~J?i~d ___ in. ~h~~ri~s. o~. _:pars 91?-~~;y~ a~d- .<l.a'? t~:tn~a . of ~~; 
beea.uae it brings us, traditionally at least, to the plaee I . ... . 
of man • s awareness of God; and. beeause it has been a peint 
of focus in man's thought of. immortality. 
As we prooeed we shall find that some of the infor-
mation will come to us through direet statements which these 
writers have made, but other informatio~ will come only 
through deduction and inference. And we shall be helped 
~directly as we study suah related concepts in their writ-
ings as e~o. self and person. 
It will nQt be necessary :for us to define what we 
mean by naouln; rather, we wish to know what Kierkegaard 
and what Freud mean by the term. It will be sufficient, 
the.~efore, to state what has already been implied, that 
1n human history one important entity in the ver,y midst 
of the life process, and perhaps a part of it, bas been 
the soul or the soul-equivalent. 
As we proceed it will not be overloe~ed that a 
definition or a partial definition may be best seen, not 
by what has been accepted but by what bas been rejected; 
and especially as we see the reason or reaso~s fer the 
rejeetion. Nor ahould we overlook indifference as a 
reasen. When a man is saying the al~habet of his cul-
ture and ~eaves ont a ee~tain letter, t~is si~ence or 
thiS forgetfulness becomes part of the psyohopathologF 
of everyday life, and, aa Frena woUld tell us, this is 
always signi~ioant. And ~ar~anyone in.our culture who is 
.-l 
:!,nter~~,~.eci. ~I} e:n>l.o;oins. ~d Q.~fi;t~S ma.n.. .. :p~rt ... Q.~ ~he .. c qn-
ae:pt-al:pb.abet is the soul, even though it be sa14. only to be 
rejeoted. 
2. Questions to be oon~iderel. 
Through evidence of direot aooe:ptanae, then, and 
~~o~h ev~aen.oe o~ .<I.ireot or ~di~eet r~j-~otio.n; .. ~e ~ball 
seek to define in the thought of Kierkegaard. and e:f Freud 
this key-oonae:pt, the soul. 
Raving done this we shall :pat to eaoh of these men 
two xoequests and to atu"selves two questi.ons. The first of 
- ~ - ~ 
these requests is, w1ll you consider and comment upon the 
eonee:pt o:f the soUl or the soul-equivalent as the other bas 
de~ined 11;. And the seoo:ol is, will. you find in your aye tam 
o~ thOUght_a place :for this other concept even though it 
must be put at once under the oategGry of unequivocal error. 
By these two requests we would hope to bring about the dia-
lectioal relationship between the two conaepts which would 
be mast ~ruit~ul for our study. 
When these two requests have been responded to, we 
shall put the two questions to ourselves. F~st, if these 
soul concepts are found to be different in the writings of 
the two men, which of the two is more acceptable, and why? 
And second, and assuming than to be different, if this 
rather than that concept were found to l>e true, and if it 
4 
- -\ 
)IY.~~e. ~~v~nr as_.~ 'f)~l;e~. ~o the h.?JtL~n. I?i~~·-_.wha~_ d~r,eo:fii~~ would 
man -~nd his instituti?ns be likely t_o ~~ke beoause o'f it? That 
is to say, w~a~ development would follow from suoh teaehing? 
~. Area to be studied. 
ICierkegaa.rd has :produced what has been oalle~ by 
Otto A. Pi:pe:t' o:f Princeton Theologioa.l Seminaey. a 11 0b.ristian 
- . . 
anthropology"l• and, i:f not in orde:red :fashion, at least with 
elements set near enough to allow the gestalt principle of 
closure to oomplete the picture. In this antbro:pelogy man 
is seen to have his existence in a dynamic :frame o:f re:ferenoe 
which, bea~use o:f the presence in it o:f the Christian God and 
the Christ o:E the New !,l!estament, may be said to be Christian. 
Man, in Kierkegaard'' s thinking, is :petentially and essentially 
the religious man~ whioh is a deeper and more ooiD.J?rehensive 
concept, as he is _.at :pairua to show, than the ethioal man or 
t}le aes th,etie man. And in man aesthetic, ethical or religious, 
the so~ holds a uni~ue place. We shall study. there:fore, this 
Obristian anthropology. 
Freud, on the other hand. and ohiefly because o:f the 
attitude of soienoe at the time when he himself was becoming 
a soientist, gives us. a naturalistie a.n:t;hrOJ?Ology. and gives 
it in a mnoh more ordered fashion than does Kierkegaard. It 
will be necessary tG study his concept o:f natural man. Two 
li 
e~am:pleQ might be, primitive man as Freud thonght him to be, 
r. Fe:rrn, ER~ 41'1. 
5 
6 
~· • ~ .... ••• .. • 0 • - •••• ,.. .. •• ~ •• 
basing his belief on somewhat limited antb.ropol~gioal :;re ... 
.... . . . .. • . .. . . . . ." • . ... •. . .. ... . .. . 1 
seareh; and, seeondly, man when he ha.s undergone a. su.ooess--
. . . . . ~ ' . . . . . ' ., 
ful. :psyoh_oa.nal~sis. The ~.in th~ W13,it~g ... r~!l~ o:f tlle 
:psyohoanalyist, and oertain+Y the unanalysed man out in the 
st~eet, is still non~natural. still warped by his allegiance 
to the pleasure principle; that is. to the non-essential i~ 
~ttr apoiety, non-essential in the light of the reality :prin-
oi:ple. 
~he way tn.at religion has, according to Freud, con-
tributed to this wa:n>i:mg, an4, his su,.gg_ested way of recovery, 
. - . . .. ~ -
or of retarn from religion, will engage oti:r attention in so 
f~ as either of these pr~cesses bas to. do with the stated 
or. inferred ooneept of the Freudian soul. 
4. Meth.e.d t0 be used. 
We shall begin by looktng at eaoh man separately; the 
:plaoe from which he came, and the :plaoe in whioh he lived and 
worked; the immediate :family and other close relationships as 
they may be relevant; the conte~t of eon temporary events; the 
o~rents and cross-currents of ideas; and the reaction of each 
man in this contributing pa~tern. 
M~h o:f our information will oame from the statements 
which Kierkegaard and Freud have made about themselves; fo~ 
instance, from Kier~egaara•s JQurn~l, or from the seleotions 
:from it whieh Dru has made; and statements :from Freud's 
Autobiography, or from his lectures delivered at Olark Uni-
varsity in 1909. There will be~ toe, the indirect auto-
biagraphical references; the Abraham-Isaac discussion in 
Fear and Trembling - Abraham being Kierkegaard, and Isaac 
his one-time :fiance~, Regina; or Freud relating and analysing 
some of his own dreams. And much of our information wUl 
acme from books and articles about these two thinkers. 
It will, of course, be necessary to see what others have 
done in this specific field of investigatisn, and if there be 
helpful material in, say, studies of an organically related 
field such as "religion", we shall summarize these findings. 
Our chief source of information will, however, be the 
published writings of the two men, and because of the t~1es 
which are dealt with, some of these writings will require 
closer attention than will others. For example, Kierkegaard's 
The Concept of Dread makes use of the concept of "so~" in a 
teclm.ioal se:nse, whereas not one of the seventeen uses of the 
term in Purity of Heart is other than conventional. And, 
thinking o£ Freud, we are more likely to be near to significant 
material, significant for our purpose, as we study his devel~ 
oped theory of the id, for example, than we are when we are 
:following him tbl'ough the pecul.iar labyrinth of explanation as 
to why the name Signorelli once escaped him. 
Because of what he·was trying to say, and because of his 
reaction to the Hegelian nays tem", Kierkegaa.rd did not try to 
give an ordered presentation of his thoughts, but none the less, 
when we have gathered our data :from his unordered utterances, 
we shall try to make a systematic statement about his soul-
beliefs. Freud too, £or ~different reason, was inclined to 
be discursive, but he would have no ob jeetion, on principle • 
to our rearranging, for clarity' a. sake, our findings. 
When we have pushed the matter through to end-statements, 
to final summaries of their respective beliefs about the soul 
or soul-equivalents, we shall, as we have said, bring the 
resUlts into contact with each other. The~e will• perhaps, 
be similarities, and there w~ll, we believe, be di£ferenees. 
And when these have been made clear, we shall ·bring the two 
requests and the two questions given on page four and five 
of this dissertation to these sifted findingse 
5. The limitations of this work. 
Some of these limitations have been stated or implied 
in what has already been said. The principle which will 
guide us in our very necessary limiting will be that of nar~ 
rowing and sharpening the foeus of our attention. The 
central point of focus will be the concept "soul" in the 
writings of these two men. The light will grow more and 
more dim, as it were, as we move away from this central 
point. But in these outer eirc1es where we shall find 
closely related concepts. biographical and historical events 
and the promptings of a climate of philosophy, we shall also 
be alert. Stressing the contemporary moment, we shall none 
the less remember that which has gone into its making. 
The two men we are studying lived and worked in their 
own thought-decades, and where they did not find it possible 
9 
to accept the products of their age. they shaped themselves 
by their resistance; Kierkegaard against the almost over ... 
whelming system of Hegel and against the Christendom of his 
day; and Freud ag~inst the 1~ and professional opposition 
of his day. The~e was the environment, and there was, in 
eaoh ease, a very definite person·in that environment. 
It is not our primary concern to relate the thinking of 
Kierkega~d or Freud, in this matter of the soul, to the long 
history of the o.oneept o:f the soul whieh preceded them. Ner 
shall we deal exhausitively with that variable in our eompar-
ison whieh we ha~e called the thought-climate in which eaeh 
~ived and worked. And lastly, we shall not study the eontin-
uing development of the soul concept. or the soul-substitute 
coneept o:f these two in the writings whioh they have inspired. 
CHAPTER II 
Biog~aphi~al and Other Material Relevant to the Study 
S¢ren Kierkegaard 
1. Denmark and its capital in the first half of the 19th century. 
Kierkegaard was always more alive than the age in whioh 
he lived, and oertainly more alive than his native oity of 
Copenhagen. And yet even here he was by no means an aotor 
upon a oardboard stage. The English, in 1801 and again in 
180V, had found the oitizena of the Danish oapital not men 
of "'even-tempered., jovial medioori ty" • but men who were able 
to give an a.ooount of themselves. 
England, fighting for her life against Franee had thQught 
it neeessary to oapture or to destroy the neutral Danish fleet 
to kee~. it .~rom falling into the hands of Nap.oleon, and be-
cause of Danish resistance to this Admiralty decision, the 
British had on these two occasions shelled the eity of 
Copenhagen. 
At Kierkegaard's birth, in 1813, this was still a topic 
of conversation. and because the Danish king straightway be-
gan to show sympathy for Napoleen•s cause, and because the 
elder Kierkegaard in his home beside the Town Hall in Copen-
hagen was, as a suoaessful merchant, one of the eaonomic 
courtiers of the king, this British action may have done much 
te turn the young Kierkegaard in the direotion of his even-
tual political conservatism, and away from English philosophic 
-- '>'·' ...-:. 
thQll.ght. For other than that whiah is contained in 
Sha.kespea%;~, and whioh eame to him through a German trans-
lation, English thought did not mueh in:fluence him~ 
Another effect of this fringe-partieipation in the 
Napoleonie wars, and in the interloeking pattern of trade, 
was Danish bankruptcy. As is USJl.ally the aase in periods 
of inflation, the government sought to meet this :financial 
erisie by the issuing of more and more unbaaked banknotes. 
The break eame in 1813, the year of Kierkegaard•s birth, 
and somewhere he speaks of himself, humorously, as another 
worthless banknote. 
In spite of the reorganization of the finances of 
the nation, Kierkegaard•s very early childhood would be 
filled with talk about business stagnation and the re-
sulting peverty and inseeurity. But Kierkegaard•s father, 
because of shrewdness or because of good fortune, had in-
vested in the one stock the. t gained in value during this 
period of depression. The stock had been guaranteed by 
royalty, and a o when many .familia s aro una. than did not 
have finaneial security, Kierkegaard's family did, and so, 
in his young eyes, they were d.if:ferent and, in a sense, 
favored o.:f God. This :favoring, however, was later to be 
seen as. God, the oat, letting the Xierkegaard family, the 
mouse, go for a time eo that the :final ttpounoe" woul.d be 
the more startling and the more in keeping with what the 
family rea11y deserved. However, whether it was thought 
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to be a blessing or a--IJreparation for a more weighty aurae, 
the financial security of his youthful days in the midst of 
great insecurity marked the youth as being di:f:ferent from 
others. 
Denmark was a little land - at no place does it l!e 
more than forty miles :from the sea - surrounded by large, 
active, power:ful.nations; England~ Fran0e, and, after the 
Napoleonic wars had brought the beginnings o:f an ambitious 
nationalism to the land, Germany. 
A restless, brilliant Danish mind would, therefore, 
be expeot~d to do two things: to cultivate his home plot, 
small though it was, with stubborn intensity, and to look 
abroad :f~r intellectual nourishment. 
England was, geographically, dif:ficul t o:f accesEf 
and was remembered :for her misdeeds. France was nearer, 
but she was, perhaps, too Catholic and too un-Teutonio :for 
Kierkegaard. And both England and Franoe were overshadowed 
by the philosophers of Germany. For it was the day of the 
great German systems, and the greatest of them all, that of 
Regal, had oome to Kierkegaard t~ough an ardent Hegelian 
in the University o:f Oopenhagen, the one university in 
Denmark. 
So Kierkegaard the student turned to Germany, ana 
with a great deal o:f enjoyment mastered the Hegelian uni-
verse o:f thought. In his reaction to this system, which 
began early in his student days, Kierkegaard was driven to 
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the shaping o£ positive counter-thoughts. 
Copenhagen, in Kierkegaard's day, was a city of about 
200,000 inhabitants. It was the capital o:f Denmark and the 
home of sel:f-oonsciou.s royalty. And those institutions which 
it is fitting for royalty to patronize, the Opera, the Theater, 
the best Library in the land, the University, and, o:f course, 
the Church, a Cathedral Church, were all there :for a subject 
as well as for a king. 
The oity was not yet industrialized, and so the sea 
water in the soun.d was clean, and :forests, within easy driv-
ing distance, green. And though it was a city and not a town, 
there was still time :for men to know each other, and to stop 
and talk as they met each morning. A:nd Kierkegaard was fa-
mous, most o:f his adult life, £or his little visits with 
tradesmen up and down the stl:"eet. 
The Church in the city was the osntral place of wor-
ship :for the Danish Lutherans. TS8 ~otestant faith had 
aome into the land 1n 1536, and by this 19th century the 
Church was offieially established. It was a very rich and 
very dignified ChuroA.: The king was required by the law 
o:f the country to belong to it. And :for those who were 
not content with the solemnity o:f outward ritual, and with 
the dUll excitement o:f seeing the pieces o:f the catechism 
fitted together, there were Lutheran monasteries, or the 
left wing of the new Liberal party in polities. 
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Kierkegaard was taugh ~ aecording to the system of the 
Ch~eh, and all his life, though not always with reverence, he 
quoted from its catechism. Partly because of his relationship 
with his religious father, and partly because of a deep per-
sonal intel,"est in religion, he studied theology, preached the 
fe~ times be was given an opportunity, wrote many intricate 
"edifying discourses", or sermons to be read aloud, and never 
put from him the thought of taking final orders ~d official 
resp6ns1bilitie s. 
But this was also the Ohuroh which was at the very cen-
ter of the "Christendom" which he eventually attacked. For he 
came to feel that the Church of the day was preventing the 
Kingdom rather than revealing its mysteries and establishing 
it in the hearts and the institutions of men. And his attack 
was the more bitter - he died in the midst of the oattle -
because he knew that those who could, would not see the truth; 
that it was not a ease of the blind leading the blind, but of 
the proud leading the proud. 
2. European thought in the first half of the 19th century 
In this section we shall need to do two things: first, 
to look briefly at the development of German thought up to 
Regal, and second, to see in its broad outlines the meaning 
of the Romantic movement, in the literature of Europe. · 
Until the appearance of Leibniz there were in Germany 
and in the period after the Reformation, three strands of 
thought; strands which are seen to be interweaving here and 
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running se:Parately there. These were~ :first, a developing 
Lutheranism which was dominated by a theological and a pol-
itical concern; seeond, a strand of natural science which 
was in its modern infancy; and third, a strand, from out of 
the past, of Rhineland mysticism. But with the appearance 
of the versatile Leibniz, who lived in the late 17th and the 
early 18th centuries, Germany found its first great modern 
philosopher. 
Leibniz was systematically presented by Ohristian 
Wolff, who developed a philosophy and a theology which were, 
after the ex~ples o:fDesoartes and Spino~a, rationalistic, 
and even geometrically so. The great German "systems", 
which so disturbed Kierkegaard as his own thought began to 
develop, had begun to appe.ar. 
Lessing, who is important in the thinking of Kierk-
egaard, and espeoially in his aesthetic writings, had helped 
to turn the attention of 18th eentury Germany .. to aneient 
Greece. Lessing, who wished to show legitimate lines of 
division between the arts - poetry for things in action, 
painting :for things at rest - was both a olassieist and a 
romanticist, and in both of these roles he influenced Kierk-
egaard. As the latter, the romanticist, Lessing was in search 
of the particular, the individual in art. And the concept of 
nthe solitary individualn standing in the presenoe of God was 
not only eentral in Kierkegaara•s psychological theology, but 
Kierkegaard himself was, at the stage of his greatest maturit.1, 
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uniquely particular and indiv~dual. 
. . 
Lessing's theory of truth had its influence on Kierke-
gaard. It was not the correspondence theory, according to 
which ideas are true only as they are concentric with and 
have the same dimensions as the circle of the :fact "out 
there"• but a theory which said that those ideas are true 
whiah are of true servioe to the individual, and which change 
him in the direction of truth. Kierkegaard, who saw in phi-
losophical systems, not the truth, but a refuge from the 
truth, ~ fleeing :from essential inner change, a moving away 
from subjectivity, found sUpport in the older Lessing. 
Herder, who has been called the father of the roman-
ticists - for romanticism :found a philosophical expression in 
Germany - lived into the 19th century. His thought moved rap-
idly in the direction o:f the subjeative. Fer instanae he had 
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held to an ethia, not of rationalized prinaiples, but to an 
ethic which was an answe~ to an urge in tbe deeps of man, or of 
a nation, to develop its own individuality. Again he said that 
While there may be and probably iS Scientific truth that is ab-
solute. there are also the relative truths of morality and o:f 
aesthetics, and these relative truths are. somehow, more real 
than the absolute truths of science. He was groping for the 
existential, and Kierkegaard-,. who studied him, must have· been en-
aouraged to go forward and develop his ow.n existential thinking. 
Reason, as absolute Emperor, was tottering on its throne, 
and it was left to Kant to reduoe this strong, ancient author-
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it~ to the rankpf Tetrareh. Battered b~ Hume on the one side, 
and on the other by Rousseau, Kant set to work to define the 
limi t.a tiona of knowledge, to systemati"Ze that whieh was certai:p. 
within these limitations, and to make his own assumptions about 
that which never could be knowledge as the result of Reason. 
One of his conclusions, namely, that things may be true even 
though they can never have even logical support, would be deep-
ly pondered by the ~oung Kierkegaard. And too, the fact that 
in the "honest paths" of Kant ( the phrase is Kierkegaard's) 
the Will ma~ do for one who is on an intellectual journe~. 
wba t the Reason can never do. And Kierkegaard 'moving from the 
aesthetic stage to the highest religious life, is at eaeh tran-
sition point dependent upon a "leap" which a person must be 
willing to. take. 
We come next to Fiehte. Fiohte looked carefully at 
the Kantian eoncept of "the thing-in-itself" and proceeded to 
discard it; not to return to the rulership of sense-data, but 
to expand the Will. ~he Will, sa~s Fiehte, keeps its own moral 
laws, and stretches, by self-assertiveness, ever forward. The 
object world is there, posited by the Will., so that the Will, 
in overcoming it, gains necessary strength. 
The non-rational in this system would encourage Kierk-
egaard to study that in life which was neither scientific nor 
metaphysical, but something nearer to the living processes of 
the relationship between man and God. 
In Schelling we have one to whom Kierkegaard himself 
, 
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listened, for S~helling was leaturing in Berlin when Kierk~ 
egaard made his first trip to that city. At :first Kierkegaard 
was enthusiastic, but very soon he was writing to Denmark that 
the talk was so much drivel. 
Schelling did, however, bring home to Kierkegaard the 
need to come to terlll5with the concept o:f the dialectic. Fichte 
had need of this process in his thought to show how the will or 
Ego created its opposite, the world of objects, and then, by 
opposing it, found Ego-growth. .And Schelling saw a somewhat 
similar process in the total universe. Nature is :filled with 
interacting opposites. And as we make our abstractions :from 
this total process, we come upon both determinism and :freedom. 
For they are both dialectically present in nature and in human 
nature. The stage is being set :for Hegel, and a process is 
going :forward o:f making the paradox both necessary and intel-
lectually respectable. 
In Schelling's system, however, there was a difference. 
The older philosophers had had, as their means and as their 
end, logical consistency, with the result that they not only 
had to clip the data to fit the system, but the end result 
tended to be statio. Sohelling•s new way o:f systematizing 
sought to give the Will full value, even though logic was 
sacrificed in the process, and thought such as this, sat-
urated as it was by Will, was strongly dynamic • 
. In one sense the newer system was the tracing o:f a 
line o:f production, :for the will produced. And, said 
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Schelling, the-chief productions of the Will are not the scien-
tific, nor yet the maral, but the aesthetic. 
Again we have distinctions made between the moral and the 
aesthetic, and the emphasis upon the latter may have bad its in-
:fluence upon .Kierkegaard who wrote, in Berlin, part o:f his aes-
thetic works. 
Schelling outlived Hegel by twenty years, but because it 
was Regal who completed Schelling, and because it was Hegel who 
influenced Kierkegaard, at least negatively, more than any of 
the others, we have left Regel till noW.~ 
Regel 1 s interest, teo, was in a process. Given the pos-
sibility o:f a higher and higher synthesis, a synthesis in the 
direction of absolute spirit, how does it come about? By tbe 
dialectical process: thesis, antithesis, synthesis, which be-
comes the new thesis, and so on. 
By a carefUl selection and by a good deal of manipula-
tion - so some .. writers say - Regel brought his thinking down 
to earth by discovering this dialectical process at the core 
of human history. The sweep o:f his miDd, its subtlety and its 
power, coupled with the deep nationalism and the developing 
' 
militarism 1n Germany, and especially in the neurotically su-
perior Prussian state, stirred sympathetic intellectuals to 
the depths. For here was the Will expressed as never before, 
here in this thought-out system and in the driving process 
which it sought to describe. There was an expectation in the 
academia air. All must understand Hegel, all must accept the 
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"s1stem", all must :fall into the line of ma:t"ch. 
Kierkega~d was well schooled in Hegelianism, and, as 
we have said, found great intelleetual pleasure in mastering 
its intrieaoies, but :from his student days he felt that there 
was something frightening about it all, something de-individ-
ualizing. Admittedl1• it was a rare e~erienoe to mareh in 
this strong line, and if one were a "believeru, one eould hear 
marching music from the gods themselves, but supposing the 
-
maroh were in the wrong direction? And supposing this line of 
maroh were to become some sort of super-organism, a sooial 
oentipede whieh used and discarded the individual with the 
same casualness that the eentipede will use and, if neoessar1, 
discard a leg? And this fieroe work of systematizing; what 
was lost in the prooess? What was overlooked? What, in life, 
refused to oome into the system, into any system? And how es-
sential was that which always stayed out? Perhaps the most 
essential. Perhaps the system was the great enemy of the soul 
of man. Perhaps the one thing needed was a oourageous protest. 
These were some of the questions and some of the thoughts whioh 
troubled Kierkegaard, and brought into being, eventually, his 
own brilli~t existential writings. 
We must consider, next, the romantic reaction, in lit-
erature :for the most part, to the classical emphasis of the 
18th century. Kierkegaard oould not help but be aware of 
this movement, and since he himself was as much a writer, a 
maker of sincere and aoourate phrases, as he was a thinker, 
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he eouJ.d net help but-he eoneretely affected. 
In this Romantic Movement he would find strong sup-
port for his protest against the maas conceptions of the 
Regelians, and against the de-personalizing tendencies of 
the science of his day. For the Romantic Movement stressed, 
and almost exclusively, the value and validity of individual 
perceptions, individual experiences and individual ways of 
living. And as thet reacted to the "meddling intellect", 
they opened, these writers and these artists, the way for 
a re-evaluatien of the non-rational in life. And are not 
the climax moments in .the religious li:fe of "the solitary 
individual" of Kierkegaard the resUlt of non-rational af-
firmations? One does not, through the neat use of the 
syllogism, grasp the meaning of his nteleological suspen-
sion o;f the ethical"l. Nor does one enter into a state o:f 
faith, or rather, the process o:f living by faith, by an 
intellectual laying of brick upon briek. 
The Romantie turns from the mass., the race, the 
nation, the statistical Man, and turns toward individual 
men, <the: mart~, the here, the saint, the ordinary person 
who is fUll of extraordinary worth. 
And o:ooe again we remember how K'-erkegaard called 
for those who would be individuals, and who woul.d make 
an individual protest, even to the point of giving up 
their lives, against the grouping, massing tendencies of 
1. Kierkegaard, FT, 79ff. 
the times.- And the whole idea of the need for struggle and 
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for suffering. so deeply developed and lived oat by him, was 
kn~wn to every creative, Romantic artist. 
And so we begin to see, in the thought of the first 
half-century, the 19th, two opposite trends: one, propelled 
by logic, moving toward non-human systems; non-human beeaus e 
they sought to deal with man in the mass, or with a part of 
the individual msn; say, his ability to do this or that for 
the state. 
ihet'e. W6s 
And~the second trend, with feeling rather than the 
wish to be consistently logical as its e~rly motivating 
p.ower; which made positive protest against all logical de-
fining which was confining, all catching of the individual 
into the imprisoning groupt all piecemeal treatment of men 
who were made to function as whole, individual beings, beings 
who were ends, not means. And Kierkegaard was strongly on 
the side of conerete life, as opposed to the abstracted life 
of the philosophical systems. Life, for him,was onlyli:fe 
when it was making personal, realistic decisions in concrete 
situations. For him, reaJ.jli:fe was "ehoosi:ng". And men must 
-
never run away :f'ip:om this and "hide in the crowd", nor allow 
the crowd to debase them by ita careless welcome, but men 
must :fiDd and act in and :frem a highly individualized and 
constantly re~ewed faith. This courageous, informed and 
highly individualized Kierkegaard is the person whose soul-
aonee:pt we are E{.eeking to aaco unt for and to understand. 
3.Kierkegaard's abilities and his opportunities for development. 
To a marked degree we have in Kierkegaard an accumulated 
abundance·of life. For he was not only a productive scholar 
living forward, but he was deliberately and increasingly aware 
of his childhood, of the inter-personal events of those years, 
the resulting emotions and their abiding significance. And too, 
because of curiosity, beeause of a need for direct and symbolic 
e~ression, and because of the need to struggle for personal 
survival, he was aware of the depths of his own "Gothic"l per-
sonality. 
The man appeared early in the child, and the child re-
mained in the man, for in every decade he was sensitive and 
whimsical and sad. And his wit, found in hie baby talk, was 
still sharply present in his last polemical attack upon the 
Ohurch. In its r·ange, hie wit remained wide. For some it 
was stinging, scathing, devastating and bitter. For an af-
fectionate middle group it made him "the Forktr, a family 
nickname given on an occasion when he threatened, as a child, 
to be a fork and stick those who were teasing him; or, in the 
words of a reminiscing school companion, a "wild aat", who 
fought back and whose wit scratched. And for those who were 
not his enemies his wit was a marvellous surprise and a stim-
ulating jQy. 
1. Friedman, KAP, 23. Also, Otto, MEW, 184. 
Kierkegaard, the ~h~ld_o£ a mother o£ 44 and a £ather 
of 56, did not have his share o:f body strength. And there 
was added, in childhood, the burden of a ourvatu:r:e of the 
spine, the result of a £all from a tree. And it was this 
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that was the preoi~itating oause of more than one embarrassing 
and literal collapse and, it is thought, it contributed muah 
t$ his early death. 
Friedmann, speaking as a psychoanalyst and as a dooter 
of medicine, notes the iisorepanoy between his baokward bio-
logical state all through his life and his highly evolved 
emotional oondition~l And he sees this unevenness sf devel-
opment as being both: a.·direat and an indirect cause of muoh 
of Kierkegaard's unhappiness. For with all his merriment he 
was also deeply unhappy; but beneath that aga~, and espec-
ially as he oame to understand religion, he was deeply happy. 
Kierkegaard himsel£ speaks quite frankly of having a 
body deplorably unequal to his mind. And this faot was 
brought home to him yet once again when, at military age, 
having been entered in the Royal Life Guards, he was dis-
charged three days later as unfit for service. 
This physical frailty, and the threat o£ instability 
as he learned of his unstable family, increased the eompen-
sating thrust o£ a mind that was already ~owerful. Fo~ Kier-
kega~d, in his mental ability, was ~ighly gifted, eeuld ob-
serve quickly and minutely, oould see linking relationships 
1. Friedmann, KAP, 32. 
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both at deep levels an~ between phenomena and ideas which 
would seem to the ungifted to be widely separated, and eould 
take the imaginative leap from a phenomenon and an abstraction 
seen in a pattern to an utterly new and eduoed i~ea. 
But the philosophe~, with his love of cool, objective 
understanding of the dialeotieal process, was balanced by 
tbe poet and the colorful dramatist. The reach of logic was 
extended by a fearless intuition. Straight thinking led 
straight through to glowing illustration, and trenchant ar-
gument was brought home by a delineated character or a con-
crete situation. 
His thirst for learning was unquenchable, though he 
says, modestly, and no doubt with hiS own perfectionism in 
mind, that it was impossible far him to learn a language 
other than the Danish. He found great delight from his 
early routh in playing with·ideas. They were his toys and 
his contemporary companions. He wri tee in his Journal, 
"this up-and-down and down-and-up of thought was a joy 
beyond comparert.l But while he learned and learned be 
also produced, writing and rewriting, working, in his 
peak periods, twelve hard hours a day and giving to tbe 
printer and to tbe later research worker thousands of 
closely written pages on which was to be found subject 
matter for which he had ransacked the universe. 
1. Lowrie, SLK, 56. 
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He was a writer upon religion. :for he himself had oome 
:face te faae with God and knew how· te~rible it was to :fall in"be 
the hands of the living God, and hov; necessary. He was a writer 
upon ethics, for he knew the importance and the limitations of 
this half-way house upon the journey to God. He was a writer 
upon aesthetias, which were broadly defined by him to take in 
all that we today would speak o:f as humanistic; for he bad a 
distaste :for a dualism that would separate matter and spirit, 
and a deep appreaia tion of human life and its manifold products. 
And yet, in his writings about the aesthetic man, the man who, 
in his philosophy would be likely to be a phenomenologist, in 
his ethics a hedonist, and, all too frequently, in his living 
a deeply selfish epicurean, in his writings about such a man 
he has spoken with an accuracy whioh could come only :from very 
personal experience. Kierkegaard knew this life and the grad-
ual exhaustion and spiritual attrition which it brought because 
he himSelf bad been an aesthete. .And :finally, and in part be-
cause o:f an inner necessity, he was a writer upon psychology; 
one who anticipated many of the depth discoveries o:f the next 
hundred years, and one who was, in the words o:f Emil Brunner, 
"the greatest o:f all Christian psychologists".l 
Those who write o:f this superior personality struggle 
to find the qualifying phrases, and it seems at times as if 
they were depending upon a sheer quantity of adjectives. He 
is described, :far example, as being pert, witty, merry, humor-
ous, childlike, sensitive, tender, sarcastic, independent, 
1. Brunner, ww, 70. 
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h'llmble, sad, melancholic, :filled with a mind of amazing sub-
- . 
tlety and power and deeply religious. And, as Martin and 
Jolivet and Lowrie and others have-said, he had an ability 
to fuse thought and feeling and to speak with an accuracy 
that is rare among the rare ones of all the c:enturies. 
With a Friedmann who sees 'him through the eyes of' 
a psychoanalyst, he is one who had the power and the in-
tensity, the oourage and. the need tQ go beyond the norma.J. 
e:xperienoes of life aDd to transvalue the values t.bat he 
found in his sooiety. Beqause of his "weak and cold in-
stinotive life and his laok o:f surface :feeling" he was 
able , a ays Friedmann,· \f6 ·'·work with "the serenity and 
delicacy" of the Olassioist.l ·~ut because of the turbul-
ence of his hidden life and because of his ability to 
perceive the details o:f the world ar.o'lllld him and to 
guage its feeling-life, he was able to comprehend and 
to speak about and, at times, to apeak from the Welt-
scbmerz of the 19th century Romanticist. 
Given these unique abilities then, what were the 
opportunities :for development and :for expression? In 
our next two sections we shall be speaking about certain 
persons and experiences which influenced him profoundly 
in either a gradual or a traumatic fashion, but the pic-
ture would not be complete without some mention of certain 
1. Friedmann, KAP, 15,23,49. 
other interests and momenta and relationships. 
The tremendaua influence which his ~ather bad upon 
him we shall leave till later. His mother, who is never 
once mentioned by him in his intimate and voluminous Journal. 
and who died when he was twenty-one woUld do little to help 
him in his intellectual development, ~or she definitely was 
not an educated woman; but from the evidence that we have, 
she and his favorite older sister, Petrea, who also died when 
he was twenty-one, must have done much in a quiet way to give 
him his unusual understanding of women and his great res:pee·t 
:for the woman-ideal. Ind.eed it is said of him that in his 
religious approach to Mary the mother of Jesus he could find 
in himself more awe and adoration than can most ardent Cath-
olics. There is, however. to match this sensitiveness, a 
note of unreality in his inner relations with women, and this 
unreal note was sounded in his relationship to Regina, the 
girl he was engaged to b¢ deeided he could not marry. 
The substantial financial backing which he bad during 
his childhood and student days mu.s t have given him many 
opportunities, both academic and non-academic, which were 
denied to others. And the money which he inherited, while 
not enough to make the publishing of his books a thing of 
little financial concern, lasted quite literally to the day 
of his death. 
Living as he did in the cathedral city and being 
closely linked by his fathe::- and his father' a pastor to the 
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routines and the dis~iplines of the Lutheran religion, he 
had an opportunity to 1earn :from the inside the national 
Ohureh system; a Ohureh from which he could only part him-
sel:f by a vehement attack at the eleventh hour o:f his li:fe. 
As part of his protest - and it was for love of the Ohttreh, 
the Ohureh as it should be, that be made it - he re:fused, 
on his Qeath bed, to aeeept the :formal ministrations of a 
Pastor. 
And living as he did in the saue setting most of his 
life, a small town for all its 200,000 inhabitants, and in 
a li.ttle land in a time til! little aetion, he had an opportu-
nity to live down into the community. And j.n this community 
it is said o:f him that "he knew everybody worth knowing",l 
whether they were in positions o:f high authority or were 
ncharactersn performing a menial task. 
Most of his years were spent under one roof, but in 
his rebellious student days he did have an opportunity to 
try his wit, not only in the elass rooms of the university 
and in the debating society, and not only at pavement ca:fes 
and in o-ther drinking bouts - one of which took him to a 
brothel - but at the table of a boarding house where he had 
gone to live. 
He was all his adult li:fe drawn to the theater where 
one went, he said, not to be entertained - the Ohureh was 
for that - but to be enlightened; a remark which may have 
been inspired by the inscription over the stage of the Royal 
1. Lowrie, SLK, 8. 
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Theater in Copenhagen: "Not for pleasure only•' .1 
In his student iays, besides languages, philosophy, 
physics and mathematics, he began to read and to discuss 
with his customary brilliance, literature and to listen to 
music. The legends of Faust, Don Juan and Ahasuerus the 
Wondering Jew absorbed his attention at one time, and in-
deed it might be said that he identified with each of these 
figures in turn. However his romantic sensuality-identi-
fiqation with Don Juan was somewhat balanced by the restrict-
ing classical musie of the Mozart opera of that name. 
Two years after his father's death and upon 00mple-
tion of his theological examination in the university be made 
a journey to the heaths of Jutlani and to his father's old 
home. It amounted to a :pilgrimage, and there in that place 
of isolation and desolation he was deeply moved. Thoughts 
of his father's boyhood, its utter misery and its moment of 
desperation when God was cursed by the father - still a young 
boy - gave Kierkegaard an opportunity to gain and feel family 
knowledge, and so, self-knowledge. Al:ld since the God whom 
Kierkegaard came to believe in is one who must be faced in a 
moment in which one is utterly solitary and defenceless, it is 
more than likely that the sensing of such a relationship had 
in it as a contributing factor the memory of a crouching, 
shivering boy on this wild heath. Kierkegaard returned to 
1. Kierkegaard, RK, 164. 
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Copenhagen with something of J~tland sta~ed upon his bra~, 
and, as we have indicated, his subsequent life and his devel-
oped theology show the influence of that lonely place. 
The next incident of importance was his year-long en-
gagement to Regina Olsen. It is spelled "RegiiJe" by some, 
that being the Danish spelling. This important relationship 
will be dealt with later, but when he found it necessary to 
break with Begina, he made his first trip to Berlin, the only 
foreign city he was to visit though he had the means to travel. 
He bad heard philosophy in its most abstruse form in tbe 
conversations between his father and visitors to the home, and 
he had studied philosophy and in particular the philosophy of 
Hegel at the university, and it. was to philosophy that he gave 
his attention in Berlin. Schelling was there, disapprsving of 
Hegel. Kierkegaard listened, at first with enthusiasm, but very 
soon with extreme impatience. Schelling seemed to be getting 
nowhere, and, at least in his letters, Kierkegaard said so. 
Berlin gave him, not only philosophy at first ha.Ild, as 
it were, but a chance to move further into the German language 
and into German literature, and it also gave him a chance to 
look uack upon Copenhagen from a foreign vantage point. This 
was helpful, though his fottr visits to Berlin did not amount, 
altogether, to more than a few weeks. 
At the age of twent.y he had begun to keep a notebook. 
It later became his Journal, a book which he expected to have 
published after his death. Also, by the time of his first visit 
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to Berlin, he bad written a _literary article, at least one in-
tricate sermon and a university dissertation "On the concept o£ 
Irony with partiauJ.ar reference to Socrates", but now with the 
:Regina experience tumbling tbl:-ough his brain, and with the stran-: 
genese o£ Berlin to bring him alive in an unaccustomed :fashion, 
the £loodgates were opened. From henceforth he was a writer. 
Either/Or, unusual in quality and impressive in bulk was his 
first publication, and with it be began to :find, as he tells us, 
that writing can be an intense and satisfactory way of worshipping 
God. 
4. The specific sources o:f Kierkegaard's thought, both as student 
and as scholar. 
When visitors eame to the home they would very often fill 
the hours with talk about philosophy and theology. They brought 
with them trained and well-stocked minds, and Kierkegaard 1 s fa-
ther was well able to lead the discussion. From a very early 
age Kierkegaard was allowed to listen, and as a result learned, 
very early, to be versatile, creative and accurate in the ex-
pression of his thoughts~ And in his solitude, not having toys -
the :father did not approve - he learned to play with ideas; to 
make this and tbat. pattern, and then to stand back and view the 
results with a judgment that was always beyond his age. 
In school, and especially in his Latin hours with his 
God-fearing teacher, Michael Nielsen, he learned to understand 
and :favor rules and to recognize and be wary of exceptions. In-
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deed, he went so.,.:far as to identi:fy his :father with "the :fule" 
and to look upon those habits o:f living and those ways o:f think-
ing which wer~ not his :father's as e~oeptions.l This did much 
to give· him a kind of consistency and single-minded:ness, and when 
years later he came upon what he believed to be the rule or essence 
o:f Christianity it gave him a deep, personal motivating :factor :for 
p~oolaiming this rUle, and the courage to su:f:fer the consequences 
as he prounouaced what he thought to be exceptions, exceptions. 
What the rule or esseno~ o:f O~istianity is is not the purpose o:f 
this dissertation, but one statement made by Kierkegaard in one o:f 
his papers reads as :follows: nThe in:fini te humiliation and gra.13 e, 
then a striving grounded in gratitude, this is Ohristianity".2 
Many of his ideas came to him as he rejected current 
thought. For where he could not accept he ~earned, early, to 
give reasons, and. the drive of his mind caused him to produce 
adequate replacing theories. 
In e%amining the specific sources of his thought we can, 
without distortion or under-statement, say that the Copenhagen 
of his day ean account :for all but very little in his turbUlent, 
productive mi~. Of course many ideas came over tbe border of 
Denmark~ Fo.r example, the philosophy o:f Wolff which his father 
had absorbed. But these ideas came to Kierkegaard the student, 
and in some oases to Kierkegaard the scholar in the Danish lan-
1. Kierkegaard, E/0 11, 225. 
2. Thomte, KPR, 219. 
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guage. And they oa.me, a.s w.e have suggested, not only. in home 
discussions, and books and university lectures, but in the 
coffee hours in the Heiberg hQ.me, the meeting plaee of artists 
and thinkers; and in the o~fes and a.leng the sidewalks of the 
oity. 
Martin, in his a.ooount ef Xler:\[:~ga.a.rd, gives a seore of 
' 
names of the ph.ilosepl':u~rs and theolegia.ns and the makers of 
literature with whom Kierkega.a.rd was fa.milia.r.l And mere than 
three times this number are mentioned py ~ierkega.ard in his 
Journal. Same presented a body o:f thought for his oonsidera-
tion; for example, Plato - including Seora.tes - and Aristotle 
and Hegel and tb$ teachers of orthodox Christianity. othera 
gave him mu.sta.rd-s.eed ideas; ideas which la. ter developed to 
unexpeo ted proport.ions. l!'er example the legend of Ahasuerus 
from Hoffman, and of Don Juan in the music and libretto of 
Mozart 1 s opera. And some of these writers gave him ideas 
whioh steadied him, or direot~d him, for good or for 111, as 
a man might direot a stranger in a. oity and then have no more 
to do with him. In this last category I think of the dubious 
counsel given to him by the depraved Jorgensen, who, in the 
2 
month of May, 1836, led him astray sexua.llY• And, perhaps 
for good rather than for ill, there were the talks with King 
Obristia.n VIII of Denmark• Kierkegaard says of his monarch 
that non the whole he has enriched me with many psyohologioal 
observations. n 3 
1- Martin, KMD, 28ffe 
2. Lo~ie, SLK, 100. 
3. Lowrie, SLK,.l92. 
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From the sources alrea~y mentioned and fram others. we 
learn that among the non-German and non-Danish persons whose 
ideas were known to ~1m, at least in part, we have Augustine, 
Shakespeare, Reusseau, Hugo o£ St, Vietor, Socrates, Abelard, 
Anselm, Montaigne, Pascal, Plate, Aristotle, Ma~cus Aurelius, 
Ep~otetus, Spinoza, Eugene Sue. Savonarola, Fenelon, Bernard 
o£ Olairvaux, Aristophanes, Franklin (probably through quota-
tions) , John Wesley (a~ whom he did not approve), Tertullian, 
Thomas ~ Kempis, Homer, Victor Hugo, Lamartinet Napoleon, 
Vinet, Origen, and, o£ course, the writers of the books of the 
Bible~ 
While at university he studied Hebrew, Greek and Latin, 
and in his books he uses the latter two witl;l. ease. We know 
teo that he was well along in German. And among German 
writers and thinkers mentioned in his books we find, Goethe, 
Fiehte, Schelling, Luther, Sahopenhauer, Hamann, Heine, 
Sohliermacher, Tauler, Hoffman, Kant, ~easing~ T~endelburg, 
Lichtenberg and, o£ course, Hegel. We shall have more to say 
about one or _two of these later, but since Kierkegaara began 
his study in Denmark and in the Danish language we must, in 
our search for the sourees of his thought, mention Qertain o£ 
his fellow countrymen, 
~here is, first of all, his £ather, and there is the girl, 
Regina, and all through his productive years he lived, inwardly, 
very close to both of them. We shall look at these relation-
ships in more detail in a later section. 
Next we have the Most Reverend J. p. Mynster, Bishop 
Primate of the Ohurah of Denmark. He was the Pastor of the 
Kie:rkegaard family and as the young Kierkegaard was growing 
up, Mynster was for him an admired giant. However. toward 
the end ot Kierkegaard' s life, and after Myn.ster 1 s death, 
Kierkegaard felt it necessary to attack the man. He tried 
to keep it non-person~l and to attack him as the represen~ 
tative of what Kierkegaard considered to be a tragiea.lly 
mistaken pseudo-Ohristiani tyt but he did not snoeeed. 
Mynster becomes, in Kierkega.a.rd's writings~ the "Prelate", 
a. type-figure for which the author had very little use. 
Mynster's successor, Hans Le Martensen. who was a leo-
turer in philosophy in the university, became, as Kierk-
egaard felt it necessary to denounce, the type-figure of 
36 
"the Professor"; the representative of all those in the 
academia world who were deluded by their :feeling that onee 
they had been subtly intelleetual about a problem they had 
therefore solved it. He had in mind, in particular, the 
Hegelian system, :for Martensen was one of the ehief of the 
Hegelians in Denmark, and it was through h~m that Kierkegaard 
received his basic instruction in German philosophy, 
Kierkes~d did not like Martensen as a type and not too well 
as a person, and this colored his attack upon "Professors". 
However, he also had a. certain respect for Martensen the 
trained mind, and he was able to say of him at one time 1n 
his career, that he was "not only the most eminent theologian 
in Denmark, but ene who would shine in any university in 
Germa.llf."l 
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T~ara was another leader of Hegelian thought in Dan-
mark, namely the J. L. Heiberg who, aa we have already 
indieated, opened his home to the writers and artists of 
Copenhagen. Heiberg was not only a professor in the uni-
versity, but a writer of successful playa and the editor of 
the leading literary review in the country, the Intelligena-
ble,de. 
Heiberg's home, where the intellectuals of the city 
gathered, was open to Kierkegaard even in his student days, 
and in the frequent gatherings Kierkegaard 1s brilliant wit 
was developed and disciplined. And here too Kierkegaard the 
aesthete was among productive people~ Heiberg's mother, Fru 
Gullemborg, who was present at the gatherings, was both a 
Wl'i tar and an actress, and the wife of Heiberg was ala o on 
\ 
the stage. Kierkegaard never got to Paris, but in the 
Heiberga he had friends who made periodic visits and who 
brought him into touch with the Freno.h eapitQJ.. Heiberg's 
intere~t and understanding were not, however, sufficient to 
prepare him for a reading of Kierkegaard 1 s ~ither/Or, for 
when this book, the first of Kierkegaard's ·aesthetie produc-
tions - volume two moves into the ethical - reached his desk 
for reviewing, Heiberg was puzzled and annoyed by ita 
strangeness. 
l. Lewrie, SLK, 22'7. 
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T~ee other professo.rs of philosophy in Copenhagen. 
- . 
F •. o. Sibbern, Hans Brpohner and Rasmus Nielsen, gave infor-
mation and stimUlation to Kierkegaard, and ware his compan-
ions in diseussion. Br¢ahner was not a professing Ohristian, 
but it is said that he was perhaps "the only man who at that 
time understood what Kierkegaard was aiming at!"l Xierkegaard 
thought for a time that in Nielsen he might find an interpreter, 
for the pro:fessor ·seemed to wish to become e. pu:pil, but a mis-
understanding, which Kierkegaard sensed as potentially present 
almost from the :first, drove a wedge between tbem. 
In reading Kierkegaard. and ~s~oially his earlier writings, 
one is struok by his knowledge of the ancient Greeks end of 
their importance to him. This is particularly true of the 
writers of Greek tragedy and the figure of Socrates, Muoh of 
thi, knowle~ge oame to him th:r: ough or bees. us~. of another pro-
:fessor at the university, Paul Martin M~ller. M¢11er was not 
only Kierketgaardc~s fa.vori te :professor2 but a poet" .And not 
merely in the sense of a producer of lines, but in the more 
basie sense of one who makes an original and creative approach 
and response to life. And Kierkegaard too, and espeeial.ly 
after the R~gina episode, was essentially a poet~ With the 
possible e:xeeption of Attack u;pon "Obristendom", all of 
Xierkegaa~d's books are charged with poetry; an outstanding 
example being Fear and Trembling. 
1. Lowrie, SLK, 6. 
2~ Kierkegaard, RK, 164, 
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Mp~~er•s feelings forZierkegaard were those of a tender 
theughtful father for a son. He was able to see beyond the 
f2oundering, exaggerating, insecure student and to s~eak a 
gentle warning or word. of adviee~ and having s~aken, he was 
able to wait. He it was who put Kierkegaard to the academic 
task ef reporting on "ireny", and there is the suggestion of 
the teaching of more than subject matter here, for it cer-
tainly gave self-knowledge in a plaoe and at a time when it 
was greatly needed. And it was Mpl~er who startled Kierkegaard 
by saying to him at a crossroads moment of life, "You are so 
polemi.oal through and through that it is per:feetly terrible. nl 
And there came to Kierkega~d from M~ller 1 s death bed a 
specific plea that he not drive his frail body too hard. 
Kier~egaard, in response to this, gave up at once an unr~­
sonabl~ difficult literary project. Dru, in the introduction 
to his selections from the Journal, has said - and we have 
changed the word "man" to "person" - "M;ller was the only 
person beside his father and Regine (Regina) who influenced 
Kierkegaara.n2 One of the important ways in which M;ller 
influenced Kierkegaard 1 s thinking, rather than his behavior, 
his habits of life, was by his presentation of a strong 
philosophical point of view that was other than Hegelian. 
For u:;11er, in many respects, was a 11la ter Greek". 
Two groups of Danish people have yet to be mentioned, 
the journalists, and the cafe or boarding-house companions. 
l. Lowrie, SKL; 107. 
2. Dru. JSK; xxxii. 
Of the journalists, abou~whom Kierkegaard had very mixed 
feelings even before he was a.ttaeked in an irresponsible 
scandal sheet, we need mention only three, Gi;awad of 
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uThe Fa.the:r.'landn; who remained on friendly terms with 
Xierkegaard all through his relationship difficulties; 
GoldaqJbmidt,.who edited the noorsair"- the scandal sheet-
and who was an early supporter of Kierkegaard, though like 
Heiberg, he was annoyed by not being able to understand 
Either/or. Later however he found it necessary or profitable 
to make a personal attack upon Kierkegaard's oddness, with 
the result that every bootblack along the street had his epi-
thet or his remark as Kierkegaa~d went by. 
The third journalist~ and a former member of the boarding-
house group, wasP. s. (not professor) M~ller. At the time 
the "0orsair" made its attack M?ller was on the staff. and 
was most unfriendly to Kierkegaard; perhaps .be.cau.se he could 
see that in his book, Either/Or, Kierkegaard had used him as 
the mo~_el ~or his portrait _of the Seducer. 
Other boarding-house companions in the months in whioh 
Kierkega$,Xd the student preferred to live away from home, 
were J, v. Jacobson, who is the important~ aooeptable figure 
of Judge William in the same Either/Or, and Hert~; a poet 
of sorts who finds his way into a biography of Kierkegaard 
ohie:fly beeause he has reoorded in his diary, wit.h impl.'es-
sionistio descriptions and eharaoteriatio talk, an account 
of a meeting of Kierkeg~ard with this youn$. student group. 
J 
41 
Emil Boesen, a Paator_~ho grew up with Kierkegaard and 
w~o remained his only confidant. was for a time a member of 
the coffee-drinking group in the Heiberg home. He by no 
means understood Kierkegaard, but he realized that his friend 
was somehow great, and as a result he preserved several re-
vealLng gap-filling letters. 
And lastly in this group we have the writer of fairy 
tales, Hans Ohristian Andersen. He was older than the others 
in the group and far behind Kierkegaard in abilitY". Fer some 
reason Kierkegaard, for a time, made him the target for his 
barbed wit, and the defenceless, sentimental giant, Andersen, 
went staggering ~om meeting to meeting. One of Kierkegaard's 
most concentrated attacks was a ~itten review of Andersen's 
novel, Only a Fiddler. There was much to be said against the 
story but in his review Xie~kegaard strikes with sueh vehemence 
that one suspects that .Aladersen and his novel are symbols or 
reminders of something else 1n Kierkegaard 's li:fe which is en-. 
.. 
dangering his ego-existence; perhaps his fear of emotion and 
the self-protecting device of seeking to be rid of the blur in 
any and all thinking~ As part of his reply Andersen pillories 
Kierkegaard as the conceited parrot in his story "The Shoes 
-. 
of Fortune". And this is, in part, a stinging reference to 
Kierkegaard's rasping voice. 
In 1633 after a misunderstanding with the father, Kierke-
gaard's brother, Niels, came to .Ainerica and died shortly 
afterward in Patterson, New Jersey. This family rupture and 
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this loss served to deepen Kie·rkega.ard•s moods o:f melancholy, 
but otherwise he seems to have been untouched by this per-
sonal link with the new oontinent. 
His brother Peter, who stayed home and who survived. 
with Kierkegaard, when the mother and three children died 
within a year, was even less delivere~ from melancholy than 
was s;ren~ But Peter was non-rebelliou~ and erthoda:r and in-
clined to be a moralizer and a judge, and Peter is no doubt 
one of the reasons why Kierkeg~rd felt it necessary to take 
roams for a time away from home. Peter went into the church 
and was elevated to a place o:f responsibility, but hie laok 
of understanding of Jfilerkegaard and his br.ooding jealousy 
lasted long after Kierkegaard's death. Indeed, since many 
of Kierkega.ard's papers oame to him, they did not :for years 
:find their way i.nto prii!l.t• And it was only a personality 
d1f:fion1ty. in Peter, namely, an inability to m~e up his mind 
even about trifles, whieh kept these papers of Kierkegaard 
from being burned. Peter was not in :favor of preserving them, 
but Peter was oaught at the very transition point between his 
own "Either /Ol'", 
In our brief S'tllDmary of certain ideas in German philo.so:PhY 
which must have eome to the attention o:f Kierkegaa.rd as he 
studied the history of that subject and which did in many eases 
have a de:f1n1 tebearing on his develepment; we spoke ef Hegel. 
Beeause e:f the importance of his in:fluenee we wish to give in this 
section on "specific sources" a more detailed statement. 
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It was the Hegelian aystem which gave Kierkegaard phil-
QSophic practice, taking him, as it were, through the 
"scales" ~d on to more advanced interpretations. Kierkegaard 
always admired Hegel as a thinker, and bad Hegel been content 
to consider his work a philosophic experiment rather than the 
final word. Kierkegaa.rd would have given him first place among 
the experimenters. But let-us, in a rather lengtbf quotation, 
hear Kierkegaard himself on this matter. In a footnote to his 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript he writes: 
"I cherish a respect for Hegel which is 
sometimes an enigma to me; I have learnt muoh 
from him. and I know. that on returning again 
to him I could still learn muoh more.,.Trust-
ing that there might be paths left for thought 
to find, I have bad reoourse to the wri tinge 
of the philosophers, of Hegel among others. 
Bat ••• he leaves one in the lurch. His phil-
osQphical knowledge, his astonishing learning, 
the s}larpsightedness of· his genius, and what-
ever else ean be alleged ta the advantage of 
a philosopher, I am ready as any disciple to 
concede - but no, not to concede, that is too 
proud an e~ression; I would say, rather, will-
ing to admire, willing to let myself be taught. 
But for all that, one who is thoroughly tried 
in life's vicissitudes and has recourse in his 
need to the aid of thoughts will find him oomie -
in spite of thi great q~lities which are no 
less certain." 
It shoUld be observed just here that "oomio" has a 
special meaning for Kierkegaard. In the book from which the 
above quotation is taken he speaks of three e%istenee-spheres, 
the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. Between the 
first two and in its own "con:fineu we find nironyt'• and be-
tween the ethical. and the religieus spheres or "stages" we 
1. Kierkesaard, OUF, 558. 
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fini "humor" or "the ecnnie". This would place Hegel on the 
very border of the highest of all Kierkegaard 1s spheres, the 
I 
religious, but only on the border. 
Hegel, at least in his own conception of his }'system", 
stands nearest to bare abstraetion at the very beginning; 
from then on, he fee~s, he becomes more and more eoncrete. 
This bare beginning is "Being". an entity whioh is indepen-
dent of all time and all space. It is :Being as sheer exis-
tence, and when we begin to ~k about its essence, about its 
nature, that is, when we move from ontology to metaphysics, 
and when we begin to form a eanoept of Being we are, accord-
ing to Hegel, moving in the direction of the concrete. 
The process, which is logical in a Hegelian rather 
than an Aristotelian sense, is one of ndeveloprnent; or change; 
of evolution," in short, o:f beooming. This :first, bare, "Ab-
solute Being goes into exile in nature for the purpose of 
self-realization, and at the end retll.rns te itself :fully eon-
scious as Spirit."l 
Nature, therefore, is "Being in exile", and as Being 
has its existence in time and space it is subject to certain 
laws and forces; and as this Being realizes itself more and 
more in becoming, we come to the various levels of life. 
In H'QlD.Sll Nat'llt'e we have the Absolute Being with which 
we began eoming to self-consciousness as Spirit. And it is 
1. MeElroy, MP, 9. 
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the concrete expression of this that we have in the data of 
the psychologieal and social sciences, and in art, philosophy 
and religion. And with the emergence from the continuing di-
alectical struggle of Spirit or Absolute Being self-realized 
with that which is not yet spirit, we have freedom. 
This was Kierkegaard•s sllringboard, and it was this 
"system" with its numerous, intermesb.ing, ongoing ttwheels" 
'which provided him, as he reacted against it, with many.of 
his own categories. It was too neat and too ttobjeetive" for 
him, and for Kierkegaard the being and essence of relationship, 
which was the existential heart of religion, was forever "sub-
jective". In the system the individual was hidden, if not 
lost. In the religious thought of Kierkega.ard• th'9 individual 
must stand out from every sril.othel'ing, natux-al and human rela .... 
tionship and face God alone~ Salvation was not a ease of sing-
ing ene•s part faithfully- in the chorus of the all ofexistence, 
but it began and it continued as a lonely cry in a night of 
"fear and trembling". 
For him, Hegel 1 s system was "merely on paper".1 And 
Kierkegaard 1 e concern was actual life. And as he studied 
actual life Kierkegaard found that there were not the seam-
less joinings and the smooth transitions of tbe Hegelians, but 
gaps and gashes, The real responsibility in life, said Kierke-
gaard, was not the reconciling work of Hegel, but an acknowl-
edgment ef the unreconoiled in life and a choosing between 
i. McElroy, M:P, 2'1. 
utte:r alternatives. De~er than any Both/And approach to 
life there lay the approach o:f Either/or. "In actual living 
there is no gradual evolution but decisive ieaps.nl And the 
' leap is DB de when and only when an individual human choice 
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has been made. Life advances from stage to stage, nat as it 
throws before itself a linking bridge, but as it leaps in the 
darkness of oourageous faith. from this side of each succeed-
ing oha.sm to the other • Nature and mind, and time and eter-
nit~ do not, therefore e.hade off, the one into the other, but 
belong to different and separated realms. Indeed, the relig-
ious life is that life which is and must be lived nbetween 
nat~e and spiritn, or mind, and nbetween time and eternityn.2 
The "soul" in the Hegelian system is a psychological 
manifestation of Spirit or Absolute Being on its way to com-
plete self-realization, ~~far as this soul is part of the 
natural world it is bound by necessity, but ~~far as it 
~artakes of the spiritual~ or succeeds in expressing the 
Spirit, it is free. It is a subjective entity, but since it 
is not the object of our present stu~ we need say no more 
than the faot that in the system it is something other than 
"mindn and something other than "oonseiousness"; and that it 
stands at a less evolved, less spiritual place on the dialee-
tieal ladder than do law and morality, whether it be individ-
ual or social, and art and religion and philosopny.3 
1. McElroy, MP, 27. 
2. McElroy, MP, 31. 
3. McElroy, MP, 9. 
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With ICierkegae.rd we s-hall :find that the "soul" is some-
thing other than a mani:festation o:f S~ir1t. though it stands 
in an intimate and ne~essary relationship with Spirit. We 
shall :find that the soul becomes sel:f-aware only as it be-
comes aware o:f Spirit. We shall :find that he too thinks o:f 
soul as subjective. and as something other than 11mindtt or 
uoonsoiousness 11 • or something more than these. And we shall 
:find that its :freedom comes :from its aeknowledged relation-
ship to Spirit, but we shall not :find that it is considered 
to be less real, in its partioul.ar existence, than the gen-
eral-ized instit'l;l.tions which it helps to produoe and in which 
it bears its share o:f responsibility. These :final ends o:f 
Hegel, art and philosophy and religion~ remain means, in the 
thought o:f Kierkegaard• and even dangerous means, :for they 
are ever striving to engul:f and to bring into dehumanized 
servitude the "individual". We have used the term "dehUmanized". 
By this is meant, in Kierkegaard, making man less than man 
in the image o:f God. 
In looking into the specific sourees of Kierkegaard's 
thought there is one other German thinker and writer who 
shoUld be mentioned, He does not ~ppear in our list of 
great philosophers, because in the history of the subject as 
it is formally taught he is not considered to be one. Never-
theless he was :felt, by Kierkegaard, to be "his most congenial 
eontemporary".l 
1. Lowrie; SLK, 108. 
'. 
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His name was Georg Hamann and he was not, literally 
the oontemporary o~ Kierkegaard, for he lU.ed i.n 1768, twenty-
five years before Kierkegaard was porn. 
Kierkegaard began to read him as a un~yer~ity student 
and in the period of his life when he was on the edge of a 
eerioua break with his home su:rroundinga. And while Hamann's 
thought did not have its fUll influenoe upon Kierkegaard 
until later, it began to swing him away from Hegelianism. 
N·at beoau.se Hamann offered another att:raotive point of view, 
the Greek - though Hamann knew the philosophy of Greece -
but beoause Kierkegaard began to see in this older German the 
terrible·olaim of "real Obristiani~y". From him Kierkegaard 
began to learn the need for the "miraole of faith" and not 
"mere reason" if one were to know and embody the truth of 
O.Uistianity:1 
In his early student days Kierkegaard had been all for 
philosophy, and states that he oould see no way in which phil-
e.sophy and Obristianity coUld ever meet. At the time he meant 
~hat Ohristiani ty was the laggard., and one ~that oouJ.d never, 
beoa11se of its presupposi tiona and its prae ti(les, elos e the 
+f..~t gap. But now, upon reading Hamann, he began to see,_ the meaning 
of "philosophy and Ohristiani ty can never ll'e reo onciladu lay 
in the reverse of his first belief: that it was philosophy and 
not Christianity whioh ooUl.d never olose the gap, phil.osophy 
being the laggard, 
1. Lewrie, SLK, 108~ 
By philosopb.lr he meB.Jl--t "life-views that are :Purely 
human and attainal>le by human reason".l And of all :Phi ... 
losephies Hegel 1 s was by far the most sophisticated and com-
pleJr and the most :Presum:Ptueus, and therefore the greates.t 
present danger to the cause ef Christ. 
5. Other experiences in Kierkegaard's life relevant to our 
purpase. 
We shall refer to three suoh e%!)erienees. First, to 
Kierkegaard's relationship with his father; second, with his 
/-1- . 
one-time fiancee. Regina Olsen; and third to his attack toward 
the<:e,lose of his life, upon tlle State Ohuroh, 
Niels, the brother of Kierkega.ard, dying in !meriaa and 
sending farewell greetings to Denmark, never mentioned b.is 
fat·her~'· X:ierkegaa.rd, after a rebellion "against his :father 
and against God" which lasted :for eight years, returned home, 
both to the father and to God, And even dut'ing the separation 
the father was willing to support Kierkegaard and. X:ierkegaard 
was willing to aooept a substantial allewanee. And the :father 
was willing, too, to pay debts aequired by Kierkegaa.rd in his 
"wild oats" days to the amount of about two thousand dollars. 
The father was born in Jut~an~ an~, as we have indicated, 
had sttffered greatly in his youth :from loneliness and from ~ 
want of the necessities. of life; had, in:'taot, as a. shepherd 
bOY on the heath dramatically cursed God for giving him such 
.· 
a cold and lonely life~ 
-1. Themte, KPR, vii. 
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Delivered from hie shepherding by a relative, the 
father had oome to Oopenhagen>and by ability and drive had 
risen to a position of affluence in the merchant class. But 
his melancholy nature had nourished itself on guilt; guilt 
beoa.use of the childhood eursing of Gad, a terrible secret 
in his life and coneide~ed a.t times in hie life t.o be the un-
forgivable sin; and guilt, too, because of' sexual wandering 
after the early death of his first wife; though these oon-
aoience-burdening episodes are only hinted a.t in the biogra-
phical material whioh we have about him. Ria relations with · 
hi~ eo~ein-aervant. however, are well known, for he got her 
with child and married her. And Kierkegaard was the seventh 
ohild of this marriage. 
The mother's position in the home is not clear. She was 
more than a housekeeper but less than a wife, We are told 
that Kierkegaard loved her dearly, but, as we have said, not 
once in his tntimate Journal, and, according to Jolivet, not 
once in the whole of his writings does Kierkegaard mention her.l 
BUt from very e~ly, the precocious last-born child, the Ben-
~amin to old Jacob, began to be the "spiritual wife" to the 
father.2 
In his orazy upbringing, as Kierkegaard calls it, his 
father drove hie very sensitive imagination to a high piteh. 
They took their indoor walks, father and son, hand in hand, and 
1. Jolivet, IK, 3. 
2~ Friedm~, ·KAP, 29. 
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the :father :peopled the room-.with colorful• :far-away ebjeets 
and persons and stimulated the young Kierkegaa~d to the :point 
o:f nervous exhaustion. And then. as if i.t were a game as 
serious as chess, Kierkegaard would follow his father through 
the adult twistings and turnings of theologi~al and :philosoph-
ical argument. 
Ria feeling for his father during childhood, and indeed 
all his life, oan be described as veneration. And as Kierke-
gaard, without understanding it, and, at :first, not under-
standing that it was ha:p:pening, began ta take over the load of 
guilt from the father's shoulders, and to experience the re-
sulting moods of melancholy, the father saw a belief which he 
held coming true; namely, that every member of the family was 
marked :for :punishment because ef his guilt; or rather, that 
whioh he had done to bring this guilt. Moreover, the :father 
told the son, still a young child, that he was so marked. For 
he carried the name, and therefore the guilt. The father was 
not seeking to be rid of his own guilt by this device, but to 
inorea.se it. At any rate, with this introjeoting of guilt, on 
the :part of the young Kierkegaard, and with the solemn e:x-:pla-
nation of ita religious significance, Kierkegaard was the more 
firmly bound to the father, and was made more aware of the 
awful wrath ot God. 
The father was successful, but even this success in 
worldly affairs was twisted by the father to mean a heavier; 
eventual judgment from the God whom he had greatly wronged. 
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Brooding on his ~uilt year in and yea~ out, and even retiring 
from business while still a young man to give him time to plumb 
the depths of his dark theology, the father saturated the mind 
of the growing boy with darkness. ·It was, almost, the story of 
Good Friday without the deeper meaning of that story, and with-
out an Easter. 
The father believed that one of the way~ inwhioh he was 
to be punished was to see his children die one after another, 
and in many intense moments this recurring thought was also 
shared with Kierkegaard. Then four of the children did die, 
three of them in one year, and here for the father was proof 
positive. Kierkegaard himself expected to follow them, and we 
find him expressing his surprise, at different times in his 
life, that he was still alive •. 
But living in such a home and with such a :person, and 
being uniquely sensitive, Kierkegaard began to have strange 
feelings that there was more behind his father's heavy moods 
than bad been told, and when he was twenty-two he learned by 
chance that there was; learned it, perhaps~ in some such fash-
ion as he himself describes in Solomon's "Dream" in his book 
Stages on Life's Way. In this related incident, Solomon over-
hears his father, David, at his private devotions confessing 
certain sins of the flesh. However Kierkegaard discovered it, 
and whatever he discovered, he spoke of the experience from 
then on as "the great earthquake'1 • Martin describes this 
earthquake as 11 the shock of knowing the weakness and guilt of 
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the sne toLwhom he had always looked up to in veneration and 
respect. nl 
Xierkegaard was in despair. for his reverent attachment 
to his £ather was vary deep. And added to whatever guilt he 
was already carrying there would be the guilt o:f having :feund 
the matter out. It was, almost, like :finding a flaw in God, 
and it is thought that it is this more than anything else that 
led to his careless living away from home :for a time. There 
was this separation, then, between father and son, but it was 
the separation of two successive waves on a deep Atlantic, tem-
porary and only on the surface. 
It was some time before Kierkegaard had absorbed this 
new and frightening experience, this need to give a new inter-
pretation to his very important relationship with his father, 
but gradually, and certainly by the time o:f his coming of legal 
age, his twenty-fifth birthday, when he was reconciled with his 
:father and with his religion, he learned to bring to the father 
a depth o~ sympathy and understanding that was as rare as was 
his total personality. And something o:f his father's guilt was 
now taken willingly and with understanding upon his own young 
shoulders, and it is said that even his features began to take 
on the expression of his :father. 
The reconciliation meant a return home and shortly after 
this the :father died. But for Kierkegaard this marke~ the be-
ginning of a closer and closer study of the events of the fa-
1. Martin, KliiiD, 14. 
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t~er's life, and especiall~ o£ their moments o~ intense re~ 
lationship, It was part of Kierkegaard 1 s effort to know him-
self, but the memor~ of the old man remained "as a constrain-
ing and inspiring infiuence". 
We come now to the relatiQnship with Regina Olsen. Fer 
thirteen months, and covering parts of his twenty-seventh and 
twent~-eighth ~ears, Kierkegaard was engaged to her. And 
then, in her eighteenth year, he found it necessary to break 
off the engagement. But since he was never one to lead a com-
partmentalized life, this break, and the cause of it, and the 
important inward oonttnuation of the relationship, affected 
his writings and even his most subtle theological concepts. 
In his Fear and Tremblins, which is largely an attempt 
to explain in symbolic language his reasons for leaving 
Regina, .be tells us the story of Abraham and Isaac. And for 
any who know the story of his life in Copenhagen he himself 
is seen to be Abraham>and Regina7 Isaac, 
As it is retold, the point of the story is that Abraham 
(Kierkegaard) oan explain the 'impending sacrifice neither to 
' 
.Isaao, who is to l>e saorifioed, nor to the ather members of 
his household. and community. Ab:ttaham must go forward to the 
place of sacrifice in silence, a silence enjoined by God him-
self, and a silence that is itself ~art of the sacrifice. 
And had he struck the knife~blow it must still have been in 
silenee, For with an attempted explanation, the religious 
value of the act, an aet of lonely faith, would have been 
lost. 
Bnt in Kierkegaax.d's rendering Abraham goea a step beyond 
silence and, to save Isaac (Regina) from the shook of believing 
that this father who had so loved him is now destroying him, 
speaks ou.t agains~,h7msel:f. Abraham aays that all along he was 
deceiving Isaac, that he never really ~oved him. This was to 
help Isaac to die and, we gather, it is said beoau.se of Abraham's 
great love., It would be easier, Abraham believes, for Isaac to 
die by the hand of a cruel, dissembling one than by the hand of 
a loving father. And because of his love, Abraham is willing to 
bear the weight of this last lie, this doing of ethical evil added 
to the ethical evil of destroying the beloved, so that religious 
good might result. This silence, this going even into the realm 
o:f deeeption to make the death blow the easier to bear, rtf'··K·~-;;.~-,.._,; 
kegaard•s explanation of his method of breaking his engagement 
with Regina. It does not explain his reason, but it is important 
to him to have her understand that it has been a terrible sacri-
fice for him to make, that the cru.elty in his method was an at-
tempt to lessen her pain, and that the series o:f events and the 
whole relationship are to be understood by means of a religious 
conte:x-t. 
Of con:rse at the last moment Isaac was saved_. And this 
too may have been in Kierkegaard 1 s mind as he chose and elabo-
rated this story. Fer Fear and Trembling springs from the 
same time and mood as does Repetition and we know that in the 
latter book there were pages which expressed, in thinly veiled 
language, the hope of a "repetition", a coming back into a 
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relationship :for which one llas -.been specially prepared by the 
very aet of giving it up. But on his return :from Berlin lle 
:found Regina engaged to another, and tllese hopeful pages were 
therefore destroyed. 
In the aatutal Copenhagen story, Kierkegaard, in a rela-
tionship in wllieh each loved eaoh, put behind him his deep 
senea o:f separation and of doom ~d encouraged a formal en-
gagement. For months he suffered and wished with all his 
soul that he did not have this sense of being different :from 
other persons, so that he might enter wholehe~tedly into the 
relationship and be one with humanity, Outwardly he was gay, 
but after much thought, at first as to whether or not he 
shoUld break with Regina, and then, when he decided to do so, 
as to the kindest way of doing it, he decided to play the 
role of a trifler with af:feetions~ It was Abraham making the 
death of Isaao the easie~ by his last lie. Regina, who had a 
strength of her own, must have understood more than Kierkegaard 
gave her eredit for, for there is unselfishness in some of her 
desperate moves to keep him in the relationship, but she did 
not suooeed. 
To make the matter still more plain from his point of 
view Kierkegaard writes, in this same Fear and TremblinS about 
the inoident at Delphi reoorded in Aristotle's Peetios when a 
bride, almost at the moment of her marriage ~eremony, sees 
the groom walk toward her door, and past it, never to return, 
Kierkegaard takes Regina ~ the book was for her ~ into the 
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mind of the groom at this mom~nt and tells her the alter-
natives whi~h faced him. He, the groom, has just learned in 
a confidential visit to the augurs of the temple that i:f he 
marries, misfortune will follow and his bride will undergo 
great suffering. This "d~vine~ word has just oome to him; 
that is to say, he has not been light-minded in the period P,f 
courtship. And the werd.dem~nds a decision, one that must 
be made in the few short steps between the temple and the 
bride's home where the wedding ceremony is to take plaee. It 
is forbidden h~ to e~lain. Haw then ean he make the evil 
less? He must bring harm to his bride; what will bring the 
least harm.? .. -
In his unhappiness he asks himself; Shall I g0 forward in 
spite of this warning? But that would pull the girl into his 
bitter destiny. Shall I keep silent then, and walk past the 
door without an explanation, and so out of her life? That teo 
will bring pain, and to both of us, but there is nothing else 
to do. For I am forbidden by this temple e~erienoe to speak. 
It would be ethical to give b.er a reason, to st~p beyond nthe 
aesthetic loftiness of silence", but must there not be, for 
her ultimate sake and for the sake of the reality of that 
religious experience, a "teleological suspension of the 
ethioal", silence, and an aoted lie? 
Here was an experience, an inner communication from the 
gods, which the girl must understand without being told, And 
until she did understand, as he hoped she would someday, he 
must bear in silenee and a~ne the pain o~ being misunder-
stood by her and of being judged by the world. But that 
too was part of what was required of him, that too was part 
of faith in the authority and wisdom of the gods. 
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And so, symbolically, Kierkegaard tries as muoh as he 
dares. to explain himself· to Regina, and whether he suooeeded 
or not, we know that something of her love fer him remained 
until the day of her death. 
Whir Kierkegaa:rd broke with Regina is a .de.ep psyehological 
problem and one that is related even at the time to the raw 
stuff of his theology, And perhaps there were many reasons. 
For one thing, Kierkegaard knew that he was neither beautiful 
in body nor strong, and it may be that he oould not bear the 
thought ef failure in marriage because of physical inferior! ty. 
Again, there was in his life a time o:f oarelessness and immo-
rality, and being as morally sensitive as he was, this may 
have prevented him, or it may be that knowing that he was a 
genius, he believed that genius is not only threatened by the 
olose relationship o:f marriag~ but prevented from doing its 
work. But perhaps more than any of these. he may have broken 
the engagement because he believed and had evidence to prove 
that he was a member of a marked family. Its melancholy was 
not without oause. Mother and brothers and sisters had died 
and. had died before their natural time. There was the strong 
probability that he too would follow them. And there were 
strange ambivalent experiences in his prayer life, It seemed 
as if a terrible, loving G~d bad put a mark upon his fore-
head, a mark o:f loneliness, the mark of the "individual". 
What right had he, therefore. to invite or to drag suoh an 
one as Regina, and :Regina of all persons, into such danger-
ous depths? For until she expressed her human needs by 
turning to Sohlegel, the man she m~ried, she was very muoh 
idealized by Kierkegaard. In his mind, the Virgin Mary may, 
at times, have worn the features of Regina. 
I have said that he may have seen in his proposed mar-
riage with Regina a ohanoe and perhaps his one obanoe to 
aome into the human family. For he knew himself to be a 
fringe person, and while he never flii.O.Ohed when he aaw a 
path he must take, in this ease the path of loneliness, he 
wondered, ttnderstandab.ly, if he might not fulfill ~is des~ 
tiny through marriage, if he might not have, as Abraham had 
had Isaao returned to him, Regina returned to him. His ges-
ture of faith, his religious giving up, his aooepted self-
imposed and God-imposed silence. these might be su:ff.i(}ient 
to oha.nge what seemed to be his "fate". 
These particular repetition-fires were fed by the smile 
of a ohanoe meeting with Regina in the cathedral~ It was 
some months after the break but Regina had not yet entered 
into marriage with Schlegel. The "Yes" welled up in him, 
but, with equal strength, the "No", and :finding these two 
voioes still so alive, he left again :for Berlin. 
When, shortly after this, Regina married, Kierkegaard 1 s 
reaction was two-fold, se~rn - though this passed - and 
relief. At one time he had hoped to come to God and to 
£nlfi~lment through this human relationship with "man", 
that is, Regina. Instead he found that he had to come 
to man, and to fulfi~ment through God. And this discovery, 
this proof of old religious wisdom, to man through God, 
became an essential part of his teaehing. 
The continuing presence of Regina in his inner life 
is not, I be~ieve, an indication of an escape into the pre-
sence of an embalmed sentimentality, but indicates, rather, 
an identification of Regina with the woman~soul of Goethe, 
the anima of depth psychology, and perhaps, as we have sug-
gested, an identification with that need in life which has 
been symbolized by the Virgin Mary. But whatever she was, 
it was Regina who strengthened him and inspired him to do 
some of his most lasting writing. And she too carried part 
of this same load. and carried it without direct oommttnica~ 
tion~ Regina, too. must have been a very strong and very 
unique person. 
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And new a brief wora about a third emotional experience 
in Kierkegaard's life, one that was very meaningful and very 
disturbing; namely, his break with the State Ohuroh. 
For some years Kierkegaard had been troubled about his 
Church, and about the 11 0briatendom" of his day. .And he 
could see that his basic ideas, and espeeially those whtah 
were to be found in Ooncludin~ Unscientific Postscript and 
-~~- -~-- -.----~· 
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The Siekness Unto Death, would _9ne day meet existing Christ-
ian thought in a life-and-death struggle. But when his old 
pro~e~aor, Martensen, whom he had never liked, preached the 
funeral sermon of Bishop Mynster, and in eUlogizing him 
spoke of him as "a witness to the truthu, Kiarkegaard put 
pen to paper; not to give a challenge, but to join battle. 
The truth in Mynster, he wrote, had been the truth of Mynster 
.and of the State Ohurah, but not the truth o:f Christianity, 
Out of eonsideration :for the feelings o:f eertain inno-
cent :friends; he held up his publie protest for some months, 
but at last ~elt that he must publish it, Mynster had :failed 
again and again to understand what Kierkegaard, in the agony 
o:f his sineerity, was trying to say; and the seeming faat 
that Mynster lacked the minimum o~ understanding Christianity, 
to say nothing of the maximum of aooepting and praotioing it, 
was, for Kierkegaard, a sufficient preof that he did not have 
the truth. Mar.tensen, who was to suooeed Bishop Mynster in 
offiee, had said in the funeral oration that Mynster had been 
"a witness to the truth" •... Xierkegaard replied: 
uA witness to the truth is a man whose 
life has brought him profound knowledge of 
inner oonfliot, fear and trembling, spiritual 
distress, moral suffering~ A witness to the 
truth is a man who be~s witness to the truth 
in poverty, in hnm~l1ation and contempt, mis-
understood, hated, ~ooked at, despised, rid-
iouled.~u 
And Mynster had lived a comparatively plaoid life, ful-
filling his formal obligations with the dignity of a practised, 
1. Jolivet, IK, 34. 
·~,.li ': . ,. -; 
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protessional prela~ living in ijis "palaoe", respeoted by 
all and sought after by those who wished to adorn their 
drawing-rooms or their dinner tables, And the "Christendom" 
of the day said, this is Christianity! But Kierkegaard 
knew better, For he himself had lived the life he had de-
seribed, he had been a witness to the truth. And the New 
~estament was there to prove him right; in words, in the 
vivid life of Christ, and in the Sp~it whieh it promised; 
a Spirit which was seeking entrance into "Christendom" and 
was finding the door officially barred. 
This attaok, which could not help but beeome personal, 
was followed by more sharp writing against the praetiee of 
oonforming. Present day uchristendomu, he said, was "the 
earioature of true Christianity". Or again it was "a mon-
strous amount of misunderstanding, illusion, ete., mired 
with a sparing little dose of true Obristianity."l 
And so Kierkegaard spoke out, partly because he must 
do so before he eame to the end of his money and the end of 
his strength. And beoause he did speak out, and beeause he 
had to suffer the hundredfold surfaoe and sub-EJurfaoe eon-
sequences, he hastened his own death • 
.And what was he trying to say? This 1 that it is faith 
and not the objeots of faith whieh must eoncern us; that in 
our reaohing out we do not reaoh for our ideal selves, but 
for another, whieh is God~ That in our reaehing we do find 
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ourselves, not, £irst o£-all, as friends of God, but as his 
enemy, and in ourselves, closer to us than breathing, we 
find guilt, And the deeper we go the more guilt we find, 
and therefore the greater distance between us and God. 
Self-knowledge ~howe us the abyss that lies between our most 
human nature and this God. 
This would drive us to hopeless living or to hopeless 
dying were it not for God. For knowing our plight, God has 
oome to u.s t a'ome in the form of the m~ Jesus • Our faith, 
therefore, our only, saving faith must lie in this, in our 
aooeptanoe of and our allegiance to this God-Man, Ohrist. 
And our relationship to him must be subjective, that is, 
most personal; and it must be daily renewed through an 
active affirming faith. 
S igmrmd J!1reud 
1. Sigmund Freud: the late nineteenth oentury setting. 
Freud was a oity-dweller, yet in the oity he lived the 
isolated life of a deep, continuous, original soholar. 
Born in Meravia, whioh was tQ beoome part of Ozeohoalova-
kia, he was taken at the age of four to Vienna, and while he 
studied for a year in Paris and diad in axile in London, and 
while he travelled to Switzar.land, to Garmany and to America, 
he was a citizen of the Hapsburg Austria-Hungary, and a pro~ 
duot, and in part a product by negative reaction, of its vibrant, 
coamopQlitan capital, Vienna.l I£ we are to understand the 
thought o£ Freud it is important £or us to know something o£ 
Austria and something of its first city. Alt Wien. 
Moravia, or 39hemia, was a place of mountains gnd a place 
that reached far into Germany. on its upland slopes was the 
forest and along its valleys, near and between the villages, 
were the hop fields and the barley £ields, and over its towns 
and its cities there was factory smoke. It was an old, pros-
perous land and a land of devout, rooted catholics. 
Feasants were there, and peasant ways. And in its centers 
of population, of which Prague was the chief; there were frag-
ments of eulture, and the st~ulus of intellectual exchange. 
It was this land which the young impressionable boy knew 
as his home, and in keeping with his own later theories, it 
was this land that stocked the deeps of his unconscious. 
But Moravia was only one of the twelve parts of the old 
Hapsburg Empire and its language only one in twenty-one. The 
Hapsburgs had been its rulers s inca 1282, and while they were 
not to conquer by "partnership" the Magyars of Hungary until 
1867 - Freud•s eleventh year and his seventh in Vienna - and 
to make Austria-Hungary one o:f the five great powers o:f Europe, 
there was in Freud's early Austria a proud sense of destiny. 
And even in Moravia this was true. Indeed, eight years be:fere 
his birth this most northern province had made a bid :for in-
dependence and had almost succeeded. But the rulers of Austria 
1. Sachs, FMF, 18-38. 
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had tightene<l"' their grip, and in seeking a way to unify the 
country had sought to Germanize it. Thus it was that Freud 
learned, as the official language, German. But in the case 
of the Austrians the thinking remained Bavarisn rather than 
Prussian, and these Austrians, though Germanized, kept that 
"inner tenderness'' which the Viennese author, Ernst Lothar. 
bas portrayed so well.l 
Because the fortunes of Austria were so muah the for-
tunes of Freud, and its inner life one of the chief of the 
causes of his inner life, it is necessary to understand 
something of the country and its people and its history up 
to the year of his death, 1939. 
It was a land in which almost every variation ~ scen-
ery and climate could be found. On the west were the Tyrol. 
Alps, high enough to keep year-round glaciers; on the south 
were more mountains and the Balkan countries; on the east 
were the granite Carpathians, and to the north were the 
ranges of Moravia. It was an out-of-door land, and those 
who lived away from its cities were strong in body and stub-
born in mind. 
Through this land, and past the warm grain fields of 
the inner plain, flowed the Danube. .And from the city 
wharves of Vienna it took, in its boats, the produats of 
the faoteries, and when the boats came baok they brought 
the needed food-stuffs. 
It was a happy land, a land of work or rest, and of 
1. Lothar, AWT. 
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colorful holiday~. But with 1914 there came war 7 and fo~ years 
later a defeated Empire stood in cold, hungry silence and won-
dered w~at its future was to be. 
At the conference table the land was broken up and Austria, 
now smaller than the state of Maine and one-eighth the size of 
the old Empire, was made a republic. But while there was still 
the scenery ~&r tourists there was not enough to eat, and the 
people were restless. In their unrealistic dividing the Allies 
had sown dragon's teeth, and as Austria. in desperation, turned 
for relief to its blood-brother, Germany, it was forbidden by a 
frightened France and a suave Great Britain to negotiate. 
And then eame Hitler, and for some in Austria the Nazi way 
seemed the way to a future which woUld give the land some of its 
former glory. Not, however, the peasants, who wanted their way-
side crucifixes and all that they symbolized, nor yet the Vienna 
Seeialiats, whose bate noire was fascism, but the monarchists, 
the land-owners, the financially privileged and those who were 
likely to be so; and.,,. at the other e$:treme, the careless ones 
and those who were without hope. The privileged ones toyed with 
Nazi ideology and some went so far as to plot, while the hopeless 
ones, those with nothing to lose but their poverty and ~signif­
icanee, banded themselves into Nazi groups and studied the tac-
tics of brutality. 
Freud, who bad everything personal to lose if the swastika 
were to be raised over the Rathaus in Vienna, held intelligent 
fingers on the nation's pulse, and went steadily forward with 
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his researeh and his writing, 
In the early thirties the hunger and the unemployment in 
the land put Dol:fuss in the Ohan~ellery, and he,,was kept there 
by fascist and by cathelie support. But in 1934 the Soeialists 
revolted. and as they barricaded themselves in their apartment 
houses it took four days and CBJlll.Ol'l fire to dislodge them. The 
resUlt of this was the substitution of a dictatorship for the 
old parliamentary proced~es. 
Dolfuas was still in offioe, b~t he was anti-Nazi, and so 
in July, 1934 the young Austrian Na~is struek. Dolfuss was as-
sassinated and Hitler sent his hypocritical regrets. 
It was Italy, however, which for ita own safety's sake 
took the risk of mustering tbrea tening :frontier tro ope, and 
the Austrian Nazis deeided to wait. Sohuschnigg was made Ohan-
cellor and in 1936 he received :from Germany a solemn promise 
that Austria's sovereignty would be respected. But two years 
later Germany was ready to take action. Schusohnigg was ac-
oused of persecuting the "friends o:f Germany" in Austria, and 
after :frantic attempts to prevent it, he was swept aside by 
the next German move, an ul.timatum. He resigned and an Austrian 
Nazi, Spyss-Inquart, was installed in of:fio e. A :few hours later, 
and by "i;tvitation", German troops crossed the :frontier. and in 
a matter o:f days Oesterreich, the eastern realm. bad beeo:m.e 
Ostmark, the eastern province o:f Da~eich. 
This was in March, 1938. A few weeks later Freud and his 
:family crossed the English Channel and came to London. and there, 
,c ' ·~· ··:· .,-_- r ~ .• _.. • • • • , 
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as a refui~e~ he lived and worked until his death in 1939. 
But we have yet to speak of Vienna itself. For it was 
the city rather than the land of Austria that entered into 
his adult being and gave him, in spite of his quiet, schol-
arly ways, so much of taat rieh life whieh he bas shared with 
so many. 
Vienna, loeated between East and West and on a road of 
commerce, bad taxed the travelling merchants since the time 
of Christ. Rome bad sent its troops ·to this anoient site~ 
and it was here that Marcus Aurelius died.· Then Rome drew 
baek, and Attila and his Huns made it a stopptng-plaee. 
By 1237 the oity had suffioient strength and prestige 
to win a charter of freedotn from the ruler of the la.ndt and 
it was shrewdly there te reoeive the money-toll of the over-
land Crusaders. In 127& the Hapsburgs, who bad begun their 
long reign, ohose this place as a center of operation. And 
located as it ~as at a gateway to both East and West, it 
bore the brunt of the Mohammedan attaoks when, in the 16th 
and 17th eenturies, the T'tlrks pushed into Europe. With the 
help of the Foles it held them back. 
It was in 1814, howevert that Vienna became a city of 
the first magnitude, for to its streets and halls there came 
the statesmen who were to redistribute the Europe which bad 
been wrested from Napoleon. The deliberations were under 
the leadership of Metternioh, and one suspects that the bril-
lianoe and gaiety of the oco~sion te~ted all concerned to 
prolong the sessions. It was the Vienna which was to become 
69 
a nostalgic memory; the Vienna of mirrored ballrooms and vivid 
uniforms and flowing gowns, the Vienna of the Beautiful Blue 
Danube, and gracefUl gaiety and intense romance. 
And as Freud waa growing up, the orowds along the Rtng-
strasse were as alive and as cosmopolitan as they had been in 
the days of Metternioh. 
This Ringstrasse, a boulevard which was one hundred and 
fifty feet wide, had walks and carriage roads and a bridle 
path, and along or around its two miles of road - it circled 
the old trinner aityn - were to be found, in a deliberate va-
riety of architectural styles, the new buildings of the city. 
The Hapsburgs, with space and money to werk with, had been 
lavish, and for Freud and all the world to see, there was the 
Grecian Parliament Building, the Gothic City Hall, the Ren-
aissance University - his university - and, a short oarri~ge­
drive away. the state-supported Opera, the Academy of Art and 
the Palace and the Library of the King. 
Within the cirole of this boulevard there lay the older 
city where, in a matter of minutes, a traveller could drop 
back and range through si% centuries. The streets were 
croaked and the buildings, some of them, fUll of the past. 
It was here the people oame shopping, and it was here at five 
in the afternoon that all Vienna sat down to coffee~ Fer these 
apartment-dwelling Viennese and these visitors from the suburbs 
or :from other l.ands, conver~tion over coffee cups was an 
institution, The merchant~ met in their :favorite spots and 
discussed tomorrow's prices, and the ~;~tudents and artists 
and musioians met in their's, and drew thoughts :from the ends 
of the earth, and from their own lively minds. 
outside the city there were spacious parks, and to one 
of these, several miles to a side; the city came to cele-
brate its holidays. There, by day and by night, there were 
the circuses and menageries and the busy, carefree restau-
rants and the crowds. 
For the Viennese who wanted music, and who took it 
seriously, this was the city Gf Beethoven. and Mozart and 
Schube:t>t and Strauss and Haydn and :Brahms, and those who had 
succeeded them. And for those who wanted the :frontiers of 
medicine, there was Barney and there was Wagner~Jauregg, 
both of them winners of the Nobel prize, and there was Sigmund 
Freud, a "Privat~dozent" and then "Professor Extraordinarus~ 
and finally - and Sachs says it was shamefacedly conferred 
when Freud had become world~:famous1 - "Professor Ordinaru.s" 
in the Neurological Department of the University, and the 
founder and chief inspiration of "Psychoanalysisn:, 
... '· &:• Sigmund Freud.: the thought-world which informed and inspired 
hi~; a general statement. 
Randall, in his The making of the Modern Mind gives as 
"the. two great dominating concepts .o:f the science of the 
l. Se.ohs, FMF, 77-.78. 
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last century" universal mechanism a:p.d meob,anistic evolution.l 
Dampi.er-Whetham, who writes on the history o:f science explains 
these phrases and shows the modern sources of the concepts. 2 
We shall summarize from this last writer. 
Newton, in the l8t.tl century, building EJpeeifieally upon 
the earlier Galilee, and seeking to a.ecount for all the motion 
in the universe, saw this motion as the resq.l t of mas.s ·.in a 
pattern of dynamic relationships. He was oare:fnl enough to 
show the limitations of his attempted synthests of former an4 
of current :findings, but certain scientist~ who followed him 
generalized to the point a:f finding man to be a machine in a 
mechanistic universe. -And as part o:f this theory we have 
d~terminism, a elosed oause-and-e:ffeet universe. 
Those who, :for egoistic or for wis'e reasons; eoUld not 
accept sueh a. world tried various ways of e~eape. Seme 
stressed the :fact~ which was not _as obvious tQ eertaia thinkers 
as it should have been, that seienoe gave not reality but an 
aspect of reality, or reality-once-removed. Others said we 
can accept this and that, Looked at in one way, man is deter-
mined; looked at in another way, he is :free. And a third 
group, the idealists and others in philosophy, were so busily 
engaged in their own systematizing that they did not at first 
think it necessary to listen to the voiee of the new sciences. 
1. Bandall, MMM, 459. 
2. Dampier ... whetham, HS, vii-:xvii; 324-330. 
~eud did not £eel that he needed to take any one o£ these 
avenues of "escape"• 
But in spite of the £ollow~rs of Kant and of Regel -
the third group we have mentioned ~ a new philosophy began 
to gain ground; one based. on the Newtonian hypothesis"·· ~d 
eertain of these new science-philosophers came to believe 
that their Cause would sweep everything before it; all theol-
ogy, all metaphysics~ all superstition, all illusion, and 
indeed, most, i£ not all of man's seeming limitations •.. 
And then came Darwin~ and those who were looking for 
evidence to support their mechanistic philosophy seemed to see 
in his principle of natural selection the determiner of the 
generations of men. Man dropped very neatly into place in 
their unified universe. Man had been made to fit this place, 
admittedly, a place of prominence. by a blind force, and his 
future depended upon this irresistible push from behind; and, 
in some way which did not qu~te fit into their system, upon 
his use of reason. This :push, of which we spoke, was not 
seen as the beginnings of a vitalistic philosophy but rather 
as a mechanical part or function within a machine-like system. 
And so biology was brmught within the circle of this 
mechanistic interpretation, and very soo~ the causes in the 
world o£ physics and chemistry were seen to produce the e£~eots 
seen in the physiological and psychical realms. We write it 
thus because a psycho-physical parallelism held sway, with the 
ttmindtr having the status of an epiphenomenon. 
"15 
Darwin himsel~ was mor& cautious in the setting forth 
o~ his theories than were many who expounded him. For exam~ 
ple, Haeckel of Jena, who preached the doctrine of DarwinismU$, 
and who used it to undergird an in~luential system of thought 
that was both mechanistic and materialistic; and indeed, monis-
tic and, if not atheistic, at least agnostic. There is no log-
ical reason why all of these beliefs should be found together, 
but because they were held by certain strong, nineteenth cen-
tury scientists, others who wished to be "soientifie" thought 
it necessary to hold them; and those who read these scientists 
thought it necessary to reject them, if they were offeniad in 
part, in an all-or-nothing fashion. This has caused much 
misunderstanding between the scientific and the non-scientific 
disciplines. 
Before the a.ppearanee of Darwinian evolution, however, 
Biobner, in Germany, was writing his Kraft und Stoff and 
finding, in these two entities, a basis for his own mater-
ialism. And unless a person be a trained thinker, or unless 
he be living consciously and intentionally within a spiritual 
frame of reference, materialism would seem to be the common-
sense view. And living in a highly eompetitive society one 
could the more easily aooept the principle of natural selec-
tion, And Europe, in Darwin's time was, at least from an eeo-
nomio point of view, highly competitive, 
As we turn to the field of psychology in this nineteenth 
oentury, we find that it was at first rational, but that it 
was forced more and more tQ take note of the new empirical 
methods and findings. The ehief of the changes did not lie 
~ the method of handling material, but in the material to 
be handled. 
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German psychology, in keeping with contemporary German 
habits of scholarship, had sought to relate itself to other 
fields of thought, and to be part of an ultima. te world vi,ew, 
and this will account, in :part, for the ~do::ption, not mer,ely 
of the scientific method in :psychology, but for certain de-
rived concepts as an inseparable :part of the science of psy-
chology~ And the method, that is to say useienee at work", 
seemed to point to the fact that being qua being was mater~ 
ial; there was constant, :pragmatic evidence for holding such 
a belief. 
As we have seen, science was synonymous, :for many, with 
a mechanistic interpretation of :process as well, and monism 
seemed most rational, and atheism or agnosticism most obvious. 
Biehner and Haeekel, who wrote with persuasive clarity, and 
who ~ote for laymen to understand, held all of these views, 
and for decades every student scientist, at least, was fa.-
miliar with them, and for the reasons which they had put 
forth for believing as they did, And rreud too, both directly 
and through his medical colleagues and companions learned 
these conclusions, and for the most part seemed to accept 
them as self-evident truths. 
In looking at this nineteenth century, Whitehead states 
that its faith was derived ~rom three sources, the romantia 
movement, the gathering advance o£ science and the advance 
'li 
of teahnology. 1 We have stressed only the seoend of these, 
beoause it was this, the gathering advanae of saienee, al-
most to the exolusion of the other twe whieh gave Freud his 
faith. Kierkega~d derived his faith from yet another souroe, 
and one that comes with judgment to these other three, from 
God made -living for us in Jesus Christ, Freud would not have 
understood Kierkegaard in thist but would have found for him 
a oategory in the field of the abnormal, or at least, the 
non-natural. Kierkegaard woul.d have appreeiated F~eud as a 
specialist, but would have understood his meta~syohologieal 
genera.liBations as further evidenoe of man's nee(l. :for the 
truth of God. 
Whitehead also states, in oovering much the same ground 
as has Dampier-Whetbam, that in the nineteenth oentury ":four 
great novel ideas were introduced inte theoretioal soienee.u2 
And all four of them woul.d seem to have been basie for Freud, 
and even for the Freud who was at work in the thirties of the 
twentieth century. 
These ideas were that there is ua field of pbysioal ao-
tivity pervading all spaee," that "ordinary matter is atomic 
in structure and in funotion," that energy is convertible 
(we already had the doctrine o£ the conservation of energy, 
with the seoond law of thermodynamics to take care of the 
1. Whitehead, SMW, 97. 
2. Whitehead, SMW, 99. 
energy that bas become non~available), and fourth, a belief 
in the doctrine of evolution.l 
Freud as a psychologist would work it out thus - and 
we s.hiUl borrow from Guide to Modern Thought by o. E. M. 
Joad for what follows - a mental event has behind it a 
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cerebral event, and since both are taking plaee in a cause 
and ef:feot system, we can discover a reason for these events 
in something which has happened within the body or to the 
body. So at any given moment a person is the end result o:f 
these stimuli, beginning with what has been inherited; or 
rather, the result of a series of udeterminedn i:f not meohan-
ioal responses to these stimuli#· Where any v~iation has 
come into the picture it has been because o:f chance, chance 
within the mind, or ehanee in the affecting external environ-
ment, Knowing that there is this chain of causation between 
the material condition and the mental consequence, our busi-
ness is to learn the la~ of matter. When we know these suf-
ficiently, we s~l not only be able to describe, but to 
predict,2 
This is not, perhaps, as Freud would have worded it, but 
something very close to this. stands, we believe, behind his 
system of psychoanalysis. 
3. Sigmund ~eud: the shaping of his ideas as a student and as 
an instructor. 
In his Autobiogra;phy Freud says t 
1. Whitehead, SMW, 99, 
2, Joad, GMT, 38. 
"When I was a c~ild of four I eame to Vienna, 
and !.went through the whole of my education there, 
At the 'Gymnasium' I was at the top of my class · 
for seven ye~s; I enjoyed special privileges 
there, and was1required to pass seB.l"cely any examinations.u 
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In his book The Angel with the Trumpet, by the Austrian 
author, Ernst Lothar, a long novel.whioh covers the period in 
Vienna :from 1888 to the entry of Hitlerls forces into the 
city in 1938, we have a chapter on the "humanistic education" 
of one of the chief characters, Hans~2 The description o:f Gym-
nasium li:fe, which must have been something like that of Freud•s, 
shows the strain of competition at entrance e:gaminations, the 
~igid lines of benches in the rooms, the ink-stained desks, 
the lithographs of the Emperor, Franz Joseph, on the walls, 
Herr Professor glaring through thick lenses and setting, 
with preciseness and with aloofness, the work to be done at 
home- The Municipal School Council made the rules :for dis-
cipline and for curriculum and it was the teaoher 1 s concern 
/ 
to see that they were kept. There were tests almost every 
day, and the laggaras were subject to the usual penalties and 
to a flow of heavy, personal, authoritarian sarcasm. The 
students were :forbidden "to smoke, imbibe alooholio drinks, 
join societies, or publish any of their own vvritings.n3 
Freud's experience at the Gymnasium seems to have been 
happier than that o:f Hans, but many o:f the same sights and 
sounds and smells must have been his. Later in this same 
1. Freud, AF, 9. 
2. Lothar, AWT; 116. 
3. Lothar, AWT, 117. 
book. Hans registers at_ the university for a course with 
Freud.1 
Freud's family was not well-to-do, but he had the full 
support of his father as he weighed the various professions 
and tried to decide which to choose. He preferred human 
nature to nature. and influenced by ~ school friend, thought 
seriously of law. But Darwin's On the Origin of Species and, 
in partieular, Goethe's essay on Nature, decided him to be-
come a medical student. This was in 187~, and Freud was 
seventeen years old. 
He tells us that at the university he was made by some· 
to feel that because he was ·a Jew he was therefore both in-
ferior and an alien. But he was unwilling to accept either 
of these opinions and was able to us~ this opposition to 
develop a marked independence of judgment. It may be too -
though he does not say so - that this opposition encouraged 
him to prove himself by strenuous work. But the culture 
pattern being what it was - Sachs says that Austria was con-
trolled by eighty families2 ~ even brilliance and produc-
tivity would not open eertain professional doors. However, 
this may have served to deliver him from certain distracting 
ambitions, onoe he had learned to live by the reality of the 
situation, and to rel&ase him for concentration in those 
areas where he could work unhindered and with hope. 
l. Lothar, AWT. 205-208. 
2. Sachs, FMF, 26. 
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His ability was recognize~ by_ certain of his teachers, 
and part· ·way through his medical training he was given a 
minor post in the laboratory of the great physiologist, 
rr Ernst Bruoke. He was put to work on a problem in the ner-
vous system, which he carried even further than he was re-
quired to do. He was at this work and at similar investi-
gations from 1876 to 1862, that is, from his twentieth to 
his twenty-sixth year, and there was the expectation among 
his friends and fellow-workers that he had found his pro~ 
fession. Along with his laboratory duties he carried £or-
ward his medioal studies, and in 1681 took his medical 
degree. 
It was Br~ake himself, however, who, ~ the interests 
of his young helper, advised Freud to leave laboratory work. 
For while he had ability, the difficulties of an almost 
olosed system, socially speaking, wouli not permit him to 
advance as a physiologist as far as he might wish to go. 
Freud followed his teacher's advice and became a junior 
resident physician in the General Hospital in Vienna~ This 
would give him a broad training, and put him_ into toueh with 
many fields of interest and with many persons. His whole 
future would be more secure, and from an opportunity point 
of view, more as he would like it to be. 
However, he had brought with him to the Hospital a 
specialized knowledge and certain specialized techniques 
and very soon he was again at work on the nervous system. 
-----------~------------------------------------~ 
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And as he worked in a wider werld, but in just as. oonaan-
trated a fashion as he had done in the laborator~, he began 
to see that whatever else he wished to do, he did not wieh 
to do broad work, but deep work. He was later to attempt 
both, but he was at his best when focusing up.on a pa:r:ttio'lllar 
problem. To quote Sacha again! 
"Freud knew what it meant to be dominated 
b~ one despotic idea, but he considered it a neeessa.r~ condition :for ever~ great e:xploit.nl 
.As was the academic ousto!Il, he reported the progress 
of his hospital research in scientific papers, and a com-
plete bibliography of his writings today shows several im-
pe:r1:iant contributions which were all made before psyehoanaly-
sis had come into being. 
He seemed to be in line fo.r an appointment to lecture 
on the physiology of the nervous system, but he did not 
feel that this was the road he wished to travel, and when 
tactful approaches were madet asking him his wishes in the 
matter, he replied, just as tactfUlly, that that would not 
be his interest~ 
Meanwhile, he had begun a study of nervous diseases, 
not only because of a developing personal interest, but be-
eause the field, in Vienna, seemed to be anything but over-
In line with this he began to report on oases of ner-
vous illness, eases which, at first, had as one of the 
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eauses an obvious organio~a1adjustment or deficiency, and 
gradua1ly he mastered the knowledge and the theories that 
then e:xis ted. 
Re began to establish a reputation fo~ himself in this 
baffling field, and to attract attention even from abroad 
for his diagnostic skill, but as yet he had had little to d~ 
with the neuroses. On one occasion, however. when faced by 
a certain deceptive type o~ neurosis, he ventured a diagnosis 
baaed on an organic cause, and as there were always those 
wt~~.e. 
who~ eager to find him wrong, his mistake was heavily under-
scored, and he was again reminded that he was working under 
a "racial" hand.ioap. But it had the effeet of causing him 
to look more closely at the aetiologioal theories of the 
neuroses. In 1985, when he was twenty-nine, the university 
authorities had sufficient confidence in him to appoint him 
as a lecturer on neuropathology. 
It had been his hope to obtain official status in this 
field, and now that he had it' he turned to the next part of 
his plan. It was, to travel to Paris to discover what the 
great Charcot was saying about the neuroses, With the help 
" of Professor Brueke he obtained leave of absence and a trav-
eling scholarship, and in the autumn of 1885 came to Oharoot•s 
Oli:r:).io in Paris. 
A short time afterwards, knowing that Oharoot was look-
ing for someone to translate his lectures into German, Freud 
offered to do so and his offer was accepted, This meant 
that Freud had more pe~sonal contact with Charcot and with 
those around him who were at work. both theoretically and 
practically. on nervous diseases. 
Freud was particularly interested in Charcot's investi-
gation of hysteria. The medical world of the day was in• 
clined to be somewhat scornful of the victims of hysteria. 
thinking it a form of deception and a woman's illness, but 
Charcot had shown that it was frequently to be found in men, 
and that it was quite genuine. Mereover he was able to de-
monstrate that the symptoms of hysteria could be produced or 
removed with the use of hypnosis! 
Charcot, however, was not as interested in understanding 
the psychology of the neuroses as the data seemed to suggest, 
for he was basically a worker with the body, but Freud 1 s 
alert mind stored away everything that he saw and heard and 
worked over it with a persistent curiosity. "He spoke with 
warmth and gratitude of_Ohaxcot," says Sachs, "as a truly 
great man and teacher wha had encouraged the unknown stran-
ger by admitting him to the oirele of his intimate disoiples".l 
The Faria training finished, Freud crossed to Berlin 
and during his short time there learned all that he could 
about the nervous diseases of children. One result was a 
number of monographs on the subject, but they were all writ-
ten from a physiologie.al point of view. These too are to be 
1. Sachs, FMF, 47~ 
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~und in the early part ef his bibliography. That they had 
merit in the eyes of his contemporaries, we know from cer-
tain assignments which were later given to him. · 
In 1886 he returned to Vienna, married, and began to 
treat nervous diseases almost exclusively. He reported on 
his Paris experience to his fellow-doctor~ but was told in 
point-blank fashion that what he had to say about Oharcot 1 s 
induced hysteria just wasn 1 t true. The profession was chem-
ically and materialistically oriented, and here was an alien 
cause, "mind", thrusting its way into the closed system. 
In an attempt to prove his point, and to awaken an in-
terest in this new approach, Freud presented a case of hys-
teria, and a man at that, which he had found in Vienna. He 
was not more interested in "mind" as a non-material entit.Y 
and cause than were his fellow doctors, but he wished to 
demonstrate the phenomena he bad witnessed and to work with 
others to find an explanation. His demonstration of symptom-
formation and removal was successful. There was a round of 
applause, the demonstration hall cleared - and the whole 
thing was, apparently, forgotten. It was as if his col-
leagues had agreed that they would have no further interest 
and this caused him to work more by himself than he might 
otherwise have done. It brought additional loneliness, but 
it also brought the results of intense concentration.l 
1. Freud, AFt 24. 
In his treatments at this time he was using electro-
therapy and A1Pnotismt but these were not as satisfaotor.y 
as he wished. Nor did the standard authorities in the 
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field of nervous diseases seem to him, on the basis o~ the 
empirical knowledge that he had gained in Paris and in his 
own consulting ro em, to be adequate in the eJrplanations and 
recommendations. Electrotherapy, though elaborately covered 
by a theory, and by the details of administration, seemed, 
when one was really behind the scenes, to be chiefly an aid 
to suggestion. Hypnotism was better; it gave not only some 
immediate and effective results, but seemed to bring one 
into touch with so much more of the person being treated, 
but on the ather hand, in some oases he could not produce 
the deep hypnotic state whioh a treatment seemed to re-
quire, and in others it was not possible to induce any 
state of hypnotism. 
Wllile he was considering these di:ffieulties, it was 
reported that at Nancy, in France, Liebault, nthe simple 
provincial dootor who without personal ambition and un-
aided by the trained staff of a Clinic had the courage 
to help his patients by hypnonisnl, and his colleague, 
Bernheim, were :perfecting the technique of hypnosis. In 
order to understand more about this strange subject, Freud 
spent the summer of 1889 at the Nanoy center. He learned 
much, and Liebault became his favorite. 
1. Sachs, FMF, 47. 
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The thin~ that impressed him repeatedly, in the e~eri­
ments in post-hypnotic suggestion, was the way in which a 
person could be very strongly and very speci£ioally motivated 
by a oaus e which was and which rem.a:LJ::).ed hidden somewhere in 
the depths o£ the nmindu. Indeed, the patients who were 
hypnotized and given the suggestion that when they had awak-
ened they would per£orm such and such a task, would not only-
do so, and do so when they had been told to do so, but when 
questioned, and even when not questioned,. tb.ey would find 
most plausible neonsciousn reasons for doing so. .And Freud 
learned, too, that even the e~ert, Bernheim, had a certain 
percentage of complete failures in his attempts to hypnotize; 
that, for some reason, certain persons could not be reached, 
and so treated, in this way. This suggested the need for a 
way to treat these others, and so the possibility of a dif-
ferent and more co~rehensive method. 
Wit~ these new experiences in mind, experiences which 
demanded hypotheses other than those that were in existence, 
either in Austria or in France, Freud returned to Vienna and 
to fttrther experimentation. 
Ten years before a Viennese physician, Josef Breuer, 
had discovered an entirely new method of treating hysteria. 
A girl had come to him with various symptoms, all o:f them 
severe, and in a moment o:f speculative insight, Breuer be-
gan to link these symptoms to a traumatic event in the girl's 
life. Her :father, whom she bad been nursing, had died, and 
the scene, in which she waS-not merely a spectator but an ao-
tive participant, had been so unpleasant that the girl had, in 
all sinoeri ty • "forgottenrr it. But it woul.d not allow itself 
to be forgotten, and the girl 1s symptoms were the direct and 
closely related consequences. Breuer, using hypnotic methods~ 
made the girl reoall the details of the event and live it 
through again with full emotion. And when this· had taken place 
the symptoms disappeared., Breuer, not realizing just what had 
happened in the process, or because he was not of the same pio-
neering spirit as was Freud, went no further. However, some ten 
years later he recalled what he had done and began to collaborate 
with Freud in the use of the method. The resUlt of their work to-
gether was a book, under joint authorship and published in 1895. 
In this book there was not only a description of the 
method used and a reporting of results, but an e:x:planatory 
theory; namely, tbe theory of ttoatharsiarr. Fut very simply 
this meant that emotional energy can be expressed, not only 
directly but indirectly as well, or in place o:f direct expres-
sion. For instance, in the case of the girl, the horror and 
grief were so great that direct expression was too painfUl. 
They were expressed, therefore, and without a conscious de-
cision on the part of the girl that the shift should take 
place, in the form of symptoms of hysteria. To remove the 
symptoms, therefore, it was necessary to help the girl under-
stand what had happened, and, most important, to allow the 
horror and grief to be expressed as horror and grief. This 
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re&l,.-istia, oathartie expression was called "abreaationn. To 
genera1ize t~om this, it was tho~ght that the symptoms of 
hysteria were, t~erefore, s~bstitutes for unpleasant or feared 
conscious expressions. 
But how was this eathartio abreaotion to be brought about? 
HYPnotism bad shown its limitations, and suggestion was oer-
tainly not enough. 
At this point Breuer backed away from his material and 
his theorizing once again, and Freud was left to go on alone. 
He did so, and began to experiment w1 th what came to be cal1-
'/.ed ":free assooiation." The patient was instructed to say 
anything and everything that was suggested to him by his own 
t~bling thoughts, and, the theory bad it, because all think-
ing and imagining, even the most bizarre and fragmentary, is 
taking plaoe in an inner world in whioh cause and effeet and 
further effect are in an unbroken sequence, some of these 
products of free assooiation, and espeoially the more emo-
tional ones, can be traoed baokward or downward to signi:f-
ioant events and attitudes; and they would be pulled, by 
this very process, into the light of consciousness where 
consciousness could deal with them • 
.And so we have the beginnings of "psychoanalysis n. 
At first it was a method of treating nervous diseases. 
Later it beeame, at least in the eyes of the psyohoanal-
ysts, a seienoe of unconsoious mental processes. Later 
still the workers in this :field began to give more atten-
tion to conscious mat~rial and, beginning with Freud's 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life, to the normal workings 
of the mind. It began too to apply its findings and its 
theories in many other fields. Ernest Jones in his Psl-
choanalysis has dealt briefly with its application in Med-
icine, Education, Anthropology, Sociology, Politics, Crim-
inology and Law, Art and Literature, Mythology, Folklore 
and Superstition, and Religion. 
Certain of these findings and beliefs and applica-
tions will concern us in later sections of the disserta-
tion. In what is to follow this very brief historical 
statement we shall see how Freud, early in his career and 
again at its close, related his developing system of psy-
choanalysis to the data of religion. 
4. Sigmund Freudt His appraisal of the data of religion and 
the implications for our study. 
a a 
R. s. Lee, the Vicar of an Anglican Church in O~ford, 
England, wrote far his doctoral dissertation a study which 
was published in 1948 under tbe title Freud and Ohristianity. 
Gregory Zilboorg, a medical historian and an interpreter 
of the life and thought of Freud, considers the title to be 
unfortunate. For it, and certainly the contents of the 
book, suggest that there are psychoanalysts and Christians. 
Zilboorg does not see why they should be made mutually 
exclusive terms. ":Psychoanal,ysis," he wri tea, nis not an 
apostate or heretical sect, or a pagan doctrine, nl but it 
1. Zilboorg, SF, 115. 
89 
is a scientific discipline and therefore is not to be compared 
with that philosophy of life and of existence which we have in 
the Christian Church. 
And yet for all this we do find Freud speaking, and speak-
~g dogmatically about the ethico-religious beliefs of the west-
ern world, and his conclusions are linked by an undeniable logio 
with that theory of reality and that theory of knowledge whioh 
undergird and produ.ee his theories o:f human pathoJ.:·ogy. 
The ohie:f of the books in which Freud bas stated his posi-
tion with regard to religion are The Future of an Illusion, 
published in 1927, and Moses and Msnotheism, published in 1939. 
But there are very definite and very typical statements made 
about religion in his paper on nobsessive Aots and Religious 
Practices", published in 1907; his "Psycho-Analytical Notes 
upon an autobiographical account of a case o:f Paranoia (demen-
tia paranoides) u, published in 1911; Totem and Taboo, pub~shed 
in 1913; his Autobiography, published in 1924; "A Religious 
Experieneen related to him by an American professor, and com-
mented upon by him in 1928; Civilization and its Discontents, 
published in 1929 - for instance, statements made in Chapter 
1; and in Ohapte.r 7 of the New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
analysis, published in 1933,. 
Very briefly put, as a doctor is against illness so was 
Freud, in his conception of the mature person, against relig-
ion of any kind. It is not merely childish, something to be 
grown away from, but it comes to its most deceiving form as 
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a full blo~ neurosis in the adult. It is necessary for us to 
unde~stand that it does not give growth but prevents growth •. 
And in order to be rid of it, we must understand its origin, 
the psychological reason for it, both in the long history of 
the race and in the psychological development of a contempo-
rary person who may be exposed to it. 
Primitive man was threatened from two sides, f~em~the 
unprediotable, unmanageable world of nature, and from the 
depths of his own being. Here were his Seylla and his Cha-
rybdis. If he were to steer a safe course between these 
two active dangers he needed help, and he needed it ~om 
outside himself. He therefore, in an unconscious fashion, 
projected the Helper he needed outside himself, fashioning 
it by his wish for security in that place snd at that time 
when this became necessary. And having created God in the 
image of his own need, he was able, strangely enough, to 
draw inspiration from his conscious relationship with It. 
And yet this is, perhaps, not so strange. For every art-
ist has been able, at one time or another, to find nourish-
ment in the e ontemplation of his own production. And how 
mueh the more it would be possible if the production were 
as great as "God", and if the artist had forgotten or had 
never known, consciously, that he bad produced it. 
But there was a price to be paid for this security; 
namely, the price of remaining unreal. For to be relig-
ious is to be caught in the mesh of unreality - reality, 
for Freud, being the obvioU§, external world of persons and 
animals and things, 
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Thus religion in the individual or the group isf at the 
very least, the survival of a neurosis in the raoe. It gives 
protection of a sort; keeps one from breaking under the threats 
and attacks from the inner and outer world; worlds which are 
man•s enemy as long as he is ignorant of their true nature. 
It may be that in ancient times a very necessary purpose was 
served by religion, and the tensions of religion have been 
responsible for a great part of our culture, but now, in this 
twentieth century when scientific enlightenment is possible, 
religion can only keep us from the truth, And scientific en~ 
lightenment would, of course, include the methods and findings-
to-date of psychoanalysis, 
There is no doubt that the fearful uncertainties of life 
have had much to do with shaping the kind of religion which 
is empirically present in history. And projection and per-
sonification are too common, as nmental meohanismsn, to be 
denied a place in this very personal and very important thing, 
religion. Bat even from very early times there has been an-
other strand, and one that Freud seems to have entirely over-
looked. Man has not only sought to enter into a placating 
and manipulating relationship with his gods, but he has sought 
and found, with them, a deep, fearless, lasting fellowship, 
Theoretically, this does not disprove the projection 
theory of the origin of the gods, but unless we admit this 
other motive £or religion, and study its actual and tremen-
dous consequences in the history of the race, we have no 
right to make sweeping generalizations about religion, whether 
they be negative or positive. There are some who believe 
that that whieh is best in religion baa come, not as man has 
been afraid o£ God, but as he has learned to love Him. And 
by nbestn is meant, humble, consecrated, productive, loving 
and realistic in the moment-to-moment issues o£ li£e. And 
Freud at his best would certainly approve of character traits 
suoh as these. In hie treatment of ret~gion Freud is not 
only unashamedly reduotive, withou.t onoe seeing the fallaey 
of reductionism, but in his actual observations he has over-
looked more than half of the data. 
But to go back to the Freudian account of religion - man, 
in search of those powers which intimacy oan give, and in or-
der that he might be released from the desperation of restless 
doubt, oame, gradually, to reduce the number of his projected 
gods to one. And then, in this monotheism, a selection was 
made from among all of the possible relationships with tb~s 
One, a selection which gave, :pragmatically, the best results 
in a fearful situation. And the beet analogy to e:xpress .this 
selected relationship was that of the father and the child. 
So God became nour Father". 
A fear of the world outside would have been sufficient 
to give rise to such a religion, a monotheistic Father-child 
religion, but there was this other fear which primitive man 
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had to deal with as well. -And the cause of this seoond fear 
lay, as we have seen, in the inescapable inner life of each 
indiviclual. For man found - and we say "mann because Freud 
believed that his theories applied to all men - that he was 
driven at times by terrible, seemingly inexhaustible forees 
within himself, driven to the doing of many costly things. 
These "instinctual" drives must also be dealt with, and dealt 
with in such fashion that there would be no painful, bQome-
rang effects. 
And as man learned what he could do and what he oould 
not do, in response to the urgings from within and the reac-
tions from without as he gave expression to these drives, so 
did he begin to be a moral being. Gradually, over the·gene-
rations, the resUlts of man's experiments, both his despera-
tion e~eriments and his experiments of curiosity, were sys-
tematized, and handed on. And to add to the growing body of 
remembered experience there were the tough,:oonstant, relent-
less expectations of others. Then, and again gradually, these 
expectations of others, of society, of impersonal culture, 
and eapeeially the expectations of the child's parents, were 
taken into the growing person and so, through this process of 
intro~eotion, the outer beoame a part of the inner·system, 
and the origin was forgotten, the person claiming it and 
obeying it as his own •. With this new and changing inner 
formation - though change was very slow - as a ~udging and 
as an initiating norm, man ~egan to think of himself as moral 
er immoral. 
The authority given to this dynamic inner judge was 
tremendous~ It was even called by some the voie.e o£ Ged. 
And what might be called the functioning administrator in 
this built-in system of exp~ctations and ezperienoe-results 
came, in time, to be known as the conscience~ Fer Fraud the 
sys~em is greater than what is ordinarily called the con-
science and even the conscience 1st in part, unconscious~ 
Fer re~sons which we oan readily understand as we see a 
child in the living oontezt ot aduJ.. t "shalls" and "shalt 
nets", and as we remember that every adult was once a child 
similarly placed, this conscience, this organ o£ morality, 
woUld be given, in a patriarchal culture such as Freud was 
studying, mueh content £rom the £igu:re of the £ather in the 
family. And so morality and religion are £ound to be at one 
in the source of their chief authority figure. In a patri-
archy, father-ness would come to the child both as the most 
likely attribute of the personified authority within and the 
demanding and also personified figure without who can, if Re 
be properly approached, give help! 
Freud does not say so, but it may be that we have here 
the psychological beginnigs of the theological concepts o£ 
immanence and transcendence; immanenee because of the autho-
rity given to the introjected One and transcendence because 
of the authority given to the projected one. And each would 
be identified With eaeh in the one Father-concept, making 
monotheism deeply and psyehologieally ooherentt and accep-
table and perhaps necessary, 
We shall have more to say about Freud and religion when 
we are considertng his concept o:f the soul, but, given these 
theories~ what might we e%peot him to say about the soul? 
First, they would suggest that i:f Freud is interested in 
religion enly in this fashion and to this eztent he is not 
likely to be too interested in "soul" as a religious eoneept. 
That is, unless he oounts the soul-eonoept as a nerve-oenter 
in the body of that whio~ he wishes to destroy, a particularly 
vUlnerable spot, and therefore a spot worth knowing. 
Second, they would suggest that since he has, most of 
his adult life, rejected religion as being unreal, he has 
been out off from many ef those who are best qualified to 
talk with htmt as learned man to learned man, about religion; 
in other words, that his opinions about religion would be 
likely to be based, not on the central pedestal of its thought, 
but upon illy-wrought out-works, whieh woUld interest him as 
a student of the abnormal; and upon the opinions of those who, 
as prejudiced or unprejudiced wo~kers, are attempting to 
understand religion from without. 
And thirdly, his theories may suggest that we shall have 
to 10ok for much that others would include under the data of 
religion with traditional religious names attached, in his 
eystem under other na,mea. He may disagree with concepts and 
interpretations of religion, but his study is still man. 
.And man has been, for tens of thousands of years, a relig-
ious animal.. 
We shall find, I believe, that Freud i$ not interested 
in nsonlu as a religious eoneept, nor yet as a point of at-
taok on the enemy lines. We shall find that in his gathering 
of material for an understanding of religion he has dr~wn 
heavily from anthropology, but that otherwise his sources 
have been very poor. And we shall find that there is in his 
system a term whioh includes muoh that has been found in the 
traditional. nsonl", namely, nl)syohio a.ppa,ratus 11 • 
OH.APTER III 
An Eramination of the Concept of the Soul in Kierkegaard 
1. Previous research and summary of conclusions. 
In the forty-sf% references consulted. including the 
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introductory statements to the translated works of Kierke-
gaard. there are only a few which make a direct contributi~n 
to our stttay. However. many other writers .have dealt in 
general with that area of thought in whieh Kierkegaard 1 s 
ooneept of the soul might be e%peeted to be found; namely. 
the nature of man, both psychologically and theologically 
oonsidered. We shall borrow, therefore. from these indirect 
contributors as well as from the direct. We shall eonsider 
them aaphabetioally and by author only unless it will not 
be clear. in the bibliography to this dissertation, whioh 
referenee is being consUlted. 
Aldworth and Ferrie who have made one of the transla-
tions of Consider the Lilies, remind us, and reminding is 
very important, that in considering any of Kierkegaard's 
statements we must note whether or not he is speaking in 
his own name or in the name of one of the invented eharao-
tars or pseudonymous authors through which he gives us his 
indirect impartations. Kierkegaard himself makes it clear 
that he is not to be held personally responsible for the 
truth of any of these invented utterances. And this is 
reasonable~ For who, in writing a book about Satan, would 
wish to be considered a disci:ple? AnQ. the "authors" o:f 
many of Kierkegaard's books must be ~eated as characters 
within them. We shall have to remember this as we seek to 
discover his own idea of the concept "soul". 
Attwater, in the introduction to the book which he 
edits, considers Kierkegaard to be one of the company of 
modern, Ohristian revolutionaries. For in mind and spirit, 
Kierkegaard was most radical, and the Christianity for which 
he poured out his abundant nervous energy, and, in a deep 
sense, laid down his life, was greatly different :from the 
established, complacent Christianity of his workshop. Den-
mark; and different, too, from most of those beliefs and 
praotioes which passed for "6bristendom". We would expect, 
therefore, that in his conceptualizing Kierkegaard would 
also be radioal, but in his use of the word nsoul" that is 
not so. 
Blackham, while he speaks o:f Kierkegaard as being "the 
boldest and the greatest of existentialist thinkers"l is not 
altogether sympathetic in his exposition. Nor does he help 
us to understand Kierkegaard's use of the term "soul". He 
is more concerned to set forth the thought o:f Kierkega.ard 1s 
philosophic works than those which give us his religious 
psy-chology. 
Ohanning~Pearae, writing on Kierkegaard in the book 
which Attwater had edited, and giving a sensitive and even 
1. Blackham, SET, 22. 
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comprehensive introduotioiL to the li:ee and thought o:f Kier-
kegaard, has in an incidental fashion told us much about 
Kierkegaard'a oonoept o:f the soul, muoh that we shall dis-
cover :for ourselves when we make a systematic examination 
o:f his writings. 
In Ohanning-~earce we learn that the soul, as Kierke-
gaard uses the tar~ is assumed to exist, even as God is as-
sumed to exist, and that it can be known intuitively. It 
oan know travail and it can and it should have resilience. 
It is that in man which, when confronted by Obrist, or 
Reality, or God, :finds itself; and,.it does this as it re-
sponds in a condition of lively faith. And in finding it-
self it beoomes the oore of the "new man". 
The soul can be ohanged religiously, and the ideal is 
that it should be made Oh:riatia.n. This is the meaning of 
saving one 1 a soul, and it is brought about by the agenoy o:f 
spirit, which lies deeper than the soUl, and whioh is unknown 
to "natural man". 
The soul, when it has been clarified by spirit, oan 
mirror back the world of man to each man; can and does give 
more and more self-:-knowledge and a knowledge of others, not 
excluding spirit and the things of the spirit. 
; 
To escape the decomposing, which is the hody 1 s natural 
end, the soul, that "tragic climax" in the life of nature, 
must oome to know the immortal and immortalizing spirit~ 
The soul belongs to the realm of beooming,spirit to that o:f 
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being. Mind itself iE1_. not the soul., but is nsoulishn. and 
as the soUl ish and the bodily are held in synthesis by- the 
spirit, the resUlt is man. 
In a statement made in 1941, and with only three ref-
erences to guide him, the Journal and Philosophical Fragments 
of Kierkegaard and the long life by Lowrie, this same Chan-
ning-Pearce gave a very lively introduction to Kierkegaard's 
thought, and related him to certain moderns with whom he was, 
in many of his ideas and in his feeling-reactions, star-
tlingly contemporary. From this account we shall set down 
only two related ideas which will help us as we seek to de-
fine Kierkegaard's use Of the concept soul. 
First, progress in or by the soUl is not by the method 
of evolution, as the Christianity of Kierkegaard's day- ana ~he 
liberal interpretati_ons of our own have thought, b:m,.t by the 
method o:f "ehoice" repeated over and aver again in that in-
stant o:f eternity which lies between two moments of time; 
the choice in and o:f this eternity made as one leaps into 
it, as it were, is the only way of soul.-progress. One 
moves, thus, into eternity, not with any thought of remain-
ing there, for the soUl is in time and is necessarily con-
ditioned by time, but that the souJ. shoUld, by this means, 
be changed for time and made msre sensitive, both to the 
phenomena o:f time and to eternity, and made more strong 
for its temporal tasks. 
The second of the Channing-Pearce ideas is this, the 
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natural soul is the natural soil in whioh the seeds of the 
t!hristian man must grow. And these seeds have come from 'an 
nin'finite Self" or an uinfinite Spirit" which is God. These 
thoughts are found in the boo~, The Terrible Crrstal. 
Croxall suggests by implication that in his use of the 
word nsouln Kierkegaard has been strongly influenced and per-
, 
haps completely so by the ancient Greek word :for soUl, ljlu Y- 1'\.. 
This Greek soul does not bave.nas a principle in its own 
right" sensuous enjoyment. The sensuous was there, but it 
was not sel'f-oonscious. " It was only when 7TYf-l!).lCS.., or "spirit", 
came into men's thinking that the principle o'f the sensu-
, 
ous was given a life of its own apart 'from «l'UJln • And~ 
while it came withtrve~~, this new principle of the sensu-
ous was found to be in opposition to?Tvtu,u.~. According to 
Croxall, it was "spiritn with a Christian content which 
brought into conscious being and sharpened up the prin-
ciple of the sensuous. 
From Croxall, too, we learn that the locus of the 
soul, in Kierkegaard, lies between the sphere of the mate-
rial and the sphere of the spiritual. A man living in and 
from the soul-sphere "lacks infinitude"2. This .does not 
mean that the material has been put :from him but that the 
material and the spiritual have, through the spirit-led 
work of the soul 1 been prought into a new, :functioning re-
lationship. A man living in and from the soul-sphere lives 
1. Croxall, KS, 43. 
2. Croxall, KS, 106. 
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in the realm of the "agreeable-disagreeablen, that is a life 
of feelings and emotions. A man living at this level has 
learned to examine the events of life, and in tracing the line 
back :from effect to cause comes upon n:eate"· and n:fortunen good 
N\ ' 
or bad. When he is in difficulty he thinks, mistakenly. that 
/ 
he ~as lost hie grip upon the temporal, but, as he may learn 
i:f he will rise to the realm of spirit, his real loss or the 
real absence :from his life, which is magnified in a. time of 
trouble, is the eternal. 
Friedmann, in his psychoanalytical study of Kierkega.ard, 
never mentions the concept nsou.l!'. The nearest he comes to it 
is in hie use o:f the word lfperaonali tyn, and as he uses it in 
relation to Kierkega.a.rd, it would have content :from the realm 
o:f apiri t as well as :from the n a.greeable-diaa.greeablen realm 
of the soul. For while he put a negative evaluation upon 
spirit, he none the less thought o:f Kierkega.ard as a. spir~ 
#ual man. 
It is when we come to the personality of the non-spir~ 
$ual man that we have a. definition that is very much like 
the soul as Kierkegaard would use the term. Friedmann's def-
inition of non-spiritual personality is, "the rich, positive, 
interior structure which emerges as the persona, the facade, 
fades out; that is, the mask one assumes in one's relation 
to the world".l 
Geismar, in his lectures on the religious thought of 
1. Friedmann, KAP, 62. 
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Kierkegaard which be gave after years of intense study, falls 
easily into Kierkega.ard•s own, almost casual usage o:f the word 
"sonl", and like Kierkega.e.rd himself, he pauses occasionally to 
give more speci:fio information about the meaning of the concept. 
The soul can be wounded, says Geismar, it can know longing, it 
can suffer, it can know melancholy and penitence and peace. It 
is a "place" where these emotional events occur, but evan so, 
it ean itself be endangered. Not only by the intensity of suf-
fering, but by such an outward thing as "riohes". It oan give 
its allegiance to other than the higher spiritual life, and ean 
therefore be lost. 
In a more specific passage in Geismar we read of two "selvesn, 
an outer and an inner. He says: 
"The outer self is naively convinced of its power 
to aoeonxplish such and such ends in the external world, 
and to gain such and such satisfactions. The deeper and 
inner self knows that it can do absolutely nothing with-
out God. nl 
Kierkegaard, when he is using "selfn as an aoc~ate psy-
chological concept rather than casually and as one may do in 
non-teohnioal writing, uses it as this second "self''. And 
the soUl, in Kierkegaard. would seem to be the theatre of a 
struggle between these outer and inner selves of Geismar. 
:But the "theatreu figure is misleading. For the soul is af-
fected by the struggle, and may become an active supporter 
of either side, of either the outer or the inner self. When 
it supports the outer self against the inner, or with no con-
1. Geismar, LRK, 65. 
104 
cern for the inner. it is in the process of being lost. When 
it supports the inner self, and returns to its outer responsi-
bilities a follower of the way of the inner self - or spirit -
it is in the process of being saved, and of saving others. 
Haecker, inKierkegaard the Cripple, states that man is 
man and not animal beaause he has a spiritual soul, and he 
suggests that W'8 should not speak of a s ou.l-realm and a spirit-
realm, but of a soul that is more or less spiritual. If soul 
be quantity, then spirit might be its most meaningful quality. 
As he makes his statement, he implies that Kierkegaard would 
agree with him. But in so far as spirit here, would depend 
for its existence upon the soul; Kierkegaard woul~ not agree 
with him. 
In another. of his books, S¢ren Kierkegaard, Haecker uses 
the trichotomy which is 11 Christian", and which both he and 
Kierkegaard can acaept; namely, body, soul and spirit. In the 
unity of these three active spheres man is and remains man. 
The soul is at stake in all of the transactions of the earthly 
life. And, in Haecker, soul is frequently equated with mind, 
and yet, also in Haecker, as in Kierkegaard, we ·can see that 
the soul is something more than mind, and, in part ~t least, 
something other than conscious mind. Nor is soul to be equated 
with what we speak of poetically as the "heartn. 
Every man bas, and always has, a soul, according to 
Haecker•s reading of Kierkegaard, and each soul has its indi-
vidual place and its unique contribution to make. But there 
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are di££erences, both quantitative and qualitative, between 
men's souls, and within the soul of an individual £rom one 
hour to the next. It is possible to speak of a person as 
wanting in soul; the meaning being that his soul is wanting 
in access to that consciousness of the spirit in which the 
soul can best live. 
Marriage, according to Kierkegaard, and as Haecker sees 
it, belongs to the two realms of body and soul, but if mar-
riage is to approximate its own ideal, it must also be aware 
of and participate in the realm o£ the spirit. 
Most men live their immediate li£e "in the psycholog-
ical sphere of body and soU1n, but, says Haecker, Kierke-
gaard belonged nto an abnormal degree to the sphere of the 
spiri t."l 
Hubben repeats what has been said by several writers 
about Kierkegaard; namely,· tba.t nthe salvation of his soul 
was the most important concern in S¢ren's thinking and con-
, versation, as the purity of his soul became his most serious 
endeavor in later life.rr2 
The purifying might be seen as a condition for sal val; 
rion, but with Kierkegaard it would be just as true to say 
that he was seeking to purify because as long as he was 
seeking to purify, his soul was already saved. For salv~ 
tion was a relationship as well as the changing e££eots of 
that relationship, a relat±onship of the soul with that 
1. Haecker, SKH, 44. 
2. Hubben, FPD, 6. 
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spirit and that God-Man, -ehrist, who manifested God. 
Purification was as the sweeping of a home to make 
fitting room in this home - the soul - for eternal truth. 
Eternal truth came down from the realm of the spiritual to 
dwell in such a soul, bringing-with it constant inspiration, 
which some oalled grace, for still more cleansing and more 
and more fellowship with eternal truth. 
The soul must bW its new-found powers project truth for-
ward into the future, and as this truth visite4 the proposed 
future, as sunlight and air visit and search out and purif~ 
and warm and transform a distant hillside, so is this future 
changed; and as time passes and the future becomes the present 
and then the past, so, because of the newly empowered soul, 
is it a. different present that slips by and a different past 
which remains for all eternity. 
Mereover, the souJ. must draw upon the :future even before 
this tnture has become the present and the past~ A man has 
a future, even as he has a past - in the present tense. His 
task is to make both the future and the past mo.re eonsoiously 
present, more available, more determining, more of a living 
"nown. And this is the task o:f a man 1 s sou1; a task which is 
made known to him by spirit. 
Here in this soul-work, as the eternal truth is in it, 
we have, perhaps, the psychological equivalent of the work 
and importance o:f a dynamic eschatology in the :field of the-
ology; that is, as this present soul-work has in it the 
..... 
:fu.ttll'e; not as potential a.nd- abstract. but as actual and 
concrete. 
And here we have, in part at least, what X:ie:rkegaard 
means when he speaks of the soUl "reoolleoting forwarau. 
10'7 
The other part of the meaning ot this phrase would have to 
do with the distinction between being and beQoming; for 
being, or eternit.y, oan never be divided into past, present 
and future, for it belongs to a realm which does not lie on 
the line of ohronologioal time, It is an eternity which 
enters man from "outsideu to reveal to him the truth.l With 
X:ierkegaard, the soul is on its :pilgrimage to this eternal, 
and X:ierkegaard, looking Within, wrote with stark autobio-
graphical realness about the progress of suoh a pilgrim. 
We oome now to Jo1ivet. He does not, anywhere· in his 
Introduction to X:ierkegaard, pause to consider X:ierkegaard's 
use of the word naoul", but once again we learn from Jolivet 1 s 
use of the term that he assumes the meaning to be thus and 
so. He gives us the theater-figure, with the drama on the 
soul-stage of X:ierkegaard not only mid-nineteenth century 
and personal, but twentieth and having to do with vast n~bers 
of people. 
The saul. says Jolivet, gazing steadfastly into and 
through the window of its own religious anguish, can have a 
vision of itself and a vision of a distracted Christendom~ 
And the soUl oan be a noble instrument for the recording and 
1. Hubben, F.PD, 35. 
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the sharing of suoh visians. Indeed, nsbility is natural 
to the soul, and Christianity itsel£ is natural to the soul. 
Any lesser state is un-natural, 
It is God who responds to the strong soul reaching £or 
£aith by the gi£t o£ £aith, This £aith remains in the soul 
as it moves through its inevitable "disputes" with the world, 
the non-spiritual. But others, acting as the instruments o£ 
God, and sometimes without a knowledge of being so, oan also 
quicken our souls. It was thus in the relationship between 
Kierkegaard and his £ather. And Kierkegaard counted himself, 
taking the thought :fx'om one of his ttmasters", Socrates, "a 
midwife tor souls". 
The soul must never try to out itsel£ o£f £rom the mate-
rial or body sphere, but as the soul is touched, at its ape%, 
by God or by spirit, the messenger o£ God, it learns that 
beth the glory and the WTetchedness of the world are as nothing 
compared with participation in the spiritual.1 
Jolivet reports that in his Concept of Ironl Kierkegaard 
speaks of a first stage or a first realm of the soul, the 
aesthetic stage. In this stage tbe soul makes "ohaotic, 
jerky movements, like a galvanized :f;ttog," But the soul can 
move on into the ethical and the religious stages and know 
the development and the responsibility in each of these realms. 
For soul-growth we need deep despair. This despair 
"ruptures" the soul in its depths, and if the soul be wise 
1. Jolivet, IK, 121. 
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it will not try to minister to itael£ in its desperation, 
but will go on to "despair in truthn.l As it is willing to 
do this, the old soul is shattered, the new, conserving that 
which should be conserved in the old, begins to take shape, 
energized by a consciousness of the eternal. This eternal 
becomes its own neternal validityn, and by means o£ this 
given eternal, the soul is able to bteak nthe magic circle 
o£ the finite."2 
One of the reasons for picturing it thus, as struggle 
and even drama, is because the "enemyn in the soul, the spirit 
of worldliness and the sources of its inspiration, may reach 
the intensity and the status of the demoniacal. Indeed, deS-
f~air itself, which can lead the soul into the state of its 
own salvation, can be enlisted in the service of the demon-
iacal. And the soul which is demon-possessed will strike out 
blindly and unceasingly, even though it be wounding itself. 
Such a soul - and it is a matter of life and death, eternal 
life and eternal death - needs above all else the ~owerful, 
controlling forces which are available to the religious man 
and which are to be found in the ever-contem~orary God-Man, 
Christ. 
The soul of the aesthetic, that is, the natural man. 
is in need of unification. Within its own realm it tries 
single-mindedness, and pursues pleasure or grasps at pos-
sessions. But these, in their very nature and because of 
1. Jolivet, IK, 130. 
2. Jolivet, IK, 131. 
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the nature of the ult~im.ately Real, the Eternal, must :fail to 
bring the unity for whioh the soul deeply longs. They may 
seem to bring unit.y, these pleasures, these possessions, and 
in most of his oonsoious life a man may thi~ that they have 
done so. But deep within him, making itself known in.the 
doing or the witnessing of an aot whioh makes the man sud-
denly afraid, or in a midnight hour of loneliness, the soul 
will speak to man o:f his disunity. And by this showing of 
the negative it will lead to a consideration of the pos-
itive. There are these helps by whieh a soul may be saved 
:from being merely natural • 
. And what will bring this unity? It oomes as the soul 
goes on to will and to realize the good. The good :for us 
is the eternal made :flesh. And not once only, at a oertain 
hour in Bethlehem, but again and again in every ho u:r and in 
every plaoe.l 
The breath o:f the soul is prayer. And this prayer is 
daring enough and oomprehensi ve enough to pray, even in 
Protestantism, :for the souls o:f the departed.2 But the 
triumph whioh we have beoause of prayer is not ours but 
God's. The :forces of the eternal are thus invited into 
the soul, and it is the work which they aooomplish whioh 
gives the triumph. They work, these :forces, in the very 
depths o:f the soul where lie the roots of the will, and as 
this happens in an increasing :fashion, God, the giver of 
1. Jolivet, IK, l79. 
2. Jolivet, IK, 188. 
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the forees, becomes the e~fective God for us. 
But prayer goes from us. to God only upon the wings o£ 
love. Lov~ gives and love is the only, full relationship 
with God. Whe~ Love is in the soul, then is the soul pre-
pared for a revelation of the tender power of God, and when 
this God. is pres ant love is inareased. By love is the soul 
made known to God; by love is God made known to the soul. 
Such love "tbe secret of the Ohristian soul",l is and 
will ever be a mystery, and yet the consequences of such 
love and of such a love-relationship will ever appear to 
amaze man and to give him the courage and the need to go on 
loving. 
The soul, in a true, Psalmist sense, can and must yearn 
after God. And yet when this yearning has come home to God, 
and He through the spirit, responds and touches the soul.to 
new life, the soul must remember its distance from God. 
Oneness of the soul with God in.suoh moments of visitation 
must, says Kierkegaard, be drastically repudiated. The soul 
finds its own sufficient unity, but not unity with God, as 
many of the mystics woUld have it. A body, relaxed and 
warmed in the sun, may rejoice in the sun, and in spirit go 
out to the sun, but it is never the sun; nor does it, even 
in its moment of greatest response, come near to the sun. 
The sun, in a manifestation or an expression of itself, comes 
to the body. In like fashion, there are both manifestations 
of God and, always, an infinite distance between the visited 
1. Jolivat, IKt 188. 
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soul and the source of its-exalted state of being. 
In Lowrie's A Short Life of Kierkegaard. we have more 
than a score of references to the soul, but almost without 
exception they stand in quotations from Kierkegaard's own 
writings, and we shall be considering them there. 
The one Lowrie phrase which will help us in our defin-
ing of what Kierkegaard meant by the soul comes in a passage 
in which he is explaining how Kierkegaard, by the use of 
pseudonyms, that is by means of indirect cemmunication, was 
able to carry forward his task of 9 delineating ·the charac-
teristic pose ibili ties of the human soul. 11 
This would suggest that there are soul-qualities that 
are general, that would be characteristic of all human souls, 
though it would not necessarily preclude the particular and 
the unique·; and this would suggest the possibility of and 
the need for soul-development, for change and for growth. 
Lowrie has translated, for the most part unassisted, 
and has written prefaces or introductions to about fifteen 
of Kierkegaard 1 s works. They were not translated from Danish 
to English in the order in which they were originally written, 
and Lowrie, no doubt, brings much from his translatien of 
later religisus writings back to his later translation of, 
say. the aesthetic writings of Kierkegaard, but it is felt 
that it will be sufficient to study both the translations 
and the introductions and notes in the order of the original 
books. Fer, as we shall see, Kierkegaard had ~om the outset 
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an overall plan ~or the wri~ing o~ his books; and since the 
e:x-istenae of the soul and there~ore the word nsoul" was not 
a problem for him, it would not be likely to change its 
meaning as he progressed. 
In the Lowrie Pre~aces and Introductions we ~ind a di-
rect or indirect re~erence to Kierkegaard's use e~ the term 
"soul" in the ~allowing: 
Repetition. The uses here are Kierkegaard's own, as 
quoted by Lowrie. But the material quoted ~rom Kierkegaard's 
"Papersn does not appear elsewhere. One of these quotations 
tells us that distress comes to the soul both ~rom within 
and ~rom without, and the latter helps the ~ormer to "let 
the soUl sink little by little into eoneern"l tmtil it ~inds, 
through concern, the testimony o~ hope in God. This concern 
is the distress and trdespair 1t o:f which we have heard else-
where, and the soul's concern is :for its own salvation. 
This concern is not to be an exclusive and excluding thing, 
:for the salvation o:f the soul depends, in part, upon its con-
cern :for the salvation o~ other aespairing and non-despair-
ing souls. 
It is in the introduction to The Concept of Dread that 
we ~ind the most direct re:ference by Lowrie to Kierkegaard•s 
use o:f the concept "soulu. And, indeed, the most direct me~ 
~ion :found in any o:f the writings about Kierkegaard which we 
have examined with the one exception o:f the statement made 
1. Kierkegaard, B, xxix. 
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by Mowrer and found later in this chapter. 
Briefly, Lowrie states that Kierkegaard "was compelled 
to revert to the Greek and New Testament trichotomy, body, 
soul and spirit.nl That he did revert is true, but that he 
was compelled to do so does not seem, to us, to be apparent. 
Unless, indeed, he was compelled to do so because his own 
teachers had not provided him with acceptable substitute con-
cepts, rather than because he strove to find such concepts 
himself and failed. 
The soul, says Lowrie who is interpreting Kierkegaard, 
lies deep, deeper even than "Freud and Yung (Jung} and Adler" 
have gone. 2 And the soul can be sick. -Indeed, "the notion 
that one has a healthy-minded soul is the most perilous of 
all sioknesses. n5 
Kierkegaard, therefore, the author of this idea - though 
others before him had had much the same belief - was a sick 
soul. But while his soul was more sick than most, it was a 
siokness unto life rather than a sickness, the siokness of 
feeling "well", unto death. And in elaborating this "no one 
••• has ever probed so deeply ••• with such intellectual eompe-
tenee. n4. 
The one thing that we learn from Lowrie•s Introduction 
to Stages on Life's Way- and we have already learned it 
1. Lowrie, CD, xii. 
2. Lowrie, CD, xi. 
3. Lowrie, CD, xii. 
4. Lowr'ie, OD, xii. 
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elsewhere - is that the soul,_ according to Kierkegaard, aan 
be lost. 
The Introduction to Concluding Unaoientifio Postscript 
speaks of the soul as capable o~ having emotions, of being 
anxious, af being stirred, and of the possibility of it being 
. 
"filled with feminine devotionn .1 
Macintosh, who assumes that he is using nsouln as Kier-
kegaard would use it, makes it the lonely aide of man, aa 
entity in man which is lonely for God and which is turned 
toward God. Yet this soul cannot live by spiritual food 
alone. It must have the bread o:f the objective natural world 
of facts and of human relationships. The soul is capable of 
anguish. Indeed, a man may be said to be two-souled, with 
the one, the evil one, grappling with the other, the good, 
for mastery. By ita struggle, a struggle "to sink more deep-
ly into its own inward experienoen,2 and by grace, the evil 
can be driven out. The latter~graoe, is for Kierkegaard by 
far the greater reason why this transformation takes plaoe, 
but for all the soulra development, for all ita progress to-
ward the divine, it never beaomes divine. The soul, by the 
last blind leap of faith, the last in a series of such leaps, 
may aome to a place of high Reality, but the Reality o:f God 
will always be higher, In comparison with the Reality of 
God, glimpsed by us in Christ, our best Reality is as a can-
dle-flame to the sun. 
1. Kierkegaard, CUP, 16. 
2. Macintosh, TMT, 259. 
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In Maddents understanding of Kierkegaard, the concept 
"souln would include "mind" as we usually use that term, but 
in so far as we are not at any time, in our actual mind or con-
sciousness, fully aware of our God~given potential. and cer-
tainly not aware of the fullness of God, and since the soUl 
can come nearer to such knowledge, the soul is more than mind. 
We learn too from Madden that before the soul finds in 
its synthesis with body the synthesizing agent, namely, 
spirit, this same spirit of the eternal has been, unknown to 
body and soul, their first and only "cohesive power". 
Martin, writing of "the melancholy Dane", comes again 
and again to the anguish and torment of the soul in its 
struggle against the disease of the soul called sin. .And 
the wounds of the soul, made because of faith, are healed by 
faith and by God 1 s responding grace. 
But it is faith, not as wishful th~ing, nor as a co-
ordinate with reason, nor as mystical feeling, nor as a 
postulate of the moral sense, nor as a special religious in-
tuitionl which brings this grace and this healing, but faith 
as Kierkegaard would define it in his non~immanent, paradox-
ical "Religion Bn; that is, in Christianity. 
This faith is an absolute trust in Christ the God-Man, 
and in his person rather than his teachings. This does not 
make his teachings wrong or unimportant, but faith must be 
seen as something which is heterogeneous from reason. It 
1. Martin, WOF, Oh. I. 
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must be seen as a passionate leap o£ life~deoiaion for this 
Christ, and for this definition of faith itself. It must be 
seen as an act of individual freedom, and as one which will 
inevitably br~ng suffering in its train.l Born out of suf-
fering, it will lead to suffering, but it will heal the 
wounded soul, and bring, through the agency of the spirit of 
the eternal, that health, that wholeness, that perfection, 
whioh God, through Christ, would have us to experience. This 
task of so~-healing, this journey into the realm of spirit 
which is brought about as we are aware of the realm of spirit 
in ourselves, is completed for us, as far as it can be each 
day, by this act of true, Christian faith. And this task is 
the most difficult "in tbe whole realm of human effort". 2 
Martin speaks, too, of Kierkegaardrs asoetisism of soul 
rather than of body. But it was a positive asoetisism, a 
doing rather than a not doing, and its purpose was, first of 
all, individual salvation. In obedience to "the absolute 
requirement of Ohristianitytt3 the soul was d~eply humbled 
and prepared for any new truth which might break forth from 
God.!> 
Martin, unwittingly I believe, uses self and soul and 
spirit as interchangeable. But in showing a speoifiq and 
radical distinction which Kierkegaard makes between the 
"knowing" ego and the n existingn ego, between the episte-
1. Martin, WOF, Oh. IV. 
2. Martin, El\1fl:),. 86. 
3. Martin, XMD,. 110. 
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m.ologica.l ego and the ontologioal ego, between man as thinker 
and m.an as living being, he helps us to understand what the 
" 
soUl is, £or Kierkegaa.rd, and what it is not. It is, or it 
is ~losely related to th~ latter a£ these two~ the e%ist~g 
ega. the ontologioal ego, m.an as living being. 
We see here a clearing up of a difficulty which was be-
gun or which was emphasised by Descartes in his self-proo£. 
It is not 11 I think, therefore I am", but~ "I am, therefore I 
think". Being is prio.r to the nature of being, and the nature 
.of being to the activities and products of being. The Hege~ 
~ians, while they sought to delineate a concretized ego or 
soul, and to make a place for it in the system, understreseed 
the individualness of it and so wronged individual man. But 
in individual man aware of himself in an individual soul, and 
because of the promptings of a realm of spirit whioh meets 
and affects man where he is most individual, we have the fac-
tual starting point for man•s journey into a real and not a. 
pseudo 11 0bristendomn and a real and not pseudo Kingdom of God. 
In this constant emphasis upon essential man as "e%iS-
tent" we see Kierkegaard as the strong contributor to modern 
e%istentialism. A term, by the way, which was invented by 
Kierkegaard himself. 1 
Mowrer, in a comparative statement in whioh he is showing 
that in several striking ways Kierkegaard in his psychologizing, 
1. ~homas, MK, 316. 
119 
has sntici~ated the depth reaearch of Freud, s~eaks of a 
_certain similarity in the "psychic anatomy, or tepography, 
which the two writers set u~ for theoretical purposes". He 
goes on to say: 
tfQlearly the bodily component (in Kierkegaard) 
corresponds to wba t Freud characterized as "idn. 
The "soulish", or psychic, factor corresponds equal-
ly well to Freud's "egon. And from the way in which 
Kierkegaard uses the term "spirit" in a number· of 
different contexts, it is not too much to suppose 
that for him it was roughly equivalent to nsuperego" 
or conscience.nl 
This is mostly untrue, and where it is not untrue it 
is most misleading. The bodily component in Kierkegaard is 
not the id, in Freud, which is part of the psychic appara-
tus, but Freud•s body; the soulish in Kierkegaard is equiv-
"to 
alent to the ego in Freud
1
butAthe id and the superego as 
well; and while ~art of the work of spirit in Kierkegaard 
may resemble part of the work done by Freud 1 S superego, 
namely, that of requiring man as he is to face man as he 
could be, the source of the two entities, the spirit in 
Kierkegaard and the superego in Freud, is utterly differ-
ent. The one, the superego> is utterly naturalistic and 
epiphenomenal; and the other, the spirit, is the manifes-
tation in man of the supernatural, and is noumenal. Apart 
from these errors of interpretation, however, Mowrer does 
have a real a~preciation o:f the light~ which Kierkegaard 
has thrown upon the problem of man's anxiety or "dread". 
1. Mowrer, LPD, 543. 
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From~wenson•s The Faith of a Scholar, we learn a neces-
sary emphasis in the processes of the Kierkegaardian soUl 
rathar·than a description or a body of attributes that are 
new. And this emphasis is upon its forward~looking acts, and 
we had something of this in Hubben. 
If the soul is to arrive in its synthesis, its full con-
scious synthesis-state in the realm of personal spirit, it 
must be aware of itself as "pregnant with the expectation of 
the eternal."l It must lean in lively fashion toward this 
realm. 
Here we have,not a struggle against illusion and the 
consequences of illusion, but a struggle for the fullness of 
a new state of being. But victory will never take the strug-
gling soul out of life; it will, rather) bring "a sound soul's 
sincere presence into the temporal. n2 
In Something about Kierkegaard, Swenson, without noting 
the fact in so many words, shows that "aouln in Kierkegaard 
is first of all "mind"; but, as Madden has suggested, in so 
far as the soul is, at least in natural man, unaware of the 
power and purpose of the spirit which holds it in ita syn-
thesis with "body", and in so far as the soul which has be-
come conscious of spirit) is that in man which will continue 
to be most aware of spirit, it is more than nmindn. 
This, of course, is taking."mind" to mean that which is 
directly accessible to the investigatory methods of empirical 
1. Swenson, KFS, 167. 
2. Swenson, KFS, 149. 
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science or of intros~ection. The soul, in Kierkegaard. is 
always more than this kind o£ mind. He can speak of lovers 
as having "one soul in two bodies" but he would not say this 
of their two minds.l The minds of lovers may mingle, but they 
remain two. 
In the Introductions to the eight works which either 
David Swans on or his wi:fe, Lillian, or both o:f them together, 
have translated into English, there is no reference to the 
concept o:f the soul as .K.ierkegaard would use the term·; that 
is, no reference which woUld increase our understanding of 
the meaning which he gave to it as that meaning is seen by 
the Swenson•s. The half-dozen uses of the word, with one 
unim~ortant exception, are all from Kierkegaard's own writ-
ings, and those writings are to be examined. 
In the two Introductions provid~d by Douglas Steer, to 
his own translation of £urity of Heart and to the Swenson 
translation of Works of Love, we have mention made of the 
individual needs o:f the soul and of the worth of this indi-
vidual soul in the eyes of God. And its worth, in the eyes 
of God, does not change as the soul progresses from stage 
to stage. Not only bec·ause God is aware of the potential 
before it has become aQtual and loves the potential as i:f 
it were actual, but because the love of God is the unchang-
ing love of God, a love which is in no way affected by changes 
in the object of His love. In the perfeQt human family, the 
1. Swenson, SAK, 67. 
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dependent or the crippled child, or the child who is out of 
contact with his family, is loved equally with those who are 
at home, and well, and helping to earn bread. 
This does not mean that each human soUl, whether it knows 
it or not, is an equal contributor to the life of God's King-
dom. There are great differences •. And some s ou.ls there are 
who would destroy this Kingdom. But the love of God remains 
an unconditional love. 
unamuno, a Spanish disciple of Kierkegaard, has said· 
that Kierkegaard gives us yeast not bread.l We are finding, 
however, in this one matter of the soul, that there is so 
much solid .content in his conception that he may be said to 
offer bread as well. But Thomas, in his Hibbert Journal ar-
ticle for JUly, 1947, has warned us that we should look for 
more than bread and more than yeast. He has said: 
"To understand him (Kierkegaard) conceptually 
without an intense resolution to live out his words 
saerifieCally in Christian character and action, is 
the surest way to misunderstand him.n2 
The fact that it is difficult to live out his concep-
tion of the soul in other than the way of accepting it into 
a doctrine of man may account for the fact that in Kierke-
gaard the concept of the soul did not receive the focus-at-
tention that one might ezpect in a man who was so intensely 
religious. 
We come now to Thomte. In his very clear setting forth 
1. Thomas, MK, 311. 
2. Thomas, MK, 309. 
• 
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of Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion, he summarizes the 
matter thus: 
"Kierkegaard accepts the fundamental assumption 
that the human soul is rooted in God, designed to live 
in harmony with God, and that it has its highest and 
most comprehensive unity in God."l 
It is rooted in God whether man knows it or not, but 
it is better that he come to know it. It has been implanted 
with purpose, that it may move from a state o:f being in an 
unconscious synthesis with the body, to a state of experi-
encing the cause of this synthesis, .the spirit, and of de-
veloping under the tutelage of spirit. And when the soul 
has become actively and fully conscious of its rootage and 
the source of its daily strength and nourishment, then it 
has reached the high unity, not with God, bu.t in the realm 
of God. 
This last distinction is sharpened by an awareness 
which comes to the soul, even at this high point of spirit-
awareness and of self-unity; namely, that it is, for the 
very reason of its comparative littleness and imperfection, 
the enemy·of God. Not only the bad, but also the good is 
the enemy of the best. 
This is something more than teaching by exaggeration. 
For the soul at its best is still, in comparison with God, 
worthless. Standing, as it does, naked before God, stand-
ing in the very midst o:f its comparative worthlessness and 
nothingness, it trembles with elemental fear. And it is 
1. Thomte, KPR, 110. 
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then, at that ultimate mom&nt, that God oan give and man can 
receive the grace o:f ou.r Lord Jesus Ohrist. And turning to 
Rim, and to His a.toning.li:fe and death" the soul begins to 
seek and to :find and to ap~ropriate; that is, to live out 
its own salvation, It is saved :from death by refusing to 
die, and it refuses to die by living; but by living in the 
God-Man, Ohris t. 
In the preparation o:f this dissertation we.have had to 
rely on translations from the Danish language, and much that 
has been written about Xierkegaard has not yet oome into Eng-
lish. There has been published recently, however, by the 
Kierkegaard Society o:f Denmark a book by Hr. Aage Henriksen 
in which certain Kierkegaard literature in Scandinavia is 
passed in review, and in this we have re:ferenae to untrans-
lated as well as to translated material. 
In a long review o:f the book published in the Times 
Literary Supplement (London) on Friday, December 26, 1952,1 
we learn that the unsympathetio Brandes • "acute interpre~ 
tation o:f Kierkegaard is an ingenious defence o:f the pagan 
humanism which Brandes advocated"; that Haf:fding is a de-
terminist uwho sees Kierkegaard chiefly, though not wholly 
as the preduot o:f circumsta¥oes", with God and God 1 s gover-
nance left out; that Vodskov sees in Kierkegaard 1 s attack 
on the ohuroh "a sign o:f deaadenae"J while P. A. Heiberg sees 
it a sign of strength; Rudin is a Kierkegaardian writer who 
1. Times (London) Literary Supplement, Friday, Dec. 26, 1952. 
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seeks to correct the impression given by B~andes; Torstin 
Bohlin de£ends Kierkegaard against those who say that for 
him the content of faith was of no importance, but Bohlin 
is wrong (according to the reviewer) in his belief that it 
was Xierkegaard•s intellectualism "which made him militate 
against Luther". And lastly, Hr. Henriksen writes of Geis-
I 
mars work, which seeks to mediate between Heiberg and Bohlin, 
as "still, perhaps, the most sympathetic and reliable expo-
sition from' Soandinaviau. :Part of Geismar's writings have 
-th~ been translated, and we have already referred to ~ in this 
section of the dissertation. We can infer very little, how-
ever, about Xierkegaard•s concept of the soul in the writings 
of these other scholars from this review, and the book is not 
at present available for study. 
We have studied what others have said, directly and in-
directly about Xierkegaard's conception of the soul, and we 
have found a general agreement that Xierkegaard assumed its 
existence and believed that it was its nature to become as 
well as to be. 
In the processes of becoming, a stage of despair was 
seen to be very important. This, in one sense, is not an 
intense moment of sel£-knowledge, but an expe~ience of utter 
self-ignorance. The soul finds in such a moment that it 
knows nothing worth knowing, and - if God be "worth" - that 
of itself it can do nothing worth doing. By this shattering 
of human pride, this sense of extremity, the soul is prepared 
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to go one o£ three ways, i~to a shallow life of excited care-
lessness, into liter·al suicide, or along a narrow, difficult 
road holding, yet not knowing why, an 'O.D.lighted lamp o:f faith. 
The soul must choose this road i£ it would live. It 
must choose it believing, but never in this li£e knowing :for 
aertain - as the world, or even the mystic counts ncertainty" -
that it is the road, and never seeing, in its lamp of :fa~th, 
the glow o:f a light. As part o:f this £aith, there is the be-
lief that this will bring the soul's salvation. 
The authority for such a seemingly comfortless way is 
Christ Himself. What He said, yes, but only as what He said 
was a description of what He Himself was doing. Joy that is 
overwhelming in its intensity will oome to suoh a soul, and 
quiet daily joy, not as something earned, but as a gift o:f 
Godp But this joy must never become the purpose o:f the sou1 1 s 
pilgrimage. Rather. the purpose ·iS salvation unto eternal 
life. 
2. · .. The laok of a systematic presentation in Xie:):'kegaard and the 
reasons for it. 
One strong, repeated, self-conscious emphasis in Kierke-
gaard's writings is that which has become in our day the 
broad and subdivided stream o:f existentialism, both Christian 
and pagan. 
Existentialism has been described by Monnier as "a re-
action of the philosophy of man against the excesses of the 
philosophy of ideas am the ~hilosophy o:f things. "l And 
Blackham speaks of it as :follows: 
"Existentialism appears to be reaffirming 
in a modern idiom the protestant or the stoic 
:form of individualism which stands over against 
the empirical individualism of the Renaissance 
or of modern liberalism or of' Epicurus. as well 
as over against the universal system o:f Rome or 
o:f Moscow or o:f Plato."~ 
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In Kierkegaard's day the arch-enemy o:f the soul o:f man 
in the world of thought was. as he saw it, a proud, driving 
Hegelianism. What this was we have already discussed. It 
would be,for Kierkegaard a vivid axample o:f the way in which 
a system of ideas could become the master o:f the men who had 
produced it, and>astb.ese men served their system, of its 
totalitarian demands. Kierkegaard, as existentialist in 
Christ, protested against this, The "system" had become 
the nsabbath", and the old, old protest had to be made. 
The philosophy of things was represented, as it has al-
ways been, by the obvious and subtle, the excused and the 
unquestioned worldliness of the times. But a greater threat 
than this to the existential truth that he believed was the 
beginning of a philosophical naturalism, one that.was rein-
forcing the very "science" that had given it modern birth. 
And against this too, and in the name of man the unique in-
dividual, he :framed his pro test. This system, which was even 
more distant :from man than were the ideas of man•s brain 
1. Meunier, EP; 2. 
2~ Blackham. SET, Preface. 
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coUld, perhaps, bring roug~correction to a ~oolish man, bat 
it could never give ~an individual the truth about himself; 
the trut}?.. of his e:x-istence in and for eternity. 
Nor would Kierkegaard have a "philosophy of man" if this 
meant knowledge brought into a system - and in this phrase 
Meunier is, perhaps, misleading - for this was to generalize, 
and not only to miss diffe~enoes but to leave "man" and to 
follow after thoughts about him. And the difference was the 
difference between a theological treatise and a fervent prayer. 
Man to be man must stand first of all and repeatedly in the 
presence of God in the e:x-istential relationship of fervent 
prayer. Seeking this first, all else that was necessary, 
philosophies of ideas and philosophies. of things would follow. 
But there was an individualism, too, whieh was an enefn~) 
~ the individualism o~ one who had given full authority to 
his senses and to no other source of truth or of pleasure. 
These proud slaves of empirical evidence and only that, these 
children o~ "feeling", these men o·f worldly optimism who in 
their ruggedness believed in inevitable progress for each and 
all, and especially themselves, and these men of religion who 
in their certainty that God was near and never far, would use 
and so abuse Ria Name - these were individualists w~o had 
been put upon the road but who had turned to travel in the 
wrong direction. 
Protesting against all systems Kierkegaard said, and 
carried out the thought, that "an existential system is 
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impoesiblen .. l Not that !l:lhere was danger in attempting it, 
but that all attempts would fail. For the vital evidence of 
the e~istential relationship with God must be "aommunioated 
more through testimony than by logio".2 And protesting a-
gainst ignorant or vicious individualism, Kierkegaard stressed 
the need :for the shattered life, the life that is beaten to 
ita knees by an awareness of its own oonfused helplessness. 
A man must be rid of all and not a tithed percentage if he 
would follow Jesus and be saved. 
Kierkegaard did not deny that a logical science was pos-
sible. And Hegel, in his masterly development of it, and 
most af all because he had discovered its processes to be 
dynamia, was to be greatly admired and even studied. But 
in testing and fitting together these dynamic processes which 
men had discovered, processes which they themselves had set 
in motion, Hegel had forgotten men themselves, and "what it 
means to live".3 
We see, then, Kierkegaard taking his stand, not for a 
philosophy of man nor yet for man as philosopher or as sci-
entist, but for man as e~istent. That is where man, with 
awareness in his soul, must begin. As a man who falls over-
of 
board at night and is left behind in the middleAa great oaean 
is no longer a philosopher or a scientist, or an individual-
ist aware of his own need :for pleasure or his own strength, 
1. Kierkegaard, CUP, 99. 
2. Meunier, EP, 4. 
3. Thomte, KPR, B. 
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but a helpless soul in the very presence of whatever God he 
believes in, so is the existential individual to whom Kier-
kegaard addressed his work, and whom he himself sought to 
become. 
Put more philosophically, any system which would seek 
to contain the soul and that relationship with God which it 
must have, is i~ossible. Any philosophy and any science 
must fail in dealing with the soul. For systems which speak 
about things - and they must - can go no further back than 
essence definitions. Existence, on the other hand, and the 
soul is, first of all, existent, is in the living "nown, and 
when the simple question "What?rr is put to it it is already 
dead. A soul-relationship oan be lived, but it oan be known 
only in part and in retrospect. It is for this reason that 
our inquiry is a difficult one. And yet, to discover that 
one has failed, and why, can have a value of its own. 
And so for two related reasons, the wish and the need 
to acknowledge the existence of man when those who would de-
fine his essenee were relating themselves to an abstraction; 
ana the protest against the depersonalizing of men which comes 
sooner or later when any system of thought or of practical 
organization is made supreme, for these reasons, Kierkegaard 
would not and could not attempt a systematic presentation of 
his thought. 
3. More specific statements about the limitations of philosophy 
and of science as Kierkegaard knew these disciplines. 
l5l 
Why Kierkegaard would see and note these limitations 
will have been gathered from the preceding section. ~hilos­
ophy, in the firm grip of the Hegelians, was being used to 
drive thinking men into the realm of ideas. Science, and 
especially in response to the technological demands of the 
day, was enticing trained men into tbe realm of things. 
Kierkegaard did not deny tbe importance of either o~ 
these two disciplines, but because of their excesses, and 
because of his intense concern for the souls of men he found 
both philosophy and science to be wanting. 
About philosophy, or "speculation", we have him saying 
that ni:f Christianity were a doctrine it would eo i;pso not 
be an opposite to speculative thought, but rather a phase 
within it." But, "Christianity has to do with existence, 
with the act of existing; but existe~oe and existing consti-
tute precisely the opposite of speculation.nl Speculation 
has to do with essence, and essence and existence are as 
different from each other as are "it" and "thou". 
Again, he states, :Philosophy noa.nnot and should not give 
faith, but it should understand itself and know what it has 
to offer, and take nothing away.n2 That is, take nothing away 
that it has no r,ight to take away. For instance, it is not 
equipped to speak of the existence., or the non-e:s-istence of 
God or of the soul • 
.Philosophy lies in a stage between aesthetics and Christi-
1. Kierkegaard, CUP, 339. 
2. Kierkegaard, FT, 43. 
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a.nity. It can never aompre.b.end to the full either of these. 
But the philosophy of his day. for all its claims to the con-
trary, was not even looking in the direction of real Ohristi-
anity. It had turned its back upon the existential and was 
in sore need of conversion, of being turned around. 
In his very first book, Either/or, Kierkegaard had taken 
several pages to discuss the limitations of philosophy. Phi-
losophy has for its domain, not action but contemplation. 
Its factual province is always and only the past. It "medi-
ates the :past and has its existence in it.nl Its s~peres are 
logic. nature and history, spheres where necessity rules. It 
deals with the world of both/and, for its task is to mediate. 
But there is another inward worldt the world of either/or, 
the world of absolute choice, and this is the world of Chris-
tianity. 
Kierkegaard saw tba t the philosophy of his day was not 
only limited by its conceptualizing and systematizing methods, 
which pulled it away from life, but that its effG~ts were be-
ing directed more and more to problems which were even more 
non-personal than were ideas about the essence of persons as 
individuals~ For instance history was claiming its attention, 
and the impersonal state. 
Swenson writes that Kierkegaard could see that 
"in his generation it was the exaggex-ated 
emphasis upon a philosophical contemplation 
of history, a speculative determination 
1. X:ierkegaard, E/0 II; 144. 
of its eourse in neatl-y arranged epoehs 
and eras, whieh was tba speei~ieally de-
moralizing phenomenon; in the next follow-
ing generation, he (Kierkegaard) prophesied 
that it wofld be the study of the hatural~. 
soiences.n 
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It would be a oaae of exohanging.one abatraotion for another, 
ideas from the world of man, forces :from the world of nature·, 
and Kierkegaard was deeply eoncerned about the real souls of 
real men~ 
One strong objeetion to the philosophy modern in his day 
was that it taught that religious faith was a matter o~ be-
lieving, of having the feeling that one was right, or having 
faith in a body of doctrine, whereas faith for Kierkegaard 
was to be there regardless o~ feeling, and it was to be faith 
~ a person, Jesus Christ. 
It is in The Concept of Dread that Kierkegaard has the 
most to say about the limitations of science, He writes, 
"'every science has its province either in immanent logic or 
in an immanence within a transcendence which it cannot ex-
plain.u2 And so, whether because of what it will not do or 
cannot do, soienoe is inadequate in the presence of eertain 
important questions. It cannot, for example, explain the 
origin and nature of sin. This must be understood, not 
through the mediating disciplines of the human seienees -
the natural seienoes stand even further away - and not even 
1. Swenson, SAK, 42. 
2. Kierkegaard, CD, 45, 
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through the divine science-of theology, but through. a.oon-
crete e~istential experience. Eaoh man must understand that 
which gives and that which blocks a relationship with God 
within his own soul. The m.eaning of aoul-matters - and sin 
is our e~ample - can be explained as little as can beiBg in 
lave. When one is in love one does not need an explanation, 
and when one knows himself to be a sinner before GOd, all 
theology and philosophy and all science are as garments which 
a.n athlete must put off in order to meet his test. 
4. The need to accept, at least temporarily, certain frames of 
reference. 
While we are seeking to understand an author who did 
not, on principle, systematize his thought we find him say-
ing that in spite of the various fields which he covered, he 
was from the very beginning a religious ·author. And he has 
told us of a plan of presentation which was present from the 
very first. 
More than three-quarters of his pages, a~ I believe, 
his most important works were published under one or other 
of at least a dozen pseudonyms, and more than once he is at 
pains to e~plain. that he himself is not to be held respon-
sible for the ideas presented on these pages.l 
We shall give, below, to have a convenient grouping and 
to help us as we seek to understand his plan of presentation 
and any development in the meaning of the concept "soul", the 
1. Kierkegaard, OUP, 551. 
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names q.:f these works, to gather with their date o:f publication 
and the pseudonym under which they were issued. 
February 20, 1843, Either/Or, by Victor Eremita. 
October 16, 1843, Repetition, by Constantine Oonstantius. 
October 16, 1843, Fear and Trembling, by 
Johannes de 1 silentio. 
, 1843, Articles in the "Fatherland", by 
Victor Eremita. 
June, 13, 1844, Philosophical Fragments, by 
Johannes Olimacus. 
June 17, 1844, The Concept o:f Dread, by 
Vigilius Haufniensis. 
June 17, 1844, Prefaces, by Nicholas Notabene. 
April 30, 1845, Stages on Li:fe •s Way, :.by 
Hilarius Bookbinder (ed). 
January , 1846, Two articles in the "Fatherlandn, by 
Frater Taciturnus. 
February: 27, 1846, Concluding Unscienti:fic Post-script, 
by Johannes Olimacus. 
May 19, 1849, Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises, by 
H.H.. 
July 30, 1849, Sickness Unto Death, by Anti-Olimacus. 
September 27, 1850, Training in Christianity, by 
Anti-Climacus. 
It will be necessary to relate these works to the purposes 
and stages o:f his un:folding thought, and with this in mind, 
and because o:f what it will yield :for our understanding o:f 
the concept "soul", or at least :!the person who has used it, 
we shall look briefly at some o:f Kierkegaard 1 S reasons :for 
the use o:f these pseudonyms. 
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In general his reason for these strange names is to be 
" 
seen as we remember to what an extent we have in Kierkegaard 
a spontaneous author with a strongly developed literary and 
theatrical sense, but a more .particular reason is bound up 
with his idea of the need for "indirect communicationn. 
As we have already seen, it was Kierkegaard•s belief 
that existential truths cannot be conveyed in direct utter-
ance. This was particularly so when an attempt was being 
made to present religious truth, because it was not the 
rtwhat'~ in the learning process which was the thing of moe t 
I 
importance, but the nhown. Here no spoon-feeding was pos-
sible. Each person must, for himself, taste and see. 
Kierkegaard stood in a special relationship with Soc-
rates; his Master's thesis at tbe university being on 
The Concept of Irony "with constant reference to Socrates". 
And the constant reference continued, at least in his own 
mind, all through his years of production. And Socrates 
had counted himself a "midwife", one who helped thoughts 
come to birth, and this very acceptable example, plus 
Kierkegaard's concern for existence rather than essence 
and for the subjective rather than for the scientifically 
objective, led him to adopt this method of indirect com-
munication. 
In this method he sought to present his ideas through 
invented characters, to keep the style up to and at times 
over the borders of poetic utterance, and to use pseudonyms. 
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Kierkegaard, too~ had personal secrets which he could 
never bring himself to share, and sometimes by a tortuous 
leading astray, and at other times by a by-road that is only 
as far away from the first person singular as is the third 
person, be carried forward his deliberate concealment and his 
practised use of indirect communication. 
Several authors have, in passing, given a translation of 
one or other of the pseudonyms, and attempts have been made 
to see a special significance in each of them. For instance, 
noonstantine Oonstantiustr, is a double attempt to say to his 
former fianc~e, Regina, just after he had found it necessary 
to break the engagement, that his love or his nature is still 
constant. But Lowrie, who bas the right of a close student 
and translator of Kierkegaard to give us his opinion,says 
that "one is following a false scent when one seeks to ex-
plain Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms as a delib,erate and 
artful device.nl 
The cause, rather, is sheer spontaneity and perhaps, 
even, a degree of compulsion. For he couldn't seem to re-
sist making a "Chinese box puzzle", one inside the other, 
and that inside yet another, for his readers to take apart. 
Before giving more of his overall plan of presentation 
in his series of books, and to help us as we seek to under-
stand the reason for the meaning or the meanings which he 
gives to the concept nsoul", here in another convenient 
1. Lowrie, in Repetition, xi. 
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listing are the books, or the ones that are available, that 
·~ were issued under his own name. 
A re~erence to the dates o~ publication will show at 
onoe that they began, almost ~rom the very first day of the 
pseudonymous works, and that they were interspersed through 
the years of publishing the "unaeknowledgedn works; that is, 
unacknowledged until the statement which is to be ~ound at 
the olose of Concluding Unscientific ~ostsoript. 
These, acknowledged from the start as his own, are all 
religious rather than aesthetic or ethical, though two re-
ligious books> standing, 'as their author says, beyond his 
own Christian experience, were, for this reason, published 
under the pseudonym "Anti-Climacus". 
' 
May 16, 1843, Two Edifying Discourses. 
Octeber 16, 1843, Three Edifying Discourses. 
December 6, 1843, Four Edifying Discourses. 
March 5, 1844, Two Edifying Discourses. 
June 8, 1844, Three Edifying Discourses. 
August 31, 1844, Four Edifying Discourses. 
April '29, .1S4f5., Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions. 
March 13, 1847, Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits. 
September 29, 1847, The Works of Love. 
April 26, 1848, Christian Discourses. 
May 14, 1849, The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air. 
Written 1848, ~ublished 1859, The ~oint of View·for my 
Work as an Author. 
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1846~p5, The Individual {Published posthumously). 
December 20, 1850, An EdifYing Discourse. 
1851, Two Disco u:rses at the Communion on.~ Fridays. 
September 10, 1851, For Self-Examination. 
1851/52. Pub+ished 1876, Judge :for Yourself! 
December 18, 1854- May 26, 1655, Articles in the Fatherland. 
May 16, 1855, This Must Be Said, So Let It Now Be Said. 
May 24, 1855- October, 1855, The Instant. 
June, 1855, What Christ's Judgment is Upon Official Christianity. 
We shall give briefly, next, the. overall plan of presen-
tation which Xierkegaard had, almost :from the first, though 
toward the last, the af:fair with the scurrilous little mag-
I-'· 
azine, the "Corsair", when he was constantly and unfairly 
attacked, and when he found no; one in the class of persons 
he had been championing helping him - all this, I believe, 
:forced him to abandon his plan, or at least the timing of 
it, and speak out more strongly against the Christendom of 
his day than be might otherwise have done • 
The title of one of Xierkegaard•s larger books has been 
called, in translation, Stages on Life's Way. This would 
suggest that when step number two had been taken, step number 
one had been left behind, and when step three, the first two, 
and so on. But this is not the case, as we shall shortly see • 
. 
Lowrie, in his work as translator, has kept the word 
"stages", but in his introduction, he is at pains to show 
that "spheres" or "existence-spheres" would better convey 
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Kierkegaar~'s idea. Swenson, another translator snd student 
of Kierkegaard, speaks of them as ways or modes of life. And 
they are ways of life or spheres of existence which co-exist 
and which overlap, rather than stages which in the sequence 
of time one completely surmounts.l We shall keep to "stages", 
since the book has that in its title, but we shall remember 
the limitations of the term and what we have learned from the 
substitute suggestions. 
The stages are usually given as three, the aesthetic, the 
·ethical and the religious, but there are, as well, transition 
stages, and there are two stages of religion which are called 
by Kierkegaard, "religion An and "religion B". 
Kierkegaard presents his material in two ways, dramati-
cally and through abstract formulations. To discover the 
dramatic source material for the aesthetic stage we must turn 
to "The Seducer's Diaryn in Either/Or and to "In Vino Veritasn 
in Stages on Life's Way. 
There are five literary incarnations of this aesthetic 
way of life, Johannes the Seducer, the author of nThe Se-
ducer's Diaryn, who has surrendered his life to the path which 
leads up to a seduction and to the moment when it has been 
accomplished; Vietor Eremita, the publisher of the papers in 
Either/Or, and who represents "sympathetic ironytr; Constantine 
Oonstantius, the author of Repetiti.on and the person who ar-
ranges a banquet in Stages on Life's Way. He represents a 
1. Lowrie, SLK, 336. 
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"cold and fLuperior intelligencen. Next, an unnamed young man 
who is the author o£ the £irst part o£ Either/Or, and who is 
the embodiment o£ nre£lective melancholyrr. And lastly, the 
Ladies' Tailor in "In Vino Veritas", who typi£iea "aesthetic 
despair".l 
The abstract presentation o£ the aesthetic way is given 
by Judge William in Either/Or, though he himsel£ is an ethicist; 
by Frater Taciturnus, or Silent Brother, in Stages on Life 1 s 
Way; and in portions o£ the Concluding Unscienti£ic Postacript.2 
As Kierkegaard uses the term uaestheticn it is in a broad 
rather than a narrow, technical sense. The "natural man" be-
longs to this stage or sphere. In this way o£ life, beauty 
can certainly be appreciated and beautiful things produced, 
but in general it means a pursuit of pleasure with little more 
than paliteness to hinder one from responding to one•s sensory 
demands. Broader still it has much to do with Biblical "world-
liness" and, as we have said, with Kierkegaard's conception of 
the natural man. When followed, it leads to a split existence, 
for the world beckons to the senses from every point of the 
co~ass. And it ends in emptiness and despair and, perhaps, 
a transition stage which leads into the ethical, that of irony. 
Swenson gives three reasons as to why all of the transi-
tions from one stage to another are always times of crisis, 
and always across a breach in continuity.3 First, the values 
1. Swenson, SAK, 169. 
2. Thomte, KPR, 16. 
3. Swenson, SAK, 162. 
in each stage are determi~ed -~y speoifio :passions or enthu-
siams which are qualitatively different. Second, a person-
ality whose life is in the one sphere cannot by a mere pro-
cess of reflection transport himself into the other; for this 
a passionate resolution o:f the will is necessary. And third, 
the change from one sphere to the other is never necessary, 
but always contingent; that is to say, it may or may not take 
place. A "leapn is necessary in eaoh case, and £or eaeh sueh 
leap, and particularly in the case of the leap into Christi-
anity, one must have the help or grace of God. 
When one has come to the moment o£ utter despair in the 
aesthetic life and has found and been given the courage to 
make the leap, first into an intermediate stage of an ironical 
consideration of that which has formerly given satisfaction, 
and then, into the possibilities that lie beyond such a way 
of life, one has begun to approach the ethieal sphere of 
living. 
The aesthetic person has sought for happiness in enjoy-
ment, the ethical seeks it in nthe realization of an obliga-
tory task". The former lives a treadmill existence; the 
latter is ever widening the circle of his living-space and 
his activities. For the ethical man is related to something 
outside himself, something greater than. himself; or, more ac-
curately, he is related to something in himself that is beyond 
the "natural man". The religious man is also, of necessity, 
related to something outside himself, or something in himself 
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that is greater than the na-t-ural man, but his relationship 
·is much more full. It is as though the ethical man were 
related to real but abstract principles, while the religious 
man is related to a real "concrete" person. 
The ethical life, says Swenson, is: 
"an overt life, without secrets, without myster-
ies, and without privacies. God is the univer-
sal background for the ethical life, but He does 
not in any special sense break into it. His 
position is the ~osition of the point which de-
termines the perspective of the picture, but 
which does not form a part of the picture itself."l 
The ethical way is presented by an invented character, 
Judge Williams, whose views are given in volume two of Either/ 
Or, and in "Various Observations about Marriage" in Stages on 
' 
Life•s Way. And there is more abstract talk about this stage 
in Oonoluding Unscientific Postscript. 
But a person living in this ethical sphere also finds 
that it is eventually frustrating. For one thing, there is 
always the pull baok into the aesthetic way of life, and for 
another, the ethical ideal is always unrealizable in its 
fullness. 
In such orisia moments the ethicist will protect himself 
and take an unwitting step forward into a transition stage by 
the use of humor, Irony, then, lies between the aesthetic and 
the ethical stages, and humor, humor at that which, a moment 
before had been the cause of disturbing frustration, and hu-
mor at the ponderous moralizing of the ethicist, between the 
1, Swenson, SAK, 171~ 
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ethieal and the religious stage. 
Out of this al tarnation between ethical suffering and 
unsatisfying humor there comes the need for the leap, the 
divinely-helped leap, into the sphere of religion. 
In the character of Judge William we find a description 
of the .ethical sphere and more than an introduction to the 
religious sphere, for the Judge is aware of this higher form 
of life even though he himself is still making his home in 
the ethieal. And besides this attempt of the Judge, in 
Either/Or to tell us of the ethical life we have, as three 
other sources, Re;peti tion, Fear and Trembling and the pa.pe:r;o, 
. uGuil ty?/Not Guil ty?n in Stages on Li:fe 's Way. 
In the aesthetic stage we have seen enjoyment culminat-
ing in despair, in the .ethical, struggle and temporary vic-
tory, but, again, an ending in despair. In the religious 
stage, whether it be nreligion A" or nreligion B" - to be 
differentiated in the next paragraph - we :find that suffering 
has become an essential. 
R~ligion A is not yet Christian. It is ucha.raoterized 
essentially by a passive relation to the divine, with the 
accompanying suffering and sense of guilt.n1 It is the reli-
gion of immane~oe and has at its core a belief that God is 
immanent in human subjectivity. It believes that li:fe comes 
to fulfilment as there is inner concentration upon this imma-
nent truth, and as an ethical effort is made to e%J>ress it in 
ooncrete living. 
1. Swenson, SAX, 175. 
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Re~igion B, on the the-other hand, is Christianity. It 
is the religion of transcendence. In it guilt has become a 
sense of sin, and there is a great gulf fixed between the hu-
man and the divine. Faith takes the place of a sense of im-
manent truth, and the God outside of human personality meets 
human personality only as the revealed One. By this reve~a­
tion, supremely shown in the God-Man. Ohrist, God shows Him-
self to be the forgiving One. 
The difference between these ways of life is sometimes 
shown by studying the relation of each of them to "time".l 
For the aesthetic way, the happy present moment is the point 
of :focus. In the ethical life the time-line ~engthens and 
contains ethical events. Religion A accepts this span of 
history and shows the way in which a life must be changed, 
changed to the way of religion, in this long line of time, 
While Re~igion B iS interested in time as a deciding-p~aee 
for the ever-present realm of eternity. Contrasted with 
Religion A, which is universal, Religion B is essentially 
particularistic, 
So life can and should move from the aesthetic stage of 
natural man, through irony, into the ethical stage, then 
through humor into the stage o:f religion A and :from he~e to 
religion B. Yet all of these must eo-exist in the last to 
be named. They are, as it were, the sections of a pushed-in 
teleseope, the aesthetic being the smallest inner section. 
l•· ·sw:ems on, SAX:, 17 6. 
Each is subsumed rather than_ eliminated as a person moves 
forward. 
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In each case, and even into and out of the intermediate 
stages, there is a leap that is necessary, and the mo.tive 
for such a leap is suffering. But even this suffering is 
something which the person takes with him into the nezt.stage, 
and with each advance - as in the ease of life becoming more 
complex and more sensitive ~ the possibility of suffering is 
increased. But this suffe~ing becomes more and more effe~tive 
as man,. through the sought and given grace of God, makes it sa. 
This outline of the stages whioh were so important in the 
thought of Kierkegaard will be before us as we study his use 
of the ooneept ttsoul". For saUl, at each stage, may have a 
different and, sinoe the stages are disconnected, an almost 
unrelated meaning 11 And we shall have in mind, too, the two 
kinds of writing, those which appeared under pseudonyms and 
those whieh appeared under his own name. For in the :former, 
the ooncept "soul" might be used, not as Kierkegaard thought 
of it, but as his invented authors or characters might think 
of it. It is only in the nan-pseudonymous writings that we 
can say, Kierkegaard believed thus and so. We shall first of 
all, and next, turn to these writings and study them chrono-
logically to discover his use or uses o:f the ooncept "aauln. 
5, A study o:f the specific mention and usage of the concept 
"saul" in the writings of Kierkegaard. 
._, 
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Under his selected ps~donyms Kierkegaa~d issued all of 
his aesthetic and his ethical writings and the two books in 
which he presents religion B, or Ohristianit~ as he eonoeived 
it. Under his own name he published all of his writings which 
deal directly with religion A, the pagan religion of immanence 
which passed, in his day - so he said - for Christianity. 
Kierkegaard himself did not, on his own admission, in other 
than the way of understanding and e%planation, move past re-
ligion A to religion B. 
In his acknowledged writings, that is, acknowledged at 
the time of publication, the concept "soul" is used hundreds 
of times~ It would be possible to list every usage, but some 
o:f them appear only as a synonym for "person" in a non-tech-
nical sense; and others show the word being used in a scrip-
tural quotation or with uncritical habitualness. We shall 
not, therefore, include these usages in our study. Nor shall 
we list those usages in which usouln is found to be a syno-
nym for "mindn as that term is commonly used; that is, as 
that which not only thinks but knows emotion. 
In this last-named category, we shall find man~ occasions 
when "soul" means something more than "mindn and in our stud~ 
we shall study these. And we shall find, too, that there are 
t~mes when Kierkegaard gives us information about the soul 
whicll he believes in, when nsouln becomes a concept standing 
in its own right. 
In our reading of Kierkegaard we find that he is eager 
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to treat man as existent rather than as essence; that is, as 
man or as individual men whom we know~ not whom we know about. 
This man is a body-soul living in a synthesizing realm of 
spirit. Aesthetic or natural man does not know this realm of 
spirit, but as man moves beyond this first stage, he becomes 
increasingly aware of it, and increasingly obedient to in-
sights gained. But in his treatment of the soulish part of 
this synt.hesis whiob. is ma.n, Kierkegaard, almost invariably, 
treats of its essence rather than its e~istenae qua existence. 
-
This was done, not deliberately, but because the concept 
"soul", except in one or two places, did not receive more 
than the passing foaus of his attention. Two of these excep-
tional places, as we shall see, are in the two edifying dis-
oourses, "To Acquire One's Soul. in Patience" and one whioh 
followed it some months later, "To Preserve Onets Soul in 
Pa.tienoe". 
"Soul." was an important oonoept :for him, one that was 
absolutely ne·oessary, but ao.mpa.red with other concepts and 
with other existential processes, ita meaning did not become 
for him a. live issue. The soul was present in the man-syn~ 
thesis as a given thing, a thing to be assumed, a.nd any talk 
about it began at this point. 
With these exclusions, -the:p., namely, the use of "soul" 
as a synonym for "person" in a non-technical sense; its use 
in a quotation or with what we have called uncritical habit-
ualness; and its use as a synonym :for mind, we shall move 
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forward into ~ur investigating task. We shall be on the alert 
for existent usages, especially in the verb-forms and the verb-
phrases which describe the activities of the soul, but most of 
our findings will be adjectival and Will point to essence. 
We shall, first of all, examine the books in which he sets 
:forth religion A. These, as has been stated, were given under 
his own name, and they giv~more than his other writings his 
own personal, realized religion, and therefore the concepts of 
that religion. 
The first of these were the Two Edifyi;og Discourses· of 
May 16, 1843. And from.these we learn that the soul is en-
dangered by the manifold - which is the world - and that if 
it would reach its destination, it must, in its struggle a-
gainst falling into· the manifold, enter into patience and re~ 
ceive there the help of the One, even God. 
The next usages are found in the. Three Edifying Discourses 
of october 16, 1843. And from these we learn that the soul 
stands, in its essence, very near to God; ~hat the aotual, 
sought and permitted relationship between the soul and the 
world (its enemy) and God {its ~riend) is more important 
than any'plan of salvation whioh is discovered or set down 
in writings. And again we see that the soul lives on the edge 
of ultimate danger as well as on the very borders o£ the realm 
of heaven. 
The definition of soul given in these extracted quotations, 
and given by the use of a synonymous phrase, is that it is a 
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man•s "oa;paoity for understanding and willing". This is, 
perhaps, nearer to nsoul" as "mindn rather than to soul as 
aonsoioua mind plus unoonsaious parts and proaesses, as Kier-
kegaard woUld think of it. 
Next; and following the list of the works given in Ap-
pendix IV o-f Lowrie 1 s longer life of Kierkegaard, we aome to 
the Four Edifying Disaourses of Deaember 6, 1843. And among 
these we find tba. t the fourt,h., nTo Aoquire One's SoUl in Pe.-
tienoen, based on the text from Luke, "In your pe.tienae ye 
shall win your -aoulsn, and the Discourse whioh follows in 
Me.rah of the next year, n,To Preserve One's Soul in Pe.tienoen, 
give more information about Kierkegaard's use of the conaept 
nsoul" than do all of his other non~J>seudonymous writings c.om-
bined. 
In the forty-eight pages of these two Disaourses, the 
aoncept nsouJ.u appears further and furtlln.er along a.road o:f 
explanation no less than one· hundred and fifty-seven times. 
A summary of the knowledge gained should be prefaeed, however, 
by a statement made by Kierkegaard in the first of these two 
Discourses.. It ehows him as a per a on who is aoncerned about 
the existential requirements and implications of winning one•s 
soul. He writes! 
"The me:r.e faot o:f knowing what the human 
soul is, what it means, ie very far from begin-
ning to acquire one•s own soul in patienae, and 
it is a knowledge which proves its own difference 
:from that acquirement by the :faet that this know-
ledge grows in impatience. Although this know-
ledge oan have its own signifioanae, it never-
.· 
the~ess £requently dece~ves a man, just as the 
world does, because he believes that he possesses 1 it, while it is his knowledge that possesses him.n 
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With this warning in mind, a warning against the mere 
pursuit of essence, and with this strong suggestion that we 
shall have much to do with processes, we shall go forward to 
give a brie£ summary o£ what we learn from these two Discourses 
about Kierkegaard 1 S conception of the soul~ 
First, doubt retards tbe actualizing of the soul, distrac-
tion, oonfuaion and earthly anxiety threaten it, anger injures 
it, and it can be destroyed by an experience of horror~ The 
body may be saved - at the soul•s expense - but the soul it-
self and so the whole man, body and soul, can ~be saved 
only through the struggle to humble oneself before God; tbrough 
the pain of this str~ggle, which makes the soul receptive to 
God 1 s revelation; and through thanksgiving as it lifts itself 
up before God. An~, a strong suggestion of the immanence of 
this stage, whioh is religion A, the Lord is in the upright 
soul. 
The soul which is nthe inward in its most universal ex-
pressionu2 stands in contrast to the world; indeed, it is 
man's distinction from a worldly life. But it also has with-
in itself a oontradiotion, :for it participates in both· ·the·· 
temporal and the eternal, and these are contradicting realms. 
And we see here the seed of that thinking which will later be 
1. Kierkegaard, E~ II. 83-84. 
2. Kierkegaard, ED, II, 72. 
develo~ed, by Kierkegaar~ into the religion of transoen-
denoe, religion B. 
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But this self-oontradiotion within the soul, whioh is 
an attribute of the soul, or, better still, this restless 
process within the soUl, gives the necessary movement for 
the actualization of the soul. For the soul of natural or 
aesthetic man, and even of ethioal man)is in need of being 
reeovered from that potentiality to which the world has re-
duoed it. 
And here we have Kierkegaard's understanding of Hegel 
translated into a dialeotioal process of his own fashioning. 
For in so far as the body represents the world, we have it 
as thesis, with the soul, antithesis; and the two must be 
brought in and by the spirit into a state of oonsoious syn-
thesis. And this must be repeated over and over again at 
different levels of consciousness until we have body-soul 
wholly living, first on earth and then in heaven, in the 
realm of the Spirit, or the Eternal. 
The world, in which natural man lives and has his worldly 
auooess, owns the soul. And yet it does not, for nan u:nlaw-
ful ownership is not an ownership.ul The legitimate owner 
of the soul, its true possessor, is God; and while this own-
er~:Jhip by God must. always be so, as a parent might be said 
to own a ohild all its life, yet man oan have his own kind of 
1. Kierkegaard, ED, II, 75. 
soul-ownership. And until a man has possession of his soul 
in this permitted and $ncouraged way, he has, no matter what 
his worldly success may have been~ possession of nothing. 
A man must, therefore, acquire/ or sav~ his soul from 
the world; and his whole life, whether it be lost in a. mo-
ment of crisis, a moment in which the decision has b~en for 
the soul, or whether it be given, this life, through long, 
patient yea.l"S, is not too mu.oh to give :fo:r his soul. And 
wise is the man who has discovered that it is the only priee, 
and who has paid that price. 
A man must acquire his soul, and yet he too already pos-
sesses it, possesses it as potential. His spiritual task is 
to acquire it as the actual. It becomes man's own possession, 
for him the pearl with the great price paid~ as he acquires 
it from the world and of God and through himself; through him-
self, not beoause his own unaided struggle is enough, but 
through himself, as God brings aid, in an inward process. The 
soul becomes, then, a possession o:f his inner life, and grad-
ually the possession is ohanged into the possessor, the orig-
inal inner life into the awakened soul. 
The soul is acquired - and this is important - not through 
patience or by means of patience, but in patience, for "the 
oondition does not cease with the acquiring.n1 
From man•s point of view, the saved soUl is so much a 
1. Kierkegaard~ ED II, 78. 
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produot o£ a nourishing inner world of patience that one can 
make the terms almost synonymous and say that to acquire pa-
tience is to acquire one's soul, To quote, "It is patience 
itself into which the soul, in patience, spins itself, and 
thereby acquires patience and itself."l 
One warning before we go on to elaborate on this method 
of acquiring: it 1s possible to use patience to recognize the 
soul, and to go no further than this. Many of the philosophers, 
the system builders, have done just this. But reeognitiont 
while it may lie along the way of acquiring, is not acquiring, 
and one is indeed blind, and as a leader most dangerous, when 
he has not made this distinction. 
Here we have, once more, Xierkegaard turning away :f:r om 
the search for essence, which had occupied so many of the 
schools, and turning toward the existing pattern of action 
and reaction, or, better still, the existing process, in the 
one moment that is most real of the individual, the present 
moment. And James is quoted to drive the matter home: "The 
rightful hearer of the word is the doer of the word.n2 
And now we oome to certain suggestions, which are offered 
by Xierkegaard about the method of acquiring the soul. The 
state of the soul of natural or aesthetic man, and, to an ex-
tent, the state of the soul of ethical man, is that of being 
imprisoned by the world in the realm of the potential. The 
1. Kierkegaard, ED II, 81. 
2. James, I* 25!' 
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task is to release this soul, or any "limb" of it, into the 
realm of the actual, the spiritually actual. To do this a 
new soul-process must be substituted for the natural one~ 
The process whereby a man is content to give his soul, that 
is, allow it to remain potential, in e%change for the world 
must be reversed, A man must le~n, through intense struggle, 
to give the world in e%change for the soul, for the actualiz-
ing of the soul, and he must do this "by allowing antipathy 
1 for the world to become more and more explicit." 
It would seem, almost, as if man were permitted worldly 
sueaeas, were permitted to forget his potential soul, so that 
the need for the struggle and ita intensity become necessary. 
Man who is not struggling may not know this, but as a man be-
gins to relinquish his grasp upon the world, and so the grasp 
of the world upon him, struggle begins to have meaning; and 
the meaning is seen to be related to God, and to the saving 
of one's soUl in patienoe. 
This constant referenoe to struggle might suggest that 
foroe is the only way. But this is not so. This reoovery 
and this actualization of the soul ~ and modern processes 
whereby one learns to increase one's eonsoiousneaa are not 
unlike it - must be the result of a baoking away, a giving 
up, a losing of ita own natural signifioanoe so that it may 
find ita true aignifioanoe in God. The soul oan be strong 
1. Kierkegaara, ED II, 76. 
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in the ~aoe o~ a threaten~ng world, only through its weakness, 
its dependence upon an other-than-itsel~, namely, God • 
.And so our ears are tuned onoe more to hear the word ttpa-
tienoe". We must aoquire our souls and retain our souls in 
-
patience. In patience we must learn to oome and oome in ac-
tuality to terms, and to daily, ever-different terms, with 
the "owners" of the soul. Kie:rkegaa.rd puts it thus: 
" ••• with the worldly life when the sufferer 
acquires himself from it; with God when the suf-
ferer receives h~self from Him; and with himself 
when he retains what, at the same time, he gives 
to both, without anyone being able to take it 
from him. nl 
In this quotation nhimself" stands, in the first two 
oases for "souln, as it does in the quotation whioh is to be 
given below; a statement about the ever-receding goal of all 
this struggle, this tireless activity, and, in a phrase from 
T. s. Eliot, this "tireless passivityn,. Kierkegaard says, 
all this must be brought to pass so that a man nmay have him-
self in everlasting understanding with God." At the end of 
this process, if there be an end, a man 1 s soul is at peaoe, 
the will of God has become ita will, and in its essence the 
soul is incorruptible,. This is the existential way to the 
soul's salvation, and there is, says Xierkegaard, no other. 
We shall look, next, at the Two Edifying Disooursea 
dated March 5• 1844. We find certain very speoifio material 
here, material relevant to our task, but before we give it 
l. Kierkega.ard, ED II, 82-83,. 
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may we stress onae again the thought that the soUl must be 
possessed and preserved in patience and not through or by 
means of patience. There is, as it were, a sustaining realm 
o:f patience, and there the soul must :find its way and learn 
to live. There is also a realm o:f impatience and when the 
soul is there, attempting to live by the means and ends of 
impatience, it is living to its own destruction. 
Patience, in its habit o:f quiet vigilance, concentrates 
on only one thing, on the winning and the preservation, the 
aotive preservation'o:f the soul. And patienoe, and the soul 
which lives in patie~ae, have :five enemies and must win, con-
tinually, :five victories. 
First, there is the never-resting enemy, time; an enemy 
which would discourage us in the present; coax us backward 
into the pleasant past; threaten us with ou:r memories o:f the 
unpleasant; or, offer us a :future which, because o:f its smile, 
will keep us :from the present; or because of its angry :frown, 
will make us cling to a present which we must let go. 
The second enemy of the soul is more a thing of spaoe. 
It is the manifold enemy, the complex organic world which is 
around us and in us to the end, tempting us to give to it our 
ba..ttee 
:full allegiance; or, more subtly, tempting us to unpro:fitabl~ 
against it. 
Third - and this and the last two o~ the enemies :fight 
:for us by :fighting against us; asking to be conquered that we 
may come to the strength of a conqueror - we are :forever in 
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conflict with and within the realm of the Spirit. or, as Kier-
kegaard calls it, the Eternal. This is God's realm rather 
than God. And, as we have intimated, we are struggling for 
something rather than against something, as one struggles, 
say, in the dialectical relationship of marriage to raise the 
level of the interchanges of marriage. 
But God himself is also our enemy in this contributing 
sense - and this is the fourth. He is our Adversary; One who 
would Himself wrestle with us that we may be prepared for His 
increasing blessing. 
And fifth and lastly, the enemy for our own soul's sake 
is our own soUl. For we are both, in our inmost ao.tualized 
souls, legitimately and necessarily, a citizen of two con-
flicting worlds, the temporal Bll.d the Eternal. We are both 
the battlefield and the battle; a battle against that which 
would make us less than whole, and a battle for the ac-
tualizing of an higher and higher body-soul synthesis. 
In this struggle to actualize the soul in its synthe-
sis with the body in and because of the spirit, we find that 
we have to begin again and again from the very beginning. 
And this, not because we have ceased to struggl_e, but be-
cause of the very strength of the enemy; and because, onae 
seeing our image in the mirror, we are apt to go away and 
forget the actual details which should ~etermine the strug-
gle. Or, to use yet another figure, we may begin the strug-
gle as we would begin a race, and forget and so cut ourselves 
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off from the inspiration o:f' the finish line. 
In this bookl Kierkegaard suggests three other helps as 
patience seeks to do its work for the soul. First, there is 
reflection. Reflection can ward off the monotony of earthly 
a!l:X'iety and keep the a oul from being swallowed up in earthly 
occupa tiona. 
Second, there is e:r:pectation. E:r:pectation is a ttprim-
itive condition of the souln, and by expectation the sleep-
ing soul may be awakened. 
And third - and we are at the heart of Kierkegaard's 
autobiographical feeling here - we are helped in our work 
of actualizing the soUl in patience by ntbe thought of the 
deadn. Such a thought, which never really slumbers, strength-
ens the sinews of patience and feedS endurance to the soul. 
But, as we have seen, the~e is another strengthener, our 
n enemy", God. As we rue h headlong to the limits of despair, 
we pass God on the way, and as we pass, He judges us in terms 
of our sincerity, and as we are sincere, He gives us strength. 
Not that we may turn back, but that we may go forward into 
despair to meet Him there again in a relationship that is 
even more hopefUl and more complete. We only come upon the 
living God as we are going toward despair, or living in des-
#pair. 
The next material which we shall present is from the 
Tbree Edifying Discourses of June 8, 1844. From these pages 
1. Kierkegaard, ED, 111 
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we have four thoughts.. First, the e:xpressed opinion that the 
greatest injury which a man can inflict upon his soul, an in-
jury for which there is no compensating way out except a turn-
ing to God, is to give up the thought of God. 
Second, the thought that the intelleot as a producer, as 
well as that which it produces (we are in the framework of a 
faoulty psychology) must notJ in the happy glow of e~feots, be 
parmi tted to draw the soul aside from its realm of humble pa-
tience, and so bring it into mortal danger. 
Third, we have another help for the soul as it keeps to 
its endless task; namely, that an e:xpeotation of eternal hap-
piness will give to a soul a valid point of refereime within 
itself, and a standard for judging that which is "petty", and 
which does not contribute to this eternal happiness. 
And fourth, we are told that if there has been the thought 
th~t a tlOul which is delivered fro.m the unlawful ownership of 
a world which has held it prisoner in its potential state, is 
therefore delivered from the world, and from standing in a 
positive relationship with the world, then that thought is 
mistaken. Kierkegaard sums this up in the following - and the 
context is not important just here - na sick soul 1 s crafti-
ness that would sneak out of life, not a sound soul.•s frank 
presence in the temporal. nl 
Next, and ooming from the press on August 31, 1844, we 
.have the Four Edifying Disoouraes. These complete the eight-
1. Kierkegaard, ED 111~ 103. 
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een Discourses whiah were a£terwards published in one volume. 
There is not a great deal to add as we read these for 
1n£ormation about Kierkega~d's conception of the soul. we 
find? in these four last Discourses, that we are still in the 
area o£ religion A, the religion of God's immanence. For in-
staneeJwe read that the striving soul must seek to resemble 
God. But this, even in religion A1 can be accomplished only 
through grace. Need is present in the soul, both when it is 
striving to live without acknowledging in action its relation-
ship with God, and when it is striving £or God. In the former 
we have the mark of human imperfection; in the latter, the 
same soUl-need with:: its direction changed, becomes the mark 
of human' perfection. 
The ne~t three Discourses are called by Kierkegaard? 
Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions. These occasions are 
a time of confession, a wedding and beside an open grave. The 
book was published on April 29, 1845, and in the Swenson trans-
lation of 1941? it is called Thoughts on Crucial Situations 
in Human Life. Part ot the first Discourse is aLso £ound in 
Lowrie's translation of Stages on Life's Way. 
In these three Discourses we find the soul involved in 
the process of its own salvatio.n. It would seem to run thus -
and we shoUld remember that this is still religion A, a re-
ligion which Kierkegaard later called un-Christian. The soul, 
reaching a s·ta te when nit is too late to shout for human aidn 
is plunged into an almost hopeless but God-directed emotion. 
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This brings it, gradual~, and especially when it is under the 
power of solitude, into· a state of wonder. The former hope-
lessness changes into the fascinated fear of this mood of won-
der, and the former glimmer of hope may burst into a great 
light and envelop~ the soul with bliss. And so this wander 
can bring one into the very presence of God; a presence which 
clarifies the soul and gives to it the prayer which it then 
utters. Before, a sigh was its best prayer and ambiguity its 
best thinking; but now, ·standing in the midst of wonder, the 
sigh finds a sufficient thought and the thought a clear-sound-
ing word,. 
But in this clear moment of an experienced Presenae, the 
soul knows itself to be in its greatest difficulty. In this 
blaze of light the soUl ts imperfections are most shown. ·Hence 
the need for confess ion and the need to accept forgiveness, and 
so, thanksgiving; and new wonder, and the beginning of yet an-
other round in the spiral of progress towards salvation and 
along that way which has for its name, Salvation. 
Rebellion against the revealed God, or rebellion against 
the current of this tending-toward-God, is sin, and one ceases 
to sin when one ceases to rebel. The same sins done when one 
is tending toward God have a different meaning from that which 
they have when one is rebelling. In the first case it is as 
if a man through weakness cut himself in a doctor•s office. 
In the other, it is as if a man had, in a gestu:re of rebel-
lion, given himself the same cut in the midst of a desert. 
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This journey, then, b.etween sinfulness and a inlessness, takes 
the whole of life all of the time. 
The ne~t of the writings which Kierkegaard acknowledged 
at publication is called Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits. 
They were published on March 13, ·1847. The first and third 
parts of this three-part work are eaoh a book in length; the 
second oonsists of three brief discourses. We shall deal with 
each of these parts in turn. 
First we have Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. The 
theme of the book is the need to purify and the insight whioh 
will be needed for this purpose. As "soul" comes into this 
book, there are many references to its hidden side, or to 
what lies hidden in its depths. And this hidden part of the 
soul is, sometimes, the little remnant o:f hope in the great 
overwhelming power of despair; the thought that as the soul 
was plunged into its mood of desperation, some good went 
down with it. And, according to this book, it is this hope 
that is one 1 s possible link with salvation. 
At other times this hidden part of the soul seems _to 
be, not just a link with the EternaJ. - whioh must be the 
bringer of salvation - but the Eternal itself; that which 
stands as the antithesis of the Time-order and all that 
this order posseases and promises. This Eternal visits 
the soul in its double state of hope and hopelessness; or, 
a description of the way it seems to happen, it awakens 
in the soul. 
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Suf£e~~ is stressed in this book; not suffering as 
self-induced, but suffering as entered into because the w~ 
that one has chosen lies through its land. Suffering may 
ensnare the soUl, and this d~ger will always remain, but to 
draw back from its potential threat and its actual demand, 
is to miss the way of soUl-salvation. 
The soUl. in its ;progress~ must accept facts as they 
are, including the fact of necessary suffering, and must 
even nhide nothing away suspiciously ••• as though it still 
wished that it had happened differently".l In this whole-
souled decision and commitment to the Good (used, here, by 
Kierkegaard as a synonym for God} a man must even take ac-
count of the soul-knowledge which can come from dreams. 
There is a curiously modern ring about this, and a link 
with Freud. 
The second part of Edifying Discourses in Various 
Spirits, which is called, by Aldworth and Ferrie, Ediff-
... ,.-. 
ing Discourses in a Different Vein, consists of three ad-
dresses on "What is to be learnt from the lilies of the 
:field and the birds of the air?" 
In these Discourses, in the incidental talk about 
the soul, we learn that the anxiety or concern or suffer-
ing in the soUl, which is a consequence of its own seek-
ing and yearning, makes it fixate on itself like a star-
ing eye.. And the consequence is the wonder of which we 
have spoken; wonder at the Eternal which is then seen to 
·1. Kierkegaard, PH, 210. 
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be implanted in the soul and whioh is the oause of the origi-
nal seeking and the yearning. 
We· learn too, ~rom these Disoourses, that it is God and 
not the soUl .., as in the J?haedo o:f :Plato ~ who nweaves" the 
human body. 
The third part o:f the Edifying Diseours:es in Various 
Spirits is oalled ~he Gospel of S~ferin&• The soul, accord-
ing to gathered statements from this work, can know two kinds 
o~ suffering, that whioh comas from doubt and irresoluteness, 
and that whioh oomes :from, or rather, that which oomes after 
one has deeided to sub~it one's will to God. Suoh a decision 
brings invisible help, help which becomes visible in its oon-
sequences, but it also brings this second kind of suffering, 
Both kinds of suffering, the suffering o:f doubt and the 
suffering of religious belief and action, can be miniS tared 
to by the remedies of worldly wisdom; but nthese remedies all 
have the distressing characteristic that they serve the body 
but destroy the soul"- The God who gives this second suffer-
ing, gives it as a sun gives a knowledge of-blemishes, but He 
also gives the remedy; namely, His own presence. Sometimes 
we call this "grace". 
The next of the writings to be examined was published on 
September 29, 1847 under the title The Works of Love. Th~ 
concept "soul" is vary little used in the two parts o:f the 
book, perhaps because it is what Kierkegaard would call "so~ 
cial ethios" and not a work in religion, though it is steeped 
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in religion. And perhaps-· the word "souln does not appear as 
much as one might e:zpect because the wordnself" is much used 
in its pages. There is, however, one passage at the beginning 
of the second part which may clarify a point. In summary it 
says, the spirit is present in a person from the moment of 
birt~ at its task of synthesizing body and soul, but it is 
only later, perhaps with the dawn of self-consciousness, that 
one may begin to be aware of himself as spirit. There is, 
then, this possible and neoessary, - i:f man would know sal-
vation, - spiritual awakening~ 
But here is also an awakening of the soul, and this, ac-
cording to the passage, seems to take place after the first 
spiritual awareness. This would seem to be a contradiction. 
For, surely, something of "soul" is needed to be aware of 
spirit. At any rate, this soul-awakening does not "proclaim 
itself in a sensuous or sansuo-:psyehioal manner", 1 but in-
wardly and after the fashion of the realm of emotion-laden 
ideas. 
Moving on, we oome to The Point of View for my Work as 
an Author, one of the most direct of Kierkegaard's oommuni-
oations. It was written in 1848, but was not published until 
1859, four years after Kierkegaard 1 s death. From it we learn, 
if we needed to do so, that the n:prodigious griefs" of the 
inmost soul, when that soul is religiously awakened, were 
1. Kierkegaard, WL, 169. 
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known to Kierkegaard. He dr~ upon himself, his own e~peri­
enoe of suffering, for his thoughts about the soul. 
From 1846 to 1855, Kierkegaard was working, from time to 
time, an two "notes" about his work as an author and these 
were published posthumously in 1859 under the title The In-
dividual. Kierkegaard uses the term nrnd.ividual" a great 
deal, and uses it with two different meanings. The first in 
an aesthetic sense only and for a person distinguished in the 
world 1 S eyes; an important or unusual person. And secondly, 
he uses ttindividual" in a religious sense. In this sense 
the nrndividual" is what every man is or can be. Every real 
Ohristian is, by definition, .an "Individualn who does not 
hide from God in a crowd or in a Church body, b~t who stands 
as a solitary person before God.. He does not send a substi-
tute into the presence of God. a priest or a fraction of his 
own nature, but goes himself as a whole being seeking whole-
ness. 
In both of these uses of the wora ulndividual" it would 
be possible to spealt of the soul. The di:fferenoe lies in 
the awareness of the second Individual that the synthesizing 
1..5 
spirit~in the body~soul, man. And the presence of the spirit, 
when it is recognized, makes the concept of the soul, both 
now and as seen by a person retroactively, to have a new im-
po:rtanoe. 
About my Work as an Author is dated March 1849 but it 
was not published until the summer of 1851. It gives no in-
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formation about Kierke·gaard's use of the concept "soul.". 
Armed Neutrality - so named by Lowrie in his longer 
life of Kierkegaard - or, "My Position as a Religious Writer 
in Christendom and my Tactics", is dated, Copenhagen, 1-{ovem-
ber 1850, and though it ±s very brief,Kierkegaard does tell 
us that he has never practised nor advocated npietistic se-:-
verity" for the soul. It has never been his wish to never-
tax human existence". 
The Edifying Discourses of December 20, 1850, contain 
no reference to the soul! 
On August 7, 1851, Kierkegaard published Two Discourses 
at the Communion on ;J.i'ridays but again there is no mention 
made in them of the soul. 
September 10, in this same year, saw the issuing of ~ 
Self-Examination. In this we learn two things whioh benefit 
the soul in opposite but necessary ways; namely, a home, with 
wife and children, which give the soul "peace and repose"; 
and, second, a sensitive, expectant reading of God's word, 
which will put fear and trembling into the soul. And so, says 
Kierkegaard, nby God 1 s help thou shalt succeed in becoming a 
man, a personality saved from being this dreadful absurdity 
which we call men.n1 
Another need of the soul is sharply stated in these words: 
One is "obliged in one's lifetime to separate from one's own 
1. Kierkegaard, FSE, 67p 
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sau1,"1 This is the scriptural losing of one's life to find 
it, and it is even more painful than "the separation of soul 
and body at the hour of death." This last statement is also 
made by Kierkegaard. in this book, and it is strangely unKier-
kegaardianJunless we think of it as a putting off of the 
earthly body as Paul would use the term. 
The third work published by Kierkegaard in 1851 under 
his own name was Judge for Yourself! • Lowrie considers its 
brief preface to be of special importance, beoause it puts 
a certain content into the much-repeated word nindividual n. 
To be a single Individual means, among other things, nto 
have and to will to have a eonscienae, n And this for the 
sake of the soul 1 s salvation. 
Sault in this work, as elsewhere, and as we have said, 
is sometimes used for "personn and sometimes for nmindn; 
but it is also used in a more specific sense when, for e~-
ample, Kierkegaard, no doubt with Luther in his thoughts, 
speaks of the disquiet and unrest which are brought to the 
soul as it attempts "the way .of salvation through works, in-
eluding monastic torture, and not faith." Perhaps it is this 
non-productive disquiet and unrest that Kierkegaard is talk-
ing about when he speaks of Christ, by his atonement,"oasting 
out,.,all a~ious dread from men's smuls,n2 This, rather 
than the pr.oduotive dread wl:l,ich is the prelude to conviction 
1. Kierkegaard, FSE, 97. 
a. Kie~~egaard, JFY, 217, 
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o£ sin, and which, in our-£lesh-and-blood li~e, is an ever-
repeated state o~ the soul~ 
We shall turn now to the Articles in the Fatherland writ-
ten between December, 1854 and May, 1855. In reading them we 
~ind the concept "soul" used only four times and each time it 
-is a loose synonym :for "pe:rsonn. 
This Has To Be Said - So Be It Now Said was published on 
May 16, 1855. It is an attack on Bishop Martensen for his si~ 
~ence when the Fatherland articles were written, and for pur-
poses of our dissertation does not need to be further consid-
ere d. 
We shall consider the ten Instant papers together though 
the last of them was :found unpublished on Kierkegaard 1 s desk 
a~ter his death, and though two other statements, What Christ's 
Judgment is Upon Official Ohristianitl and God's Unchangeable-
ne~s were issued after the second and the seventh Instant pa-
pers respectively. These two interspersed statements do not 
add anything to our understanding of Kierkegaard's use o:f the 
concept "soul.t', but :from the Instant :papers we learn that it 
was Kierkegaard•s belief that "everyone that is born is by 
being born a lost soul."1 ~his could read, "has a lost soul", 
a soul which can be saved only by a man's response to the sav~ 
ing work of Christ~ This means "breaking with everything a 
man naturally loves.n2 And, by implication at least, this 
1. Kierkegaard, AUG. 213. 
2~ Kierkegaard, AUG, 191. 
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gives a glimpse o~ Kierk~aard's doctrine of man. 
Breaking, in this fashion, will mean anxious struggle. 
And the consequences of this struggle will change the soul 
for Judgment (capitalized by Kierkegaard). This tudgment 
will be in terms of two destinations for the soul, Heaven 
or Hell, and the decision will be final. 
It is on this grim need for a change in natural man, 
this actual, conscious spiritualizing of that which is body-. 
soul, that Kierkegaard ends his writings; both his acknowledged 
writings at the time of publication, and those which were is-
sued under a pseudonym~ The spirit is present from birth and 
it is the oause of the body-soul synthesis in natural or un-
saved man, but man, to be saved must know and respond to this 
synthesizing agent or realm, the spirit. And he must do this 
by faith, faith in the atoning work of the paradoxical God-Man, 
Christ. 
But this is to move trom religion A, as set forth in the 
first-acknowledged writings of Kierkegaard, to religion B, 1 
which he wrote of pseudonymously and impressionistically. He 
says that he had not yet attained to this other religion, 
whioh was Christianity, in any but a non-existential ~ashion. 
There is, however, one more work which we ought to con-
sider before we look at those writings which he did not ac-
knowledge at the time of publication, and this is his Journal, 
a book which he wrote with the expectation that it would be 
published. 
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Soattered through the 1409 items whioh Dru baa seleoted 
~rom the Journal we do have oertain re~erenoes to the sault 
but at no time is there a oonsideration o~ its nature. The 
existenoe is assumed, and the need ~or soul-salvation, and 
its possible destiny after this life, but these seem to keep 
within the oonoeptual meanings and the doctrines of the Lu-
theranism in whioh Kierkegaard was brought up and in whioh 
he oontinued all his days; that is, in other than the exis-
tential emphasis whioh made him the man and the writer that 
he was. 
In general, soul, for Kierkegaard, was a oonoept in the 
assumption-fringes o~ his mind, though~ as a living entity, 
it was at the heart and oenter of religious living. In one 
sense it was as muoh taken ~or granted by him as the air that 
he breathed; and in another, and again as an existent and not 
as a theologioal abstraotion, it was the loous of a man's des-
tiny; the point at whioh he must make his existential disoov-
eries and live his existential life. We shall have, in a lat-
er seotion, a summ.ary of what Kierkegaard has told us about 
his use of the conoept nsoul". 
In our searoh for soul-meanings we shall deal with the 
remainder of Kierkegaard's writings under three headings; 
first, with those whioh have to do with religion B, or Christ 
#ianity as it should be; seoond, with his ethioal writings; 
and third, with those writings whioh portray life as it is 
liVed in the aestheticaJ. or nsense" stage • 
............ -----------------------
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All of these writings were issued anonymoualy,and for the 
opinions expressed, Kierkegaard takes no personal responsi-
bility~ That is to say, soUl-meanings discovered in any other 
pages. other than the acknowledged ones, would not necessarily 
be the meanings which Kierkegaard would give to the concept 
nsouJ.n. We shall, therefore, look chiefly for differences from 
those meanings of the word which we have already discovered, 
and if we find. them, discount them. .fU:l4. i:f we do not find them 
it will tell us that the meaning of the concept is fixed in 
Kierkegaard to this extent, either because he did not consider 
its meaning, or because in his thought about the soul he came 
to conclusions which he never had to question. 
In this next stage of our investigation we shall present 
our findings, not book by book as before, but in bulk under 
each of the three headings. Our general finding has been that 
in no place in these unacknowledged writings does Kierkegaard 
use the term "soul" in a way that is different from his acknowl-
edged uses. 
We come then to religion B. To review, this is specifi-
cally the Christian religion npossible only in Christendom, or 
where the historical revelation of Jesus Christ is known and 
believed. nl We find Eternity in time in the person o:f Christ, 
challenging time, conflieting with time and looking forward to 
the termination o:f time. 
Kierkegaard begins to make the distinction between relig-
ion A, which is "simply a heartful expr~ssion of a sense of God, 
1. Lowrie, K, 323. 
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or of the numinous, or of an ex:pectation of eternal blessednessrrl, 
and religion B>in Concluding Unscientific Postscript and in 
Training in Christianity, b.ut he makes his most advanced state-
ment, advanced as a scout may be said to be in. advance of an 
army, in The Sickness Unto Death. 
In looking into these works we find a repetition of the 
soul.-body synthesis idea, with health and sensuousness as "im-
mediaten determinants. However, until a man has begun to know 
himself as spirit, despair, so important in the Christian life, 
can have only the power of a "dialectical. n determinant. A man 
will be restless and not know why. 
The one place where the thought of Kierkegaard is more 
subtle, in considering the sonl, than any that we find in the 
writings which give religion A, the writings already examined, 
is found in the book Sickness unto Death. It is where he is 
speaking, almost incidentally, of the relation between body 
and saul. The paragraph is not at all clear, but there seems 
to be a kind of nnegative unityn2 between body and soul. They 
are not drawn positively to each other, but to a third thing. 
Or they are drawn by this third thing to itself, and so in 
this unity with the third they find themselves in a unity which 
they had not intended. They have each started in a direction 
away from each other, and in this sense have been negative, but 
have found themselves in a positive unity or synthesis because 
1. Lowrie, K. 323. 
2. Kierkegaard, SUD, 17. 
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of this third attracting thing. 
This third thing, if it can be called a thing, is, the 
spirit of which the body-soUl synthesis is not at first con-
scious • And it may be that we cannot speak of body and soul 
as having ever known a "separateu existence, for, as we have 
seen, the spirit has been actively present holding body and 
soul in synthesis since birth. This spirit, of which we have 
spoken many times, would seem to be the infinite in the soul 
of the subjective existing thinker which Kierkegaard talks 
about in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
We shall next examine the ethical writings proper; 
namely, volume 11 of Either/Or, Repetition, Fear and Trem-
bling, Fragments of Philosophy - thoUgh he moves over in 
this to a discussion of that which is later to be called 
religion A - The Concept of Dread - though this too be-
comes psychologically theological - and the Stages on Life's 
Wa:y:. We shallagain comment on the use of nsoul" in these 
mitings, not one by one, but as a group, the ethical group. 
And we shall be in search of differences and, if we find 
them, for ways in which to account for them. By differences 
we mean differences between the use of the term ns oul" in 
. 
these writings and the use or uses in the writings which we 
have studied in detail. 
Three of the named works, Either/Or, the Concept of Dread 
and Stages on Lifets Way>provide us with material. For exam-
ple, we learn of the importance of willing if the soul would 
176 
be "great~; the possibilities of the soul maturing through the 
acceptance of responsibility and the making of crucial deci-
sions; the way in which the world, used but not abused? can 
help to save the soul; that the soul must undergo transformation 
in despair; that as the transition is made from the aesthetic 
or sensuous sphere to the ethical, the soul "may easily be en-
snared by one expression or another of the theory of predes ti-
nation"1; and that i:f one can win the whole world and lose one's 
soul, then the soul must be something other than the whole world. 
One possible proo:f of the immortality o:f the soul comes in the 
statement that the soul can "never become ethically conscious 
without becoming conscious o:f (its) eternal nature. n2 
In The Concept of Dread we find a definite statement of 
that which is given more tragmentarily in Kierkegaard's other 
wri tinge, namely that "man is a synthesis o:f the s ou.lish and 
the bodily:r But a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are 
not united in a third factor. This third factor is the spirit. n3 
This spirit is always present, and because of this, it can 
never be said of man that he is merely ~ animal. In natural 
man the spirit might be said to be dreaming! It is both a 
hostile power and one that is friendly; the latter, because 
it does its work of synthesizing, but the :former because it 
keeps the relation between soul and body restless - :for the 
sou1•s own sake. The spirit is of the realm of the eternal, 
1. Kierkegaard, E/0 11, 195. 
2. Kierkegaard, E/o 11, 226. 
3. Kierkegaard, OD, 39. 
177 
so man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. Again, 
nthe body is an organ of the soul, and thus in turn o:f the 
spirit. nl 
In Stages on Lifers Wa:v Kierkegaard speaks, as he rarely, 
i:f ever, does elsewhere, o:f the soul "being fashioned of an 
eternal substance.n2 And, again with very few references 
elsewhere, he speaks as if the soul could become "e%tinct"; 
and in one of two ways, as it is lost, and as it is "burnt 
out to sheer s:pirit.n 
The telescope figure of speech, however, maybe the 
truer way o:f :putting it; truer to the body of Kierkegaard's 
writings. Namely, that the soul is lost in spirit only as 
the small :portion of the telescope is "los tn in the larger 
when the telescope is folded. 
In this same book we find that certain dangers to the 
soul are :pointed out. These are, a tendency of the soul to 
make God either despot or servant, or One in need of our 
co-operation. We cannot naudit his aocountsn,. nor 11prance 
speculatively and prophetically through history.n3 Nor must 
we allow the soul to shut God np in eternal silence. 
We see here the :principle of avoiding e%tremes, and the 
need, at all times, if the soUl would avoid the dangers o:f 
a false relationship with God, of a humility before God that 
is of a high and special quality, and that can come to one 
1. Kierkegaard, OD, 121. 
2. Kierkegaard, SLW, 250. 
5. Kierkegaard, SLW, 346. 
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as he gazes upon and aooepts the worth and the work o~ the 
God-Man. Christ. 
We oome now to the writings on aesthetics, as he would 
use the term. 
While there is an elaboration o~ the meaning of the aes-
thetio sphere in volume two of Either/or, and oertainly in 
Stages on Life's Wai, and while muah is to be gained by a 
study o:f what the aesthetic way is not,- as the ethical and 
religious spheres are set :forth in contrast, it will be suf-
ficient to look only at volume one of Either/Or to :find the 
meaning of the concept "soul" in the aesthetic sphere; and1 in 
the mind o:f the first of his pseudotcymoUS ohara,otera. 
The study reveals very little, for in this thick volume 
"soul" would seem to have only a synonymous usage ~or "person" 
or "mindn• and, moreover, it appears thus almost unthinkingly. 
For instance we read of a man 1 s "restless mind- or souln. 
And-so in no one of the seventy times that the soul is used 
in this book does it have a teabnioal or semi-teobnical mean-
ing o:f its own. 
6. Conoepts in Kierkegaardts writings whiah are closely related 
to the soul. 
In looking at these concepts we shall limit ourselves to 
those writings whioh were issued under Kierkegaard's own name, 
and we shall limit ourselves, too, to sample usages rather 
than attempt an over-all examination. We do the first because 
Kierkegaard disclaims responsibility for the ideas expressed 
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by his pseudonymous characters; and the second, because we 
found in studying both kinds o£ writings £or his use of the 
concept "soul", both thereaoknowledged at time o£ publication 
and those which were not, that there was very little, if any, 
difference between tbe use of the concept "soul" in the two. 
This might be oalled giving a reason for the proposed sampling 
which is based on analogy. 
Two concepts in partiaular will be studied, "self" and 
nspirit 11 ; (but first, a word about "person" or npersonality" •. 
In -Kierkegaard we find "person" used very loosely.· For 
instance he writes, there were "so many persona present." 
On the only discoverable occasion when Kierkegaard stops to 
give eontent to the term "personalityn, he equates it with 
11cons'aienae". or rather, he says that conscience is that 
whioh brings the flesh and blood entity we call man to the 
level of being.a peraonality. 1 
The concept nselfn is used in three senses. Firat, as 
a synonym fer nsoul"; second, as a shallow tYfirst self", the 
aatual, temporal, human and even unreal self; and third, the 
ndeeper self", whioh is the eternal, real self. In the ma-
jority of persons this third self is still ideal. 
This deeper self, which is the religious side of a man 1 s 
nature, differentiates the person in whom it is found from 
every other person. It is a synthesis of the universal and 
the particular, but the resUlt is itself particular. It is 
1. Kierkegaard, JSK, Entry #560. 
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in no sense a transcendental-something, but nthe concrete 
personality that constitutes for each one his appointed eth-
ical task.nl 
This deeper self may seem, to natural man, to be further 
from him, that is, from the "first self", than is the envir-
#oning world, and yet if the truth were known, it is but an 
"inward glance" away. It comes to its most intense awareness 
of itself in the consciousness of sin, and when it "speaks" 
it does so quite unreservedly. Sin, or at least the Christian 
sense of sin, sin in "religion B", is the "consequence of a 
revelation from God" which comes to us through the God-Man, 
Christ, and without such a revelation we should not know that 
we are sinners.2 
It should be remembered here that as Xierkega~d speaks 
of sin he means sin as an attitude of rebellion against God, 
rather than "sins" which can be taken care of in book-keeping 
style. 
We see then that "self", the "deeper self"1 is tied in 
with religious thinking, and as far as we can say, it is re-
lated to the sonl as a chemical product is related to a chem-
ical element; the soul being the element. We are, of course, 
using a figure of speech. 
We must consider, next, Xierkegaard 1 a use of the term 
"spirit". 
1. Swenson, SAX, 145. 
2. Swenson, SAX, 181~ 
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The term is used all thFough Kierkegaard'a works, but £or 
an understanding of ita meaning it is necessary to iurn to his 
psychological writings, The Siokness Unto Death and The Concept 
o£ Dread. Spirit, which is no-thing, that is, non~phenomenal, 
is "drea.mingn in the innocent, Adam-phase of every man. It 
does its synthesizing work, holding body and soul together to 
make natural man, but does it in a hidden fashion. It is con-
stantly of God, but it is· not God. 
Taking the initiative, the dreaming spirit of the Adam-
man projeots itsel£ outside and looks back upon man. And in 
this looking back it qualifies the innocence of man, bringing 
dread into this state of inno~ence. For the Adam-man is aware 
o£ being disturbed by this qualifying work of the self-pro-
jected spirit, and yet; because spirit dreaming or awake is 
still no-thing, awakening man has no nthing" to fear {fear, 
by definition, knowing its object); and his state is, there-
fore, one of dread (the term used in Kierkegaard when the 
feared object canno~ be known, because there is no object). 
It is a dread, however, of losing one • s innocence; of being 
made aware of the distinction between good and evil, For 
spirit has this informing task to do as well as that of con-
stantly synthesizing man. 
Freud 1 ~ concept of neurotic a~iety is very muoh like 
this concept of dread. The -difference lies, however, in that 
for Freud the anxiety is caused by a concealed "thingn (count-
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ing ideas and memories a-a- "things") and not, as in Kierkegaardl 
by no-thing, And with Freud, the anxiety h.as both its exis-
tence and its hidden aause in a closely-linked realm o~ nature· 
. . t 
while :for Kierkegaa.rd the spirit, which is the oau.se o~ the 
oause of dread, is from, and is ~orever in the realm o:f the 
supernatural. 
With Kierkegaard sp.irit is both within me and I in it! 
A oup submerged in the sea both contains and is contained by 
the sea. Again, the spirit is both a udelivering possessionn 
and a realm~ It is "invisibility11 , and to be spirit is man•s 
invisible glory.l 
Spirit is also subjectivity - a term which we shall dis-
Oll.Ss in the ne:xt part of this ohapter~ It is "an inward pas-
sionate self-ooncern"2 and the individual, the arrived man, 
is in the category of spirit. And lastly, it is "the power 
of a man•s understanding over his life."5 
Oh:ristianity n:requires us to be spirit, to strive there-
after."4 Indeed, Christianity is unique in defining man as 
spiritual; that is, man as he should and oould be. The ma-
jority of pe:t"sons in a,ny age, both within the Christian Ohu:roh 
and outside it, have been non-spiritual; that is, non-Chris-
tian. They have remained, regardless of any olaims whioh 
they might make to the contrary, at the level o:f beings who 
1. Kierkegaard, OL, 49. 
2~ Swenson, SAK, 238. 
3, Kierkegaard, JSK, Entry #1177. 
4. Kierkegaard. JY, 126. 
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are unconscious of or who are only mildly conscious o~ that 
which keeps them a soulish-body synthesis; namely, "spirit". 
Very few have risen to move, as one might move in the rari-
~ied air of a mountain top, in the ever-permeating realm o£ 
spirit. 
The life in this higher realm, the life of the spirit, 
has, says Swenson, "a structure as definite as the law-gov-
erned inorganic universe, and an organization as specialized 
as that of the highest living thing.nl And it was Kierke-
gaard•s lifelong task to chart this spiritual life, and to 
point the way to it. 
But even the life of the spirit is not freed from des-
pair. Indeed, despair is an essential part of it; for des-
pair is a prelude, as it were, to a sense of sin. And the 
spiritual person, because of that which he can see beyond 
him, and in particular, because of that which he can see in 
and around the revealing person of Christ, will know himself, 
by contrast, to be a sinner; a sinner in constant need of 
God 1 s grace. 
The destiny o:f the spirit in this life is not the in:fi~­
~ite, but in its God-relationships it must find in itself an 
"infinite resignation"; a resignation "that has no dependence 
upon the oaloulations of the understanding.n2 But when it 
has made this mental movement into the infinite, it must 
1. Swenson, SAK, 27. 
2. Swenson, SAK, 183. 
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return and go on loving and living in the finite. 
In the Attack Upon "Christendomn Kierkegaard gives as 
the two marks o£ the spiritual man, £irst, that he is able 
"to hold £ast to the fact that something is contrary to the 
understanding, an o£fenoe to the understanding, and yet will 
it";l namely, all that is involved in spiritual living. And 
second, he is able to endure, and endure positively and pro-
ductively, t.he inevitable isolation o£ being a spiritual man 
in this unspiritual and non-spiritual world. 
7. Other oonoepts in Kierkegaard•s writings which are related to 
our study. 
Body.. We have seen how K.ierkegaard uses the phrase "the 
soulish-body synthesis". With human beings there is no living 
body which is not ensouled, although a few exceptional state-
ments about losing one's soul while still alive are to be 
£ound. There would certainly seem to be,. however, degrees 
o£ ensoulment. Put more accurately, there would seem to be 
CV\..'L degrees of consciousness of soul, even as there ~ o£ spirit; 
and there would seem to be a possible and necessary develop-
ment o£ the soul which would change the total synthesis con-
dition. 
Kierkegaard believed in the resurrection of the body as 
well as in the immortality of the soul, and in this I have 
£ound no evidence to suggest that he believed in other than 
the resurrection of the fleshly body; though I believe that, 
1. Kierkegaard, AUC, 162. 
if pressed, he would define resurrection in terms of the 
Pauline spiritual body. 
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World. There is, in Xierkegaard•s writings, the world 
of nature, and there is the world in the New Testament sense. 
The following·will give his estimate of this second nworldn. 
It is from The Instant, number six; an article which is en-
titled nGod/The Worldn. 
rrrf two men were to eat nuts together, and 
the one liked only the shell, the other only the 
kernel, one might say that they match one another 
well. What the world rejects, casta away, despises, 
namely the sacrificed man, the kernel - precisely 
upon that God sets the greatest store, and trea-
sures it with greater zeal than does the world that 
which it loves with the greatest passion.nl 
Time and Eternity. Time is the realm of the soulish-
body before it has been lifted to the sphere of the spirit, 
after which the soulish-body becomes a conscious creature of 
two worlds, the temporal and the eternal. And this eternal 
world is the realm of the spirit. 
This two-world creature, spirit-conscious man, suffers 
because of this two-fold awareness in a way that he has never 
done as the creature of one world, the world of the finite. 
And yet in this suffering there is hope. 
The eternal is spoken of by Kierkegaard in one place as 
that which is acquired by man. This is to stress man•s very 
necessary responsibility, but not to take away the initiative 
1. Kierkegaard, AUO, 196. 
i 
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o£ God, Who brings the struggling person into eternity by 
the power o£ grace. But i~ eternity be the end, the means, 
on man's side, must always be o'f the nature of the eternal. 
For no other way will lead into the realm of eternity. 
We shall turn now to certain contrasting or seemingly 
contrasting terms which are used by Kierkegaard in o~ near 
that "place" in the pattern of his thoUght, in so fax as 
there is a pattern, where the concept "soul" is to be :found. 
We shall be drawing upon Lowrie's longer life of Kierkegaard 
for the chief of our distinctions. 
Actuality and Possibilitl• The first of these two terms 
is not the antithesis of the second, for the second has, for 
its opposite, necessity; and possibility, or freedom, is to 
be found within actuality. And neither God, nor man, nor the 
soUl of man is imprisoned by necessity. 
Necessity and Freedom" We have begun to speak of this, 
but there -is more to be said. Necessity seems obvious in the 
world of nature and in the moral law, and yet man is free to 
"choose his own sel:fn; to move, within necessary boundaries, 
forward into the spiritual realm. And it is as man exercises 
his freedom to choose God - which has the by-product effect 
of giving him his own deepest self - that he finds that Ged 
is able to decrease the necessity that had seemed to bind 
him as natural man. 
Immanence and Transcendence. These are opposites~ And 
immanence is never sufficient to describe reality; that is, 
.............. --------------------
? 
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God. Human existence - the axis tentialist speaks - which is 
prior to human nature or the essence of any man, £inds that 
as it has and continues to have its existence, it must leap 
the chasm of now this, now that paradox; and paradox means 
discontinuity; and discontinuity means that something other 
than the thought of continuous immanence is needed. Religion 
A, which ie found in the pagan world, and to an al{alling de.: 1 
gree, to give Kierkegaard's view, within the so-called Chris-
tian Ohuroh, is a religion of immanence. True Christianity, 
or religion B, must be a religion of transcendence. 
The eoul, in its state of acknowledged spirit-synthesis 
with body, must of necessity have its life, its nat~al li£e, 
in a world of nature where a ee.rtain immanence or connected-
ness is to be found. But the soul must also have, beyond its 
natural life and by means o£ an aver-renewed faith, another 
life, a life that is in and from a realm where reality is 
tranacend.ent. 
Objective-Subjective. We shall de£ine the former by our 
understanding of Kierkegaard' s use of' the latter,. He· does 
not mean, by subjective, that limited, distorted, feeling-filled 
thinking that is and should be discouraged~ For this can only 
blur the facts of reality as they are. But he means, by sub-
je.otiv:e, an entering into our a,:pprehensions and our comprehen~ 
- ' 
sions with a willingness and a fullness. When we are subjec-
tive, as he woul.d use the term, we live our thoughts as well 
as think them and observe them. Truth, he says, is ttan ob-
lSB 
jeetive uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of 
l 
the most passionate inwardness".l 
Subjective thinking, then, obligates the thinker to respond 
to and live out, that is, give existence to the truth. It be-
comes truth for him. This. of course, requires at least an 
ethical if not a religious orientation; for natural or aes-
thetic man can be a mere observer, a taster, a non-responsible 
dilettante in the presence of reality. Or your natural, sans-
qual, aesthetic man can turn his back on truth. 
Synonyms for subjective, a very important term for Kier-
kegaard, and important for our understanding of the concept 
"soul", are "inwardnessn and "pathos". 
a. The emergence, from this study, of the existential soul as 
defined by Kierkegaard. 
The soul, for Kierkegaard, is an entity, part of an exis-
tential bodf-Soul synthesis. The cause of this synthesis is 
spirit. Natual or aesthetic man is unaware of this spirit 
though it is present and at work in him; ethical man is aware 
of it, but only as it is translated into the language of "prin-
oi:ples"; and religious man, openly and increasingly, and es-
pecially as he moves or is moved from religion A to religion 
B, is deeply aware of the active, immediate, synthesizing and 
nourishing realm of the spirit. The ethical man knows it as 
the third-person residue of experience; the religious man 
knows it as immediate experience. 
1. Kierkegaard '· CUP, 182 • 
.............. ----------------------
. 'ltll : ~. 
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Under the nature of the soul we would list the following: 
it is, according·to Kierkegaard, partly conscious and partly 
unaonsoioua; it is unified and inward; it participates in both 
the temporal and the eternal realms; it must live its life in 
the finite world, and yet even there it is near to God and 
can be possessed by God; and lastly it has, here in the finite, 
a capacity to understand and to will, 
The soul has two possible destinations, heaven or hell. 
It can even be lost or destroyed while the body is yet alive; 
or it can and should tend to.ward the realm of apiri t, even 
while on earth. This realm of spirit is the realm of the 
eternal, The soul must come one day - and perhaps it oomes 
every day - before the bar o~ God's judgment; and it iS ita 
own state at that time whioh will clear it for further ad-
vanoement or pronounce, as it were t its own aentenoe of doom. 
The soul has certain duties. It must save itself in the 
only possible fashion, that it oan do so; namely, by submit-
ting itself to God and to the will of God done on earth,t. ,It, 
must struggle to acquire itself n:erom the world, of God and 
through itself." It must aooept pain, the pain of breaking 
with natural loves, It must yearn and seek and keep ever 
humble, even though its task is "to resemble God" in goodness. 
The dansers to the soul are many. There is the mani-
fold world; there is doubt and distraction and confusion and 
anger and earthly amriety and impatience; and there are ne:x-
perienoea of horror". Time may be the enemy of the soul as 
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it seeks to eoax tbe soul~o give it its first allegiance. 
Discouragement may strike at the soul, or there may be "coax-
ing aside", or monotonY, or r$bellionJor downright or half-
hidden sin, Suffering may be too much for the soul, or "pie-
tistic severity" or nmona.stic torturen. The soul may yield 
to ~alvation through works - make this attempt - or be irres-
olute. or attempt to nsneak" out of the responsibilities of 
life, The sick soUl, in its craftiness, may encourage the 
soul, the soul as it could be, to give up the thought of God. 
The soul may spend its life in unprofitable battles, or give 
its full attention .to intellect, or the productions of inte~ 
Xect. Or it may fail by giving full attention to - itself~ 
But if the dangers to the soul are many, there are even 
more helps, Some of these are, the presence and graoe of God; 
sighing and confession and thanksgiving and wonder, whioh 
bring one into this given presence.. Then there is the sus-
taining environment of patience, and the :religious fact that 
one is never far from the kingdom, the realm of the spiritual 
or the eternal. Other helps are knowledge - up to a point -
receptiveness, weakness, and dependence upon God; single-
mindedness or willing one thing; apathy for the world, posit 
~ive ~estling with God, reflection, a mood of expectation, 
aonst(ruotive despair, maintaining a n:frank presence in the 
temporal", daring, solitude, the acceptance of forgiveness, 
purifiaation, hope, suffering, an acceptanae of facts as they 
are revealed in the spiritual life, restlessness for God, peace, 
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faith, proper dread, the reading o:f God·' s word, and Ohrist 
himself. 
Kierkegaard also mentions, as a help :for the saving o:f 
the soul, a home environment with a wife and children, are-
membering of the dead, and, more unusual :for his day, dream-
knowledge. 
All these, and much else, will help the soul to rise to 
a state of being saved; bring it consciously into the proces-
ses o:f salvation; enable it to see its active-passive shar·e, 
as the spirit works its work and channels, :for the living of 
the new life, the grace o:f a concerned God~ 
The soul is noumenal in that it is other than a thing -
though we must speak of it as an "it" - and in that it is in 
it~elf other than an idea or a concept. It exists, and its 
existence has only one time, ,the absolute present. It moves 
along a line of succeeding absolute presents, and its destiny 
can be a state o:f being which is not temporal but eternal. 
It is spoken of as if it were phenomenal because o:f the lim:il;. 
~ations of language and of thought p:rocesses, and yet it can 
in no way qualify as. the object o:f phenomenal observation. 
Rather, it is known only in the consequences of its active 
existence, as life itself is known. Never "in itself", and 
yet remaining ever behind the evidence for itself. 
What, than, are some of the characteristic ways in which 
Kierkegaard 1 s "soulrr responds to all that affects it? In the 
world of nature it is an active part o:f that body-soul syn-
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thesis which stands betwe~n stimulus and response; part of 
the "O" in the sequence S -7 0 ~ R. In the phenomenal part 
o:f the wo'l'ld of human nature it responds in like fashion; 
but as it is faced with consciousness, in this wo'l'ld of hu-
man nature, it seeks to match this oonsciousness in degree, 
and even overtop it. In relation to itself it is only part-
ly conscious; that is to say, there seems to be more to the 
individual soul than the individual soul is aware of; and 
not merely more in terms of possibility, but in terms of 
actuality. The oommon experience of insight into what has 
been in actual soul-e:x-istenoe f.or some time would be a suf-
ficient proof of this. And in all this, the response of the 
soul to the World of nature and of human natur~and, certain~ 
ly in the response of the soul to itself - its knowledge and 
its obvious ignorance - we might be talking, not of Kierke-
gaard's "soultt, but Freud's "psychic apparatus" or soul-equi-
valent. But with thisJFreud would find the outer circumference 
of his circle o:f re:ference; while :for Kierkegaard the most 
important part of the souJ.ls environment would just be begin-
ning; namely, the realm o:f the spirit, and o:f the God who is 
the giver o:f this spirit. And as we have seen, the soul, in 
Kierkegaard, is of necessity in a constant relationship with 
spirit; at first, unconsciously, but with the need and the 
strong possibility of this becoming conscious. And the soul 
is related by faith to God in the God-Man. Christ. 
Characteristically, neither Kierkegaard's "soulu nor 
----~~--~-~--~~--~---·-- ----- --
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Freud 1 s npsyohic apparatusn comes to the :full environmental 
relationships which are possible to it, and which would have 
an enriching effect upon it. The chief of the reasons why 
this is so, in Kierkegaard, is sin in the sense of a lack of 
Christian :faith; while in Freud the reason why men live, and 
# 
die as .distorted fractions of' themselves lies in their non-
awareness o:f or their non-allegiance to the reality principle; 
reality being :for Freud the real world of the naturalist or 
the positivist. 
11ote: In a :private comm·o .. nic~,tion from Dr. Walter Lmvrie dated 
Princeton, }ieH Jersey, ,AJ;>ril 16, 1953, there is the follotv-
ing at at ement : ''There is only ~ Danish vro rd I translated 
soul, e.nd that is S;j ael.." 
CHAPTER IV 
The Freudian Oonce~t of the Soul 
1. Previous researoh and summ~y of conclusions. 
There are many- who summarize and explain Freud, either 
as disoi~les or as those who differ, at least in ~art, but 
who wish to be fair. And there are also those who reaot to 
his theories in a fashion that oan only blur and falsify. 
Many of these, both for and against, deal with his inter~re­
tation of religion, but wi,th the e:x-ce~tion of the work o:f a 
single person and, almost, a single statement in that work, 
I have found no comment upo~Freud's use of the term "soul". 
The statement comes :from Zilboorg who is writing as a ~sy..­
ohoanalyst, and it reads as follows: 
n ••• th~ Germ~ language :Permits of some 
oon£usion as to what Freud thought of the soul. 
The s~le answer is that he never told us any-
thing about the soul, and there is no reason 
why he should have. Theology was as foreign 
to him as the insight into human emotions is 
:foreign to blood chemistry~ In the German 
language, "psyohe,n nspirit," "sou.l,n and nmind," 
are frequently- designated, and were so designated 
by Freud quite often~ by one and the same word. 
Freud :frequently used the terms J.T~syohe" {"die 
Psyohe 11 ) and "soul" ( 11die Seele11 ) in the sense 
of psyohio apparatus ••• rrl 
We would disagree with this at one point. Freud does 
tell us some of his beliefs about the soul, and that which we 
have found to be his substitute-oonoept,·namely, "psyohio a~­
paratus", was at the very heart of his teaching. We shall, in 
1. Zilboorg, SF, 111. 
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a later seetion, have muo.h to say about "psychic appa:ratusn, 
but it may be useful, just here, to look once more at Freud 1 s 
theory of religion. Religion was, for him, the carrier o:f' a 
non-psychological soUl-oonoept, and it has been both supported 
and oritioised by those who have written about Freud. 
We have already seen that Freud considers religion in the 
adult to be a deep-lying neurosis. It is there as the result 
of a failure to come to terms with what he would call Reality. 
Brill points u:p the :f'aot given in Freudis Moses and Monotheism 
that religion is not only a neurosis but a traumatic neurosis,l 
It is the result o:f' a con:f'liot between the individual and the 
rules and regulations of the raee. 
Religion comes into life beoause the child :feels itself 
to be living in a world o:f' adults who are habitually arbitrary, 
or who may be at any moment. It comes in a particular form 
to an individual life beoause that child-life must try to :find 
a particular friendly· father-figure. 
These arbitrary adults, and, the chief of them, the fa-
ther-figure, are translated into permanent mental biddings 
and :f'orbiddings, ohiefly the latter, in the unconscious of 
the child and then of the child grown man; and because they 
were onoe in positions of authority with regard to the sen-
sory world, and because the child-adult wishes to control 
this world and make it minister to his sensory needs and 
wants, the bidding and forbidding inner composite figure, 
1. Brill, FOP, 2:06. 
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which has become part of the religious world. must be respect 
~ed and approached in specific, repeated and even compulsive 
ftEhion. 1\ . 
Of course; says Freud, the person is trying to do what 
he can never do, manipulate or deceive Reality, but the reli ... 
gious person must still be studied with all seriousness. He 
is a person who is· not only in the grip of his bwn desperate 
childhood attempts to live by his partial understanding of 
Reality> and his drives to seek pleasure and avoid pain, but 
he is one who is the unwitting inheritor of a tough, racial 
tendency to be religious. The reasons are the same, but the 
source of this tendency is more than personal. And it is this 
last which has much to do with making religious praotiaes ob-
sessive in character~ The obsession is the stronger because 
there was, perhaps, in the primitive, pre-scientific ages of 
the race, a definite need for religious explanations. For in 
all probability religion may at one time have provided the 
best hypothesis under the circumstances, and if this be so, 
it is understandable that this "best bypothesisn would sound 
on and on in the deeps of a contemporary mind. But - reli~ 
gion is unrealt and therefore must be gotten rid of. 
In our study of Freud's use of the term "soul" we shall 
be considering hie belief concerning its anthropological ori-
gin, but before we do this, and because "religion" and "souln 
stand so close together, we should like to present the opin-
ions of certain of those who have commented upon his ideas 
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about religion. 
M. K. Bradby, writing as a lay student of ~sychoanalysis, 
is o£ the opinion that Freud's teaching will bring a new im-
petus to :t"eligion "by revealing more clearly the greatest se-
cret o£ each man's heart.-"1 And many who appreciate the work 
that Freud has done, but who do not feel that his concept of 
man is either accurate or sufficient, would go ae far as to 
commend the self~knowledge which is certainly given in the 
~rocesses of psychoanalysis. For instance, Crichton-Miller 
and his associates and successors at the Tavistock Clinic in 
London, England, have done much to make students and the gen-
eral public aware of the teachings of Freud, but Crichton-
Miller finds that "the most emphatic deficiency in Freud's 
whole system (is that) there is no room in it for a creative 
factor .n2 And the creative factor is one of the first and 
moat im~ortant factors in, at least, the Judas-Christian re-
I\ 
ligious way of life. 
Again, William Brown, who recognizes Freud as a towering, 
contributing genius, states that in the matter of religion 
he must dissociate himself completely from Freud. Brown says 
that in The Future of an Illusion Freud has set u~ and knocked 
down a straw man. Brown agrees entirely that if religion be 
what Freud describes it to be, then it should most certainly 
be destroyed, and he admits that religion is sometimes of this 
1~ Bradby, PPL, 254. 
2. Crichton-Miller, PAD, 123. · 
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kind, but Freud, he says, must not be allowed to generalize~ 
Thera is too much careful philosophy and too much sheer re-
I ligious e:rperience of another and better kind to allow such 
conclusions as Freud sets down. 
David Roberts would stand with William Brown in this, 
for as he says, nthe truth or falsity of a religious belief 
is never merely a psychological question. nl One must have 
as well, if one would speak about religion, a world view. 
Brown goes on: Freud has dealt, not with true religion, 
but with superstition. True religion is not a step backward, 
a regression, or a step sideways, an escape, but it is a 
step forward into a realm of maturity and love~ nNo mere 
psychological aocount can be adequate to religionn, he says. 
"Moreover, this Freudian picture is a bad payohological ao-
oount.n2 Psychoanalysis is limited all through, be it in 
philosophy or meta-psychology, or in psychology, by its lim-
ited conception of Reality. Reality is always much more 
than the individual environment of the Freudian world. 
Erioh Fromm seeks to o orreo t ttthe widely held view that 
Freud is against .... religionn3 by an unsuccessful semantic 
maneuver, In summary, he states that "Freud opposes religion 
in the name of ethics, •• an attitude which can be termed re-
ligious.n4 It is true that within his own system of beliefs 
1. Roberts, PCM, 145. 
2. Brown, PR. 
3, Fromm, PR, 10. 
4. Fromm, PR, 20. 
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Freud was acting ethically and in the name of truth when he 
stated that religion being what he conceived it to be, man 
should be rid of it~ But as we have already stated, or at 
least implied, Freud, with all his striving and his ability, 
never knew what religion at its best could be. He journeyed 
in the wrong direction and never found out his mistake, Land-
ing in India, he called the people there "Americans". 
Ernest Jones, in his sympathetic interpretation of psy-
choanalysis and religion is much to the point and he does not 
seem to have a need to be iconoclastic. He walks with Freud 
shoulder to shoulder, but is, perhaps, not as inclined as was 
Freud to name that which was anhypothesis a fact. For instance, 
Jones is willing to say that "religious beliefs may or may not 
be true, for in their nature they are not capable of proof or 
disproo:e.nl And even i:f religion be a neurosis, he says (and 
Freud would agree with him in this) that "neurotics are o:ften 
the torch-bearers of civilization,n2 Indeed, Jones would make 
them responsible for the western civilization that we know. 
This is not nece~sarily truee Oivilization might have come 
to us through non-neurotic contributors, but this is how it 
has been, 
Weatherhead, who has long admired the work o:f Freud, and 
who has learned much from him, has this to say in protesting 
against Freud's conception of religion:3 First, to desire a 
1. Jones, PJ, 76. 
2. Jones, PJ, 76. 
3, Weatherhead, PRH, 399. 
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father does not invalidate the fact that he may exist. This 
he considers Freud's fundamental fallacy. Second, Christian-
ity is an historical religion, not a religion invented to fill 
a need. Freud, he says, "does not deal with the Christian 
religion at all." And third, Christianity is too austere in 
its demands to be the kind of illusion men invent. The Chris-
tian religion and Judaism, at their best, are never "peace of 
mind" religions in the sense in whieh Freud might, in a moment 
of castigation, have used the term. 
Weatherhead does point out, however, that in his book, 
Civilization and its Discontents Freud does attack Christian-
ity as that which "demands too mu~h". Even as an escape it 
has chosen a difficult if not an impossible way to escape. 
It does not, for instance, make any allowance for the need 
which every individual has to be aggressive. But Weather-
head feels that Freud has missed the aggression against evil 
which is at the heart of the negative side of Christian 
teaching. 
There are two other persons to whom we should refer as 
we look at Freud's conception of religion, and so at that 
area where "souln would most likely be :found. And the first 
of these is R. S. Lee of whom we have already spoken. His 
book, Freud and Christianity suggests that most, if not all 
of Freud's scientific discoveries can be used to undergird 
Christian doctrine, but that when Freud is discussing ethics 
or religion, or when there is such implied teaching in his 
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wri tinge, he must be read, by the Christiant with caution. 
For one thing - and Zilboo~g £inds this "an extraordinary 
and almost revolutionary thought" and one nprobably close 
to the truth"l - Lee states that "religion is more properly 
a £unction o:f' the Ego than a£ the Unconscious and the Id.n2 
Freud would not have it so. 
And lastly, in our.present attempt to come nearer to 
Freud's concept o:f' religiont both in the sense o:f' apprecia-
tion and o£ adverse criticismt we come to Christianity after 
Freud by G. B. Sanders. With the precision and almost the 
tone a£ an expert in debate, Sanders shows that while relig-
ion oan be put to the psychoanalytical test.and can be :found 
wanting in many serious respects, psychoanalysis itsel£ can 
be £ound wanting in its psychological and anthropological 
presuppositions. lt is not, he says, his primary purpose to 
oriticize Freud• but he does show that the sword used by 
Freud to destroy religion is two-edged and that it can be 
turned, with equal juati:f'ication, upon psychoanalysis it-
eel£. Specifically, the reasons :for denying a belie£ in 
God, as well as for accepting such a belie:f', may stem :from 
unconscious wishes. But Sanders realizes that such point-
making will not solve the problem o:f' God's existence or non-
existence, and that this belongs, properly, to disciplines 
other than psychology or psychoanalysis; namely, to philos-
ophy and to theology. 
1. Zilboorg, SFE, 116. 
2. Lee, FO, 78. I 
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2. The scientific method as used by Freud. 
At the close of his book called The Future o£ an Illu~ 
sion Freud states~ with his sometime dogmatism, "Science is 
not illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose .that we 
could get anywhere eJ.se what it cannot give us.nl 
By science he means, first of all, scientific principles; 
the stance which science takes as it views the phenomenal 
world it is investigating; the faith which it has in events 
being caused and causes having inevitable consequences; the 
self-imposed limitations; the concern for facts not values, 
that is, ethical, aesthetic or religious values; the willing-
ness to accept every hypothesis, every theory, as tentative; 
and, most imp.ortant, the concentrated use of the scienti:fia 
method, 
Freud, with his training and his developing interests, 
would move with ease in th~s world of empirical science; ob-
serving the facts which were in his area of specialization; 
classifying with caution and yet with the daring of genius; 
returning again and again to· the source of his :facts to ver-
ify or to change his :first hypothesis; and, gradually, build-
ing more and more solid theories, generalizations based on 
the law of uniformity and of central tendency • 
. 
But what did he himself have t~ say about this scientif~ 
ic world 9 its principles and its stringent method? We have 
already had one opinion, the quotation which opened this 
1. Freud, FI, 98. 
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section. But through his-years of ~iting he made other com-
menta. 
For instance, in 1911, we find him looking to soience as 
the one thing which can bring the reality principle into as-
cendency in life.1 A score of years later he returns to this 
same theme, saying that it is the aim of scientific thought 
"to arrive at correspondence with reality"i reality being 
"that which exists outside us and independently of ua."2 
But besides this conquest of the pleasure principle, a 
conquest which resUlts in its being ruled but not ruled out, 
the scientific discipline gives legitimate intellectual plea-
sure and, of course, necessary practical gain. 
Ten years later, in 1921, he speaks of science rather 
than religion, or contemporary socialism, as the most hope-
ful of the possible "group tiesn; but he· is clear-eyed -.. 
enough to ·see that differences of opinion between scientists 
can lead to the same group trouble whioh is so often present 
when these other group ties are present. 
Moving on another ten years, we find him writing that 
psychoanalysis .has no need of developing a world view, be-
cause it is a branch o:f science, and can "subscribe to the 
scientific Weltanschauung." 
But to those who cannot find the scientific or normal 
processes o:f thinking {he equates nsoientifio" and "normal") 
completely satisfying, he has this to say: 
1. Rickman, FGS, 51. 
2. Freud, NIP. 
"Those of our fellow men who are dissatis-
fied with the state of things and who desire 
something for their momentary peaoe of mind may 
look for it where they can find it. we shall 
not blame them for doing so; but we cannot help 
them and cannot change our own way of thitlk.ing 
on their account."~ 
3. The use, in Freud, of suoh concepts as "self", "s:piri t", 
tt:personrr, etc. 
204 
As we shall see in the next sub-seotion, Freud uses the 
concept nsoul" but does not accept it as part of his own sys-
tem. It will be necessary, therefore, to look for a substi-
tute oonoept. For the phenomena of the inner life which have, 
by ma:ny persons, been summed up in the coneept "soul" are, 
for the most part, present in even the most rigid Freudian. 
To anticipate and to repeat what has already been said, 
the substitute term we shall eventually arrive at will be 
mental or "psychic apparatusn (the last was preferred by 
Freud}, but it will be necessary to show why certain other 
related concepts, such as those given in the title of this 
sub-section,. are inadequate. As we move forward we shall 
find that some will not do because they are not used fre-
quently enough; and others,because the possible substitute 
concept is only able to cover a part of that larger whole 
which must be included in our final concept. 
In this section we shall look only at those concepts 
which will not be defined and interrelated when we turn, 
1, Freud, NIP. 
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in later sections, to the meaning of the term "psychic appa-
ratus". We shall consider five concepts, and take them al-
phabetioally. 
First, we have "human natUl:'e". In A General Introduc-
tion to Psychoanalysis Freud speaks of human nature as hav~ 
ing in it a sense of guilt which has become the source of 
religion and of morality and which was acquired, in the be-
ginning of history, through the formation and continuing 
dynamisms of the Oedipus complex. He recalls the belief of 
the biological science of his day that man is not a creature 
of special privilege, that he has descended from the animal 
world and that, as a resUlt, human nature has in it an "in-
eradicable animal nature~"l And he finds, and chiefly from 
clinical material and from the evidence of the first world 
war, that while there may be good in human nature, there is 
certainly evil~2 
In all of these uses of the term and in the statement 
that with the theory of dreams, analysis passed ":from being 
a psychotherapeutic method to being a psychology of the depths 
o:f human nature," we can see that "human naturen might well 
be a synonym for mental or psychic apparatus, and therefore 
an adequate substitute for nsou.ll', but the concept is used 
very, very little. 
We come next to "person". Sixteen uses o:f the term were 
1, Freud, GIP, 291. 
2. Freud, GIPt 131. 
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studied in seven di~ferent-works. In most oases the word 
seems to re~er to "bodyn; in others it is used :for an indi-
vidual human being; and onoe it is a olose synonym for a 
funo tioning psyohio apparatus. It does, therefore, overlap 
the term whioh we shall need, but it is obviously not that 
term. 
Third, we have "self". Rarely, if ever, in Freud's 
writings does this term appear by itself. Rather, it is 
written as the first part of a hyphenated word with the se-
cond part as varied as destructive, observation, perception, 
preservation, proteotion, reference, punishment, regard, ana-
lysis, reproach, oorreotion, betrayal, oritioism and mutila~ 
tion. 
It is obvious that in two or three o:f these uses "self" 
refers to "bodyn, but in others it refers to body and/or some-
thing else. This "something else" is the entity whioh we are 
seeking to name. Self, therefore, might be an adequate sub~ 
stitute term :for nsoul" if "psyohio apparatusn were not more 
aoourate, more comprehensive and muoh more used. 
Fourth, we have "spirit". Spirit is little used and 
loosely used by Freud. It appears, of course, as he is writ-
ing about anthropological material. And he uses it in certain 
quotations. For example, in the letter from the American phy-
sician in the Collected Papers .1 And he speaks of the nhuman 
spirit", the 11divine spirit" - asking whether or not there is 
1. Freud, OP, V5, 243 • 
............... ______________________ __ 
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one, and inclining to th~ negative - and several times of 
the spirit of science; but no one of these would begin to 
suggest a substitute term to cover the human phenomena which 
have collectively been called the soul. 
Once, and it may have been a hurried writing-moment, he 
speaks of the spirit and the mind as being, both of them, sub-
jeot to scientific inveatigation. 1 And in his Discussion of 
Lay Analysis he describes the work of the analyst, whether he 
be a doctor or a lay person, aa that of being a "secular spir-
itual guide". 2 But all in all, we shall have to look else-
where for a suitable substitute term for "soul". 
Fifth, and last, we have nsubject". Aa we remember the 
meanings which this term has had in idealistic philosophy, 
we can see that this may be the word that we are looking for, 
but our actual findings show it to be inadequate. It appears 
in the dozen or a~ uses that were studied, as a synonym for 
nperson". And yet the term is not too clear even here" For 
instance the subject, according to Freud, has, in one place, 
both a body and a mental life. What then, one might ask, is 
"subject"? But we are not pressing this point because it is 
our feeling, from a close reading of much of Freud, that he 
would turn the question aside as being philosophical; take 
blame for being careless in his writing at this point; and 
' in his writing :from then on, he would be at pains to avoid 
1. Freud, OP, V5, 210. 
2. Freud, OP, V5, 210. 
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the term. 
We must, therefore, look beyond nhuman nature", and 
npersonn, and naelf", and "spirit" and "aubjeotn, and find 
a more adequate term. But before we do this, before we give 
in some detail what Freud meant by npsyohio apparatus"; we 
must see why the oonoept nsouln as he used it, is also inad-
equate to our needs. 
4. The use of the oonoept ttaouln in the writings of Freud. 
All of Freud 1 a publications given in the Bibliography 
of this Dissertation - definitely the bulk of his work, and 
containing all of the more relevant writings - have been ex-
amined, and the oonoept nsoUln has been fo'llild in use one hun-
dred and twelve times. Of these, twenty-three have been in 
his writings in direct quotations; moat of whioh are given, 
not because Freud approves, but as examples of the kind of 
thinking and expression of whioh he disapproves. Of the re-
maining eighty-nine, eighty-one are in what one might call 
indirect quotations. For example, thirty-six of these are 
in one ease study. 1 In this, Freud is presenting his mat~ 
1ial in the language of the patient; and thirty-four of 
these indirect quotations are in the anthropological writ-
ings where Freud, using the terms of anthropology and of , 
primitive peoples, is discussing the origin of the oonoept 
"soul", He traces ita origin to give him a sufficient rea-
son for discarding it. But we shall none the less follow 
1. Freud, OP, V3 • 
.............. ----------------------~ 
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his thought through oertain o:f his writings~ namely, nThe 
Taboo o:e Virginityrr, rrThoughts on War and Death", "The Un-
oanny", Moses and Monotheism, on War, Sex and Neur.osis, ~ 
Future o:e an Illusion and Totem and Taboo. 
It would seem that Freud became interested in the origin 
o:E the soul concept during and just after the first world war. 
There may or there may not be a connection between the two. 
Oertainly with so many dying before their time, there was a 
quickened interest in survival after death, and so, in the 
'"soul". 
In 1915, Freud suggested that nthe enduring remembrance 
o:f the dead became (for the primitive) the basis for assuming 
other modes of existence, and gave h1m the conception of li:Ee 
continued after apparent death.nl And one 6:f these other modes, 
or rather the other mode of existence, was a soul-existence. 
In the beginning of primitive thought, says Freud, the indi-
vidual lately dead became a body and several souls. Belief 
in the survival of one soul, and theories of the soul, in-
cluding the belief in transmigration, came much later. 
But much else had its beginnings "beside the corpse o:f 
the beloved". For there were generated 
nnot only the idea of the soul, the belie:f 
in immortality, and a great part of man•s deep-
rooted sense of guilt, but also the earliest 
inkling of ethical law - thou shalt not kill."2 
I:f this be true, is it any wonder that the soul concept 
has been a di:fficult one to be rid of! 
l. Freud, CP IV, 310. 
2. Freud. OP IV, 311. 
210 
It is in Totem and IDaboo, published in 1918, that we 
have the first elaborated theory of the origin of the oonoept 
of the soul. And much of what he says can be attributed to 
his reading of Frazerrs Golden Bough. 
To the death origin of the concept of the soul, both the 
impression which death makes, and the wish to give immortal-
ity to the beloved, is now added the sleep origin. It was 
not a new source, but an extension, for sleep and death have 
much in common. Sleep, however, brought dreams, and thoughts 
of a part of one which was not bound down by space and time; 
and so the refinement of the soul ooncept could go forward. 
There is added, too, the evidence of the unfriendliness 
of departed souls; the enemy continues even after death. 
Oertain anthropologists hold to the belief that "evil spirits 
were the :first born among spirits.nl There is certainly ID:Uch 
evidence to show that among primitives at a very early st~ge 
the soul was thought to be nvindictive and irritablen when 
it had passed from this life. For the soul "envies the·liv~ 
ing, and would kill them in order to be reunited with them."2 
And so, to sum up, we have three possible soul-origins, 
and all three have no doubt contributed; these are, the fear-
origin b'ased on nevidenae" that my dead enemy is still seeking 
to harm me; the death-origin, when one wished the departed one 
to go on living in another mode of existence; and the sleep-
1. Freud, BWF, 878. 
2~ .• Freud, BWF_, 854. 
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origin, which gave dream evidence, and evidenc~ of a llfreen 
part of one's being. 
These original after-death souls were very much like liv-
ing persons. They were, at first, conceived of as being most 
material, and the spiritualizing here came long after the orig-
inal beliefs. 
Animism probably took its rise from this earlier soul-
conceiving. Once the world was peopled with the wandering 
souls of the dead, it would be very easy to re-embo~ them, 
as animism does. 
FreUd sees the animistic soul, a later development of 
the cruder, more primitive conception of the soul, as the 
carrier by projection of both conscious and unconscious con-
tent. And he sees the soul in the belief and thinking of 
our day as a direct descendant of this animistic soul, and 
as something which can be explained away. 
In The Future of an Illusion, Freud adds nothing to 
his previous concept. The souJ.. is still rrthe spiritual. part 
of man (that is, it is thought to be), which in the course 
of time has slowly and unwillingly detached itself from the 
body.nl And the soul is still a concept which we must learn 
to do without. The one word in the quotat.ion which would 
give us pause would be nunwillingly". If so much wishfuJ. 
thinking has gone into the invention of the soul this would 
seem a strange word, unless, indeed, he means that "soul" 
has come into being as a concept without our conscious will-
1. F~ud, FI, 32. 
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ing. 
In Moses and Monotheism Freud returns once more to the ques-
tion of the origin of the soUl concept. There seem to have been, 
in primitive man•s world, certain nspiritualn forces. That is, 
events which could only have an unse.en cause. Students of philol-
ogy tell us that the early attempts to name these unseen forces 
related them to "air" and "windn. And so nthe idea of the soul 
was born as the spiritual principle in the individual."l These 
effects which did not have obvious or discoverable causes were 
within a person as well as outside him and it would not be dif-
ficult to posit and believe in a common "spiritual.n cause. Nor 
would it be difficult to relate "soul" to this real yet hidden 
other realm, this world of cause, and to see this world as the 
abode o:f the soul after death. All.f this, o:f c curse, would be 
e:x-plained by Freud as pro:jection. "Soul" or "spiritn out there 
is put there by us, by our wishes and our seeming needs. 
So much, then, :for Freud 1 s thoughts through the years about 
the coming into being o:f this stubborn conaept "soul". In so :far 
as he is content with the evidence o:f reductionism, and gives to 
this process the authority to say what is real and what not in, 
the more comple%, contemporary conceptual world, he is rid of 
the c one ep t "s o uJ.. n • 
And yet there were data to be named, inner phenomena which 
had been taken care o:f, in part at least, by the concept "soul", 
and named it was. We shall come to this in the next section, 
but before we do that we should look at the :few times in his 
1. Freud, MM, 180. 
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writings when Freud uses the term nsou.l" in neither a di:reot 
nor an indirect quotation. but with his own intended or unin-
tended meaning. 
There are eight auoh times. Four, and perhaps five of 
them prove to be oooasians when "psyohio apparatus" oould 
just as easily be used. We shall, later, deal with this term. 
Onoe (TTpious soulsn) the word is used as a synonym for "per-
sonsn. But the ather usages, all in one passage, are worth 
noting. They appear in a paper on "Applied Psychoanalysis". 
Freud is showing how the ngeneral narcissism of man, the self-
love of humanity, .has up to the present been three times se-
verely wounded by the researches of soienoe."l First, when 
man found that the earth was not the oenter of the universe; 
seoond, when man found that there was not a great gulf f~ed 
between himself and the animal world, as he had so fondly be-
lieved; and third, when man was brought faoe to :faoe with un-
oonsoioua mental material and processes to find that he was 
not as rational a creature as he had thought himself to be. 
Man had :felt himself to be "supreme and secure in his own 
soul. n Somewhere in the oore o:f his ego he had developed 
an organ of observation to keep a watch on his impulses and 
actions and see that they a.ceorded with his demands.2 And 
this organ o:f observation was the soul. 
This sounds as though nsoul" were a something that is 
1. Freud, OP IV, 360. 
2. Freud• OP, IV, 362. 
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even more conscious than the ego, but unless we equate this 
with the superego, Freud would never push the meaning to the 
point of requiring such a mysterious·entity. This is, in 
one sense, another indirect quotation, perhaps something re-
lated to the high 11reason" of the philosophers, but we feel 
certain from the body of his writings that Freud was not ad-
vancing a new concept or even one to which he would, given a 
second thought, subscribe. But it is the nearest he comes to 
a noumenal concept, and for this reason, and to show this 
boundary mark, we have gone forward to elaborate. 
5 • The "psychic apparatu.s 112as defined by Freud. 
Freud was singularly ~ncurious about the springs of life. 
In a statement which I believe to be typical he says:. "The 
impulses and their transformations are the last things psy-
choanalysis can discern. Henceforth it leaves the stage to 
biological investigation, 111 
However, he makes it quite plain in his general point of 
view that the energy which brings the psychic apparatus into 
being and keeps its processes going is not something from out-
side man, a sort of divine cosmic ray, but something which 
takes its rise from the somatic aspect of man~ 
These energy impulses find or make psychical provinces 
or agencies, and the first of these and always the most fun-
damental is the nid" - as Joan Riviere has translated the 
German wo-rd n~n or nitn, using the Latin equivalent. An 
~· ~~~u~h~R~bathology ~f EveiSdat tife (~r.F, 103); The Inter-
• -pretat:t.on of' DreamsBW]', :•1) ± ,; a~o-z. in particular, !-!! 
outline of Psychoanalysis (OP t C.uap e s i and e. 
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/": 
older term used by Freud and re~er~ng to mueh the same inner 
ncauJ.dron of seething e:x-e i tementn is the "una onso ious n. They 
differ in that while all o:f the id is uneonaoious, not all of 
the unconscious is the id; for, as we shall see, the ego and 
the superego, other provinces or agencies in the psychic ap-
paratus, are, in part, also normally unconscious. 
In the id we h~ve the oldest part of the psychic appa-
ratus, the oore of it having come into being at the birth o:f 
the body. For it is there in the id that the somatic impulses, 
soon to be oalled instincts, have their :first unknown but in-
ferred movement. There these somatic impulses touch both 
their body source and are translated in~o a psychic thrust. 
They come charged with energy; indeed, they ~ en~rgy, but 
energy channeled in at least two diametrically opposite and 
opposed directions. On the one hand the channeled energy is 
seeking to uni~y, and on the other, to break down unity. 
The somatic impulses reaching the status of instincts 
plunge blindly forward, unorganized, yet obedient to an urge 
to fulfill themselves; to find satisfaction in obedience to 
what has been abstracted and called the pleasure principle. 
But once having found satisfaction, they become conservative, 
seeking to keep the satisfactory status quo. 
Such is the core of the realm of the id, chaotic yet 
driving ever forward to express its dialectical life and to 
keep a discovered path of satisfaction open. In its more 
marginal areas the id contains material which has been re-
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pressed ~rom the oonsoi~s province of the psychic apparatus. 
It will be useful to say something more about the Freu-
dian instincts - considered, by James Strachey, who has trans-
lated much of Freud, to be an unfortunate rendering of the 
German word ntriebn, which can also mean ndriving fora en or 
nimpulsen. 1 But these instincts are basic, in Freudrs think-
ing, providing as they do the energy which keeps the total 
psychic apparatus functioning. 
The instincts are, as we have seen, somatic in origin, 
and dependent, therefore, upon the ohemistry of the body and 
of the universe which feeds the body. They are, as it were, 
demands which are made by the body upon the psychio life 
which it itself has produced. These demands are many, but 
Freud settles upon two as being of vital importanoe in the 
present state of our being. These are, nErosn, as he calls 
it, whioh is the aonstruotive instinot, and nThanatosn, the 
destruotive instinot. The energy o~ Eros, the instinct of 
self-preservation and speoies-preservat~on, is called rrli-
bidon, but Freud does not name the energy of the destructive 
or death instinot., These energies are interohangeable, en-
ergy itself being neutral, yet ever ready for active servioe. 
An instinot has a source whioh is rra state of exoita~ 
tion within the body"; an objeot, or a means to fulfilment; 
and an aim- "to remove the exoitation".~ And as it takes 
1. Freud, OP, 14. 
2. Freud, NIP, 132-3. 
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this :road it becomes at some :point along the road, "mental". 
And an instinct may undergo the following "vicissitudes": be 
reversed into its opposite, turn around upon the subject, or 
undergo repression or sublimation. When an instinct ~s sub-
limated it has poured the energy which is driving it, or the 
energy that it is, into an ~:x:p:ression which is acceptable to 
the other judging agencies in the psychic apparatus and in 
sooiety. But when an instinct is repressed its energy is 
turned back into the id, Repression means that instinct-
energy has sought expression and has been sharply, though 
unconsciously as far as the person goes, defeated. For re-
pression is and remains an unconscious process. The some-
what similar conscious process is called suppression, and 
against the reacting force of suppression the instinct-energy 
is never compressed dangerously as it is under the reacting 
force of repression~ 
We shall turn now to the ego, "the main reservoir of 
libido"1 and that realm of the psychic apparatus which ist in 
part at least, moat conscious and most reasonable. One dif-
ference between the ego and the earlier term "conscious" lies 
just here; that all of the conscious is conscious, while part 
of the ego is not only preconscious - that is, recoverable by 
non-analytical means - but also ~conscious~ 
The ego has developed "out of the cortical layer of the id.n2, 
1, Freud, NIP, 141. 
2. Freud, OP, 110. 
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though it has also been hammered into shape by tbe externaJ. 
world. Its ~unction is to aot as an intermediary between the 
id and the external world and the superego - which we shall 
discuss later. That is, between urgent bodily needs and the 
world outside (the superego is the intro~ected world outside) 
where the instiDct-driven person may or may not be permitted 
to ~ul~ill these needs. The ego, unlike the id, is hi.ghly and 
strongly organized in the normal being, or the beings which 
make up most o~ our population. And in these perso:os it is 
largely at the service o~ the instinct o~ eros, the instinct 
which strives ~or satis~actory synthesis and uni£ication and 
the preservation o~ such states o~ being as these or the causes 
which produoe them. 
The ego stands behind the so-called individual "willn t 
and directs this will along the path which will best preserve 
. the individual, and so the species. The ego must ~ace two 
w~a in order to do its workt without and within. For experi-
ences come to it ~or handling ~rom both sources. It is alert 
along the sensory channels to what is happening in the reality· 
world nout thererr and in the kinesthetically and otherwise 
known body-world; it remembers ~ormer experiences and uses 
memory as it ~aces the present and the ~uture; it adapts to 
the externaL world where it must or where it seems best to do 
so; and it is ever seeking to change the external world so 
that adaptation and ego-development may be possible. 
As it faces the other way, that is, inward, the ego must 
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be more stern. For its task here is to keep the £orcas o£ the 
id under control and the demands o£ the superego in some way 
satisfied. This may not mean, as it £aces the instinctual 
drives, suppress ion (the eonsaious ego cannot repress), :for 
some instinctual drives may be satisfied, either upon their 
appearance or after an acceptable delay. 
The ego, too, seeks pleasure rather than "unpleasure", 
but it is the pleasure, not of ·the id pleasure-principle, but 
the pleasure which results from balanc~ng the tension between· 
the.various demanding provinces of the psychic apparatus, the 
id and the sup_er ego, and the outside worl·d o:f Reality. It 
is the pleasure o£ a :functioning giroscope. 
The particular vicissitudes of the ego are the difficul-
ties that arise as yo'u have abnormality in any or al.l o£ those 
provinces which are pressing :for self-centered expression, and 
the £act that it can objectify itself and bring judgment to 
bear upon itself. When t.his last reaches a severe stage, we 
can speak of a split ego and expect psychic troti.ble. 
So much for the ego. Much more could be said about it, 
but the material is well ~derstood, and i£ not, easily avail-
able. 
We must speak now about the superego and abo.ut Freud's 
conception of "Reality". The former, because it is a very 
dynamic. and so important part o:f. the psychic apparatus, and 
the latter, because we shall see in Reality the centripetal 
1 shaping :force o:f this psychic apparatus. We mention the 
' 
!superego and reality together, because they stand, psycho-
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logically, very close together. Te explain: part o£ this cen-
tripetal shaping £orca which helps to mould and to strengthen -
or weaken - the ego must be se~n as the parents or the parent -
substitutes in the li£e o£ the small child; and part o£ it must 
be seen as that which plays upon the child, other than parents, 
£rom the total outer environment, both physical and mental. 
And as these outer forces are at work, and as they con-
tinue, day in and day out, to have their ef£ect upon the plas-
ticity o£ the young child, something happens. That which was 
outer gradually becomes inner, and, to take an important e%-
ample, the voice of the father which was "out there" now 
sounds from within the child; and it will continue to. sound 
in the child grown adult even afte~ the £ather bas died. This 
is what· is meant by introjection. 
Moreover, part of this introjected, judging £orca (and it 
is ohie£ly a disapproving voice, or a voiae which urges to un-
happy duty, though it may als'o give a person creative release), 
becomes unconscious in tb.e child, yet ever active. Thus a part 
of the inner person, a part of the psychic apparatus, separates 
itself and begins to specialize. And this we speak of as the 
superego. 
The superego is sometimes spoken of as being part o£ tb.e 
ego, but it is clearer if we consider them as separate provinces. 
It draws its energy from the id, as does the ego. Part of it is 
unconscious, and along this unconscious "edge" it stands nearer 
to the id than does the ego along its unconscious border. That 
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is to say, the id woul.d seem to be able to communicate better 
with the superego than with the ego. One result would be that 
the superego would be more likely to be unreasonable in its de-
mands and more likely to be charged with relentless energy. 
It would seem, too, that while the eros instinct can, quite 
happily, £eed its energy into the ego province, both the eros 
instinct and the destructive instinct, and particularly the de-
structive instinct, can £iDd. e:xpression in and through the super-
ego. For two reasons then, ·the superego may be harsh: because 
it can be £ed by the instinct o£ death; and because it may be 
£ormed through introjection in a harsh human environment~ There 
are many harsh parents. 
Like the ego, and unlike the id, the superego is highly 
organized. It is the nearest thing in the psychic apparatus to 
conscience, and yet it is always more than the traditional con-
science. 
When we do not have in the superego any abnormal demands 
or suggestions, when the psychic apparatus has come into being 
in a normal, non-neurotic human environment and a non-traumatic 
natural environment, then we can speak o:f a normal person with 
a normal su:Perego. But in our western civilization at least, 
such persons are rare. 
And so in the psychic apparatus we have the superego on 
one side o:f the ego, as it were, and the id on the other, and 
all o:f them, and the ego consciously, :facing the outer world 
o~.reality. The superego and the id represent, in this appa-
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ratus, pretty much the voices of an individual 1 s past, while 
.,_ 
the ego is at work in the present and for 'the :future; the future 
of itself, of the total psychosomatic organization, and even :for 
the future of Reality itself. 
And now a brief note on Freud 1 s conception of Reality. 
For as water is shaped by its container, so, to a very great 
extent, is the psychic apparatus shaped and controlled in its 
processes by the world of Aeality, the world that lies outside 
it. The implication here is that the psychic apparatus is not 
"real". We shall have a word to say about this later on. 
Freud sets over against the pleasure principle, which has 
its place, but which must be kept in its place, the "reality 
principle". In obedience to this reality principle, the ega 
lives its healthiest life, and as it teaches this principle 
to the restless id, and as it requires the superego to take 
Reality more and more into account, so does this ego do what 
it is meant to do. 
Truth has been defined by Freud as "correspondence with 
the real external world."l And since the drives of life take 
their ria e :from the realm of the somatic·, which is part of the 
real external world, and since these drives are directed and 
controlled largely by the various pressures of this same ex-
ternal world, the psychic apparatus, with its provinces and 
its agencies, would seem to have its existence and its day-
to-day functioning between one part of the real world - the 
1. Freud, NIP, 233. 
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body - and another, the centripetal, natural and personal part 
of the real world "out there". It would seem, there£ore, that 
the psychic side o£ us, this soul-substitute, is neither nou-
menal nor phenomenal but epiphenomenal. much of it is unknown 
and may remain unk.p:own, but the dif£ieul.ty will lie, not in its 
unknowableness, but in our lasting limitations. 
6. That which emerges fr9m this study £or comparison with the 
existential soul. of Kierkegaard. 
Freud has a concept o£ the soul., but it is .one which he 
himself does not accept, for as he uses the term it is, even 
in his anthropological writings, in a religious context; and 
every suoh text and context is for him unreal. 
To give some of the reasons for this conclusion whioh 
is easily discove:z:able .in Freud 1s writings, we have made a 
systematic study of those places in which the term "soul" is 
used, and have £ound him to be consistent in his rejection. 
We have noted too, that Freud may have generalized too 
hastily as he talked about "religien". We have religion as 
he bas described it, but we also have religious persons who 
would agree with him in their condemnation o£ what he has 
described, but who would continue to be strongly religious. 
One consequence of this may be that i£ Freud's conclusions 
about all religion be in any sense. false, the~ his thoughts 
concerning the religious concept o£ the soul may also be 
£alae; or at least ungrounded.and inadequate. 
We have seen, for instance, that Freud oan find no 
224 
place in his system £or a creative £actor; someth~ng which will 
not only give man a el£-knowledge, enough :for him to see that he 
is marching, o£ necessity, in lockstep with an unchangeable past 
and an ~evitable £uture, but something which can deliver him 
£rom such deterministic living. And in religion at its best -
to judge it by ":frUitstt which Freud himself would approve of -
' 
we have a place for the creative decision and the creative re-
lations hip with God. 
The chief of the criticisms which are offered by students 
o:f Freud, those who would disagree with his conclusions about 
religion, would seem to be that the tools o£ the science to 
which he was anxious to restrict himael£ cannot work conclu-
sively upon the materials of religion. For this we need the 
tools and the methods of :philosophy and of theology; and we 
need, as raw material, the actual experiences and consequences 
in a life of religious f.aith. 
And Freud does wish to be a strict scientist. To show 
that this is so - not that he was, but that he wished to be -
we have studied his acknowledged relationships with science, 
and have found him to be a consistent advocate, i:f not prao-
tiser, of its exclusive principles and methods. It is science, 
he says, and only science which can teach us the truth. To be 
scientific, and only this, is to be normal; and, by implication, 
to be unscientifiq in any area of our lives is to be untrue or 
abnormal. And by science he means empirical science. 
Sinee Freud could never make "soul" a concept in the system 
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he would suppGrt, we have turned to possible soul-equi!alents; 
namely, human nature, person, self, spirit. and subject. And 
we have :found that no one of these is adequate to srun up and 
represent those phenomena which have been caught and conveyed 
by the strongly traditional conaept "soul". And at this point 
we began to move :from "soul" as a religious concept to soul 
as it might appear in a system of secular psychology. 
To make certain o:f that which Freud•s general point o:f 
view would suggest; namely, that he can find no place for 
soul as a religious concept, because he can :find no place 
for religion; and that he would be likely to avoid the use 
of the term as a psychological concept, we turned, ne~t, to 
see the meanings which Freud had given to the soul in the 
more than hundred times that it appears in his writings. 
The chief of our discoveries was that we should have 
to continue to look :for a soul-substitute word if the phe~­
#omena o:f the inner life were to be adequately named. And 
this we :found to be "psychic apparatus", including its 
processes. 
We studied this new term in some detail, and came to 
the conclusion that its reality belongs, not to the realm 
o:f the noumenal, nor yet to the phenomenal, but to the epi-
ph~nomenal. For "psychic apparatus" would seem to lie some-
where between the real realm of the somatic man, and the 
real realm of the sensory world which he inhabits, snd to 
which, through his energized psychic apparatus he must learn 
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to adapt. 
SoUl, as "psychic apparatus",. wonderful. and CoDIJ?lex as 
it is, would seem, therefore, to represent or to pe a kind 
of hyphen in existence; the real world being the letters in 
the two words that are joined, the body and the world "out 
there". And the religious concept "soul" 1 to. put it in 
Freudian terms, would seem to be just one more cathectieal 
. illusion; a concept in which a sum of psychic energy, a 
transmutation of somatic energy, has been wrongly invested. 
For behind the investment is the great, false wish made 
; 
in the very face of reality, to give the instinct of eros a 
victory over the instinct of death. Eut living in the world 
of truth, we see, Freud would say, that it is death which 
always conquers, For neither the soul, nor the soul-substi-
tute, the psychic apparatus, can live beyond the death of 
the body. 
After the above.had been writen, there came to my at-
tention certain references which would indicate that from a 
theoretical point of view, and especially as the psychic ap-
paratus was involved, Freud ended hie long, productive life 
with the possibilitY of radieAl changes in mind. 
Re had, according to Fairbairnl, concentrated at first 
upon the nature of repressed material; then, as the clinical 
demand was made upon him, upon the process of repression. 
He moved, in this investigation, from a functional to a 
1. Fairbairn, AE, 122. 
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structural definitign, and it 1~ at this po~t that "psychic 
apparatus" became the descriptive concept, Spelled "psychi-
cal" rather than "psy-chic", it dominates the little work which 
he wrote in 1938, and which was first published in English in 
1949. This is called~ An Outline of Psychoanalysis. 
Those who see Freud in the closing months of his life 
on the verge of change, point to this writing, and to two 
other shorter works, the "Elementary lessons in Psy-cho-Anal-
_ysis", which were also ~itten .in 1938, though never com-
pleted; and the paper from this same y-ear entitled, "Split-
ting of the Ego in the Defensive Process." These are to be 
found in volnme five of his Oollected Papers. 
Mowrer, in particular, senses in these writings, "a 
distinctly- friendlier and mellewer attitude with respect 
to the superego and ita functiona.nl The superego may- even 
be a source of happiness in man. Formerly-, say-a Mowrer, 
Freud had tended to be adamant about the only source of hap-
piness being instinct satisfaction. 
Freud began to see, too, say-s Mowrer, that a neurotic 
co~ict can be precipitated, not only as the ego represses 
the forces of the id, the instinctual forces, but also as 
the ego represses the forces of the superego. This would 
indicate - and we know it to be so - that the ego, for Freud, 
was to be more carefully- studied; and tbat these fresh stud-
ies were beginning to show that it had more strength and more 
1. Mowrer, LPD, 483. 
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importance, ·in_the development of man, than had been originally 
thought. 
The possibility of an ego-versus-superego neurosis, then, 
and the possibility of there being ego satisfaction in obeying 
the superego rather than the id~ would indicate the beginning 
of a shift in the focus of Freud's attention from the inner to 
the outer world; from the biological to the sociological. 
Fairbairn sees that the giving of-status to the parts of 
the psychic apparatus marks the beginning of seeing them as 
"internal objects"; this was especially true of Freud's de-
velopment of the concept of the superego. And from this it 
is ollly a step to a nworld of inner reality," and so to, a 
new distinction; not that between conscious and unconscious, 
but between the two worlds of outer and inner reality.l 
FreUd had begun to recognize this by putting an increas-
ing emphasis, in the process of analysis, upon the present 
rather than .the past; and had he time to develop this, and 
to realize to the :full that his neurotic patients were caught, 
many of them at least, in a struggle against the introjected 
outer world of reality rather than against their instinctual 
drives, he would have brought radical changes to his theory. 
We have read not only the Fairbairn article and the state-
ments by Mowrer, but have reread the writings of Freud in 
whioh Mowrer senses some of these uncertainties and beginnings 
of ohange. And there is no doubt that one can find sentences 
1. Fairbairn, AP, 124. 
,. 
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whiah would bear out the h:v:P·othesis. Bu.t Freud, :for some 
reason, did not oomplete either the "Outlinen or the nLessons"; 
and in the bUlk o:f these late-in-life pages he remains, in 
his orientation, consistently biological. And even if we al-
low these sensitive readers of Freud as muoh as they claim, 
or at least as they suggest, we do not see that it·wou.ld per-
mit Freud to have a concept of the "souln, whether it be psy-
ehologioally or religiously defined. And while our delineat-
ing of the psyohio apparatus might have to be somewhat modi-
fied, had Freud aompleted and reported his thinking along 
these fresh lines, we do not see that it would be other than 
naturalistic and epi-phenomenal. The evidence given by Mowrer, 
for instance; would suggest a possible shifting of points of 
energy and a modification of relationship lines within the 
Wel tansohaunng which Freud had adopted almo.st from the begin-
ning, rather than the adoption of a new one; one that would 
find a place in it,:for a "soul" relationship with any kind 
of objective God. Later in the book to which we are refer~­
jing, Mowrer states that "Freud had the advantage of being 
completely naturalistic in his thinking.nl The underlining 
is our own. 
1. Mowrer, LPD, 541. 
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CHAP~ER V 
A Oompariso~ of the Soul-Ooncepts in Kierkegaard and Freud 
1. A restatement of Kierkegaard's conception of the soul. 
Kierkegaard never seems to have faced the question as to 
whether the soul and the body, which exist in synthesis form 
in every human being, can exist apart. 
That the soul oan be lost if one :pays exclusive attention 
to the body, gaining the body as :part of "the whole world", 
might imply that the two were separable, but suoh a separation 
would have to take place at the moment of death, or at some 
future day of judgment. For life and breathing mean that the 
synthesis, and so the soul, is still in existence. 
What can be lost in life, however, is an awareness of 
that :power whieh holds body and soul together; namely, spirit. 
And as a consequence of this loss of awareness, the soul ean 
lose its one-time sensitiveness. or the soul may be lost in 
the sense of remaining throughout life in an undeveloped, in-
sensitive state. 
The soul, then, exists. It has oome into its synthesis 
with the body at birth, if not at the time of oonoe:ption, and 
it has its most vital existence for the :pattern of the present 
in the present. It is considered by Kierkegaard to be immo~-
tal, for even though it be finally lost, it will continue to 
have existence in its lost state in some future hell. 
The soul has, however, no plaoe of existence. It is 
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t~ue, the body with which it lives in synthesis, is bounded 
by its outer skin, but such is the nature of the soulish part 
that it cannot be brought under the category of place, For 
this would bring it into the realm of the phenomenal, and 
though it be spoken of as if it were a phenomenon or a part 
of a phenomena-synthesis - such are the limitations of our 
language and our imagination - it is not. 
It is in time as an active principle might be said to 
be in time, but it is also in eternity; unconsciously so at 
first, and then if and when it becomes awa~e of spirit, which 
is of the stuff of eternity, consciously so. 
Soul-differences between persons and within persons at 
different times vary concomitantly with awareness of spirit; 
an awareness which is not that of opjeotive observation, but 
of subjective participation. 
The soul, or the soulish element in the synthesis, has 
been given by God, and it continues only beeause of His sup-
port no matter what minimum existence it may choose or may 
have thrust upon it by worldly circumstances. It aan, how-
ever, through sought and aooepted graoe, know a surprising 
development. It is changed, too, by its own choices in this 
world. It will be judged by this same Giver of grace both 
absolutely and in terms of the relation between its state of 
being and the opportunity it has really had for development; 
relatively to see on which side it has taken its final stand, 
and absolutely, to see where, on that side, it will stand. 
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The soul is known at al~ times o~ God through His agent, 
the spirit. It is known directly through sel~-consciousness. 
And it is known in its e~~eats, both by the person himsel~ 
and by others. 
To summarize, the soul, for Xierkegaard, is real; it is 
actually in time and potentially - a potentiality which can 
be actualized in this li~e and for a ~uture li~e - in eter-
nity; it is known immediately in sel~-oonsciousness and by 
God, and it is known indirectly by onesel:f in re~r.ospeot, or 
by others, because o~ its ef:feots. The degree of self-aware-· 
.ness of the soul in its body-soul synthesis is in proportion 
to the degree of the soul 1 s awareness.of the synthesizing 
spirit. And lastly, it is to be valued and lived far·~ one•s 
choices and one•s actions as an entity which can have in its 
continuing s;vthesis, immortal and eternal life. 
1\ 
2. A restatement o:f Freud's conception o:f the soul. 
We shall have to give, here, our :findings about two con-
cepts: first, the soul proper, or die Seale, in Freud, and 
second, that which we ~ound to be the nearest soul-substitute 
to cover certain important data o~ the inner life. 
The soul in Freud is a concept which is discussed by him 
only because it appears in material which he must discuss. 
And these materials are, chie:fly, of four not unrelated kinds: 
the poetical, the pathological, the illusory in the li~e of 
a neurotic, and the primitive. 
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In the poetical material. made up almost entirely of quo-
tations. "soul" stands for that in man which would acknowledge 
a legitimately expanded or concentrated way of life; that is, 
legitimately in the poet 1 s eyes. 
In the pathological reporting, nsoultt is just a reiterat-
ed word that means something. in a man that is in touch with 
God or in the clutches of the Devil, or on a battlefield be-
tween the two. 
1n illusory thinking, which would include. for Freud, 
all religion, and in particular the religion· of Christendom 
in his day, soul is part of an illusory system. It is~ so 
religionists olaim and so Freud wauld refute, something par-
ticular and special in man, and some men say that it can go 
soaring up to heaven after death. With its attributes and its 
schemes for development and salvation, the soul is part of 
the larger illusory bundle of religion, Freud would say, and 
the whole bundle must go overboard. 
And in the primitive setting, which is also religious, 
or at least having to do with life after death, "soul" is a 
concept which has reference to a believed-in phenomenal en-
tity; an entity which should be carefully investigated, Freud 
says, because of the explanatory light whieh the findings may 
throw on current religion and, indeed, current pathology. 
And as contrasts are seen between then and now, it will bet-
ter enable us to understand the truth of science, of normal-
ity and - though Freud did not much use the word - of matu-
rity. 
234 
But, as we have said, m'Ueh that has :for centuries been 
explained by the soul-concept, is still to be explained by 
one who may be convinced, intellectually or :practioa.lly that 
Freud is right, And ta handle this perennial inner data, 
Freud would :favor the term "psychic apparatus". This then is 
the soul-substitute whioh we must consider as we are discov-
ering and ordering the Freudian material which can be com-
pared with the :findings about Xierkegaard•s conception of the 
soul. 
The psychic apparatus consists of interacting mental 
provinces; and the whole, in its close relationship with the 
body and with the outer world of reality, gives us active man. 
The energy for this highly dynamic apparatus :feeds through 
from a somatic origin, In the id part o:f the whole, :fitted, 
psychic scheme, raw energy branches into definite instincts. 
Of these, contemporary man must wrestle with two: the instinct 
which would uni:fy and the instinct which would destroy. 
In the id, the raw energy-life and the more-shaped in-
stinct energy life are unconscious. But they are ever striv-
ing to break through into consciousness; not because this is 
their intention, even their unconscious intention, but because 
this coming into consciousness in some :form is a by-product 
.. 
e:f:feot o:f '·their finding, or striving to find their pleasure-
led expression. 
~ut because of the outside world of nature and of humaa 
nature, which sets boundaries to the possibilities of such 
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e%preesion, and because o~another province o£ the psychic 
apparatus, the ego, which has itself and the whole being, in-
cluding the driving £orcas o£ the id as its concern~ and be-
cause of yet another psyehie province, the superego, the in-
stincts must, with tpe frequency of a rule, channel their ex-
pression along permitted ways; or postpone, and, it may be, 
for a lifetime, any ~ireot expression; or take second-best 
expression; or turn back into the id, defeated, but grambling, 
as it were, and eager to make trouble. 
All of thist of course, is reification, if not personi-
fication, but in so speaking we not only have the example of 
Freud, the inventor of these terms, but a wish to make the 
material as clear and communicable as possible. Freud is at 
pains to show a mechanistic struggle which is taking place 
between these fragmentary yet interrelated farcies, but his 
device of personifying the impersonal energy drives can mis-
lead one into believing that useful hypotheses are proven 
facts. 
To continue - the ego, borrowing energy from~ one of the 
instincts which it must strive to control, the instinct which 
would unify (called, by Freud, "Eros". with its particular 
energy called "libido") makes its precarious way through ita 
days. keeping the balance, as best it ean, between ~d-demanda, 
and superego-demands, and the demands of the real, outer 
,,.1 ·• 
world. 
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Part o£ this ego is £ully oonsoious o£ what it is doing, 
but part o£ it remains unoonsoious. And a third part of it 
has been lo~:t out o£ its organization ... :for the u.nconsoious 
part of the ego is still in the ego organization - and has 
gone tumbling, or has been pushed by a :forgetting which, is 
always signi£icant, into the seething cauldron o:f the id. 
The superego, a legacy of a person~'s past, both in an 
individual and in a race sense - at least in so· £ar as the 
past o:f the race is stil~ present in habits, customs, atti-
tudes, and in other forms - has come into being through a 
process which is called, by Freud, introjection. 
The sensitive child, with his survival needs in a world 
of seemingly arbitrary adults, and with his pleasure-pain 
needs, the getting o:f one and the being ~id of the other, has 
learned the hard way what he must do and what he must not do 
i:f he is to be aoeeptable to these adults an4.. in this world. 
And as this learning has gone on, week by week and month by 
month, the outer demands and t.he outer approvals have been 
taken into his psychic life. And, moreover, the tie between 
the child and the givers of commands and smiles, and the sys-
tem of "do•s and don'ts"; is broken in the process, and the. 
oh.ild, and the child grown man, believes that these collective 
voices within him are his very own; or, in many cases, are · 
sent by God Rimaelf. 
Thus we have cuilt up, as one of the provinces ·in the 
psychic apparatus,· this more-than-conscience, the superego; 
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more than conscience, because a part o£ it becomes unconscious, A . 
and as such, becomes the bridge by which energy from either or 
both of the two id instincts that Freud has singled out, may 
pasa into and energize. itael:f~ 
The superego, then, may be energized by the death instinct 
:for vicious oombat with the ego; it may be energized by the 
Eros instinct, which would unify the ego and support it in 
its executive functions; or the superego may be led by the 
blended energies of these two instincts to demand perfection 
:from the ego; perfection having in it both that which is pain-
ful and demanding, and that whioh would hold together rather 
than drive apart. 
To summarize, the soul as a religious or even a psycho-
logical term exists, in Freud, only to be discarded. For it 
belongs to an illusion-system, and one that sustains, under 
the guise of religion, a neurotic way o£ life. 
The soul-substitute, on the other hand. is, according to 
Freud, very much in existence. It is called the "psychic ap-
paratus"• and it is composed of three interrelated and spe-
cializing provinces, the id, the ega and the superego. This 
apparatus is energized constantly by its somatic originator. 
In the :form in whieh we oan come to some understanding of it, 
the energy-expression is called an instinct, and of all of 
the actual or possible instincts whioh come to some £ormal 
being in the id, two are of prime importance in the psychic 
life of modern man. These are the opposing drives toward 
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uni~ioation, on the one hand, and toward destruction on the 
other. 
This soul-substitute, the psychic apparatus, comes into 
being because o~ a somatic output of energy. As long as it 
has this source of energy, it exists and ~unctions, but when 
the source is cut off, as at the death of the body, the pay-
ohio apparatus or soul-substitute no longer exists. 
The psychic apparatus is, there~ore, in its nature epi-
phenomenal rather than phenomenal, for the phenomenal would 
continue to exist a~ter death, though under a different form. 
And it is certainly not noumenal, for the noumenal world, 
~or F~eud, woUld be a realmy about which, if it had any re-
ality at all, we oan know absolutely nothing. 
By "noumenal" is meant, having a real existence beyond 
the perceiving powers of the senses, even though those powers 
were extended to infinity. And the ~ailure to perceive would 
be due to the nature of the noumenal reality, to the fact 
that it - if we can speak o~ it as "it" - belongs, even more 
than does an abstraction in the field of thought, to a non-
sensual world. 
The noumenal can be known, however, in its effects, and 
so, by inference. And more directly by a life of faith; a 
faith which p~sits the existence of this noumenal, and lives 
by this belief. We have not used the term "intuition", which 
is much used by those who would speak of knowing the noumenal, 
because intuition may turn out to be inference with many of 
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the connecting links in the precess made at a level below 
conscious awareness. 
3. Similarities,betwaen the soul-de£initions o£ Kiarkegaard and 
o£ Freud. 
In making our comparisons, both in this section where 
we are seeking £or similarities, and in the next where we 
shall be looking £or contrasts and contradictions, we shall 
have to compare, £irst o£ all, Kierkegaardis de£inition o£ 
the soul with Freud's de£inition of die Seale or the soUl, 
a conoept he would be rid of. For the purpose o£ this Dis-
sertation was to examine the concept "soul" in each o£ these 
men. regardless o£ the opinion that either of them might have 
about it. But. in order to make our study of more value, we 
shall also have to compare the "soul" in Kierkegaard's thought 
with the soul-substitute, or "psychic apparatus", in Freud. 
First, then, soul and soul, In comparing "soul" in 
Kierkegaard and die Seale in Freud we £ind that in the reality 
system of each they are totally unlike; unlike in the way 
that the presence of a certain attribute is not merely unlike 
the absence a£ that attribute, but the absence of anything to 
which an attribute could be attributed. 
The soul £or Xierkegaard, is; the soul, £or Freud, is 
not. Except, indeed, as it exists as anhistorical or contem-
porary, but always mistaken concept; mistaken because there 
is nothing soulish - as tradition has defined it- to be con-
ceptualized. 
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On the other hand, Kierkegaard's "soul" and the soul-sub-
stitute which we found in Freud, the "psyehic apparatus", do 
have eertain things in common. They both have a eertain kind 
of existence; they are both dynamically present in time; they 
both have an actuality and a potentiality; that is, both can 
ehsnge and develop or deteriorate; there is a self-conscious 
knowing, a~ least in part, in eaeh ease; and certainly both 
the Kierkegaardian "soul" and the Freudian "psychic ap~aratus" 
are seen to be functioning entities, either by the ~ossessor 
immediately or in retrospect or by others, in the effects of 
this functioning. 
The Freudian "psychic apparatus" may not be considered 
to be in·a synthesis state With the body, as are Kierkegaard•s 
soul and body, but the first province of the psychic appara-
tus, that which feeds energy into the other two is as near to 
the somatic sources of its energy and as closely related as 
are the roots of a tree to the earth that helps to give them 
life. 
Ther~ are, then, these similarities, and perhaps others, 
between the "soUl" in Kierkegaard and the soul-substitute or 
"psyohie apparatus in Freud, but their differences are muoh 
greater. We shall now turn to these. 
4. Contrasts and contradictions between the soul-definitions 
of Kierkegaard and Freud .• 
Onoe again, we shall begin by looking for contrasts and 
contradictions between "soul" in Kierkegaard and die Seale, 
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or soul :Proper, ;n Freud, and then go on to compare, :for this 
same purpose, Kierkegaardis "sonl" and Freudis "psychic appara-
tus". 
Sino e there was no sameness at all b~tween .K.ierkegaard 1 S 
"soul" and Freud 1 S "die Seale"~ t~ere must be, logically, a 
complete di:f:ference. And this complete di:f:ference, as we have 
indicated, is not merely the di:f:ference between presence and 
absence, but between real and unreal. 
However, when we look :for contrasts and contradictions 
between the .Kierkegaardian "soul" and the Freudian souJ..-sub-
stitute, ":Psychic apparatus", we :find that, :first o:f all, 
there is in each case something :fervently believed in by each, 
and something comparable. This means that we shall match 
:flesh and blood with :flesh and blood, not :flesh and blood 
with a ghost which only some people think they see some o:f 
the time. 
The :first di:f:fere.noe, and many resuJ..ting di:fferencea. 
come as we see that Kierkegaard is willing to use the con-
cept of "eternity" in relation to the soul; but in relation 
to his soul-substitute, Freud is not. For Kierkegaard 1 S 
"soul" is potentially, i:f not actually and in this life, a 
creature o:f eternity; it is held in synthesis with the body 
by an agent o:f eternity, the spirit, and may rise, all through 
li:fe and beyond this earthly li:fe, into a realm o:f eternity. 
This, for Freud, would be regressing into illusion, or 
admitting that you had never moved beyond that state. His 
1. Die Seale can mean soul, mind, heart or human being. We 
are referring to the first use only. 
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"psyehic apparatus", in so £ar as it was normal and not neu-
f; 
rotie or pathologieal, wo.a:Ld have none o£ it. 
The "soul", therefore, in Kierkegaard would ~ve the eon-
earn which would come from a recognition of its eternal frame 
o£ re£erenee. It would know itsel£ to be a creature with two 
possible and extreme destinies, heaven and hell; and it would 
be changed constantly by the choices which would result £rom 
this belief. In other words, the soul in Kierkegaard would 
be a££ected not only by the lingering past and the day-to-
day present, but by eschatological thinking about the £uture; 
and, o£ course, by ita awareness of the ever-new love o£ God 
in the God-Man, Christ. 
Freud's "psychic apparatus" would have none of these 
hopes, and indeed, fears, to give it strong motivation. It 
would be able to rise only to the level of being aware of 
its own epiphenomenal existence; and the pessimism which this 
"last truth" would engender woUld color ita every £unotion. 
At best it would bring itself to a dignified stoieism as it 
sought, in its generation, and. for the sake· of :future gener-
ations, to work while it might. But soon, Reality as it had 
conceived it, would bring this substitute :for "soul" back to 
the dust from which it had set out. 
CHAPTER V1 
Bearing of the Results upon the Stated Requests and Questions 
1. First Request 
The questions and requests we shall consider in this chap-
ter are found on pages four and five of the dissertation. The 
first two are requests which we shall put to Kierkegas.rd and 
to Freud in turn, while the third and t~e fourth are questions 
whioh we shall ask of ourselve.s. 
The first, whioh we shall put to each of the two men, is 
this: as you consider the coneept of the soul or the soul-
equivalent whioh you find in the writings of the other thinker, 
what comments do you wish ~o make? We shall assume that each 
. 
·of the two is willing to respond.· And we shall, first of all, 
review the two concepts. 
In so far as it is possible to do justioe to a concept 
which is as oomplex, as real and as important as is the soul 
for Kierkagaard, he would speak of it thus; I assume the ex-
istence of the soulish aspeot of that synthesis which is man. 
But there is also the bodily aspeot, and the two are held in 
their inseparable synthesis by the agent of the eternal whioh 
is spirit. 
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to define the soulish 
or the soul, for that would imply two things: that we know e-
nough to set the boundaries of a definition about this entity 
or this fanetion; and, seoondly, that "soul" belongs to the 
phenomenal realm. 
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Baoause of habit, and because of our limitations we speak 
of "soul" as "it" (the French would say "shelf), but "soul." be-
l.ongs to that order of being or expression of being which is 
noumenal., and which, therefore, eschews the third person sin-
goJ.ar. De:fini tiona have to do with the realm o:f the third 
person. We cannot, therefore, define "soul". But we can make 
symbol.ic statements about it. set up signs, as it were, which 
point to it. And one such statement would be that it is only 
the soulish aspect of man which ean be aware of spirit; and 
that it is saved, and so saves the bodil.y aspect, in propor-
tion to the degree of this awareness. And, more important 
still, it begins to be saved as it is willing to be aware of 
spirit. 
The spirit·, which is also noumenaJ., is of qualitative 
oneness with the eternal, which is another name for the realm 
or kingdom.o:f God. And in so :far as an agent truly represents 
the one who bas sent him, and who continues to instruct and 
support him, so does spirit represent God in tbe body-soul 
synthesis, Man. And in this sense, and in this sense only, 
God is immanent in man. God is thus brought existentially 
near, but pantheism is avoided. 
The soul in man can and must communicate with that which 
saves; namely, the spirit. But the relationship is one of 
both giving and receiving. This relationship, which is self-
conscious, and which is ever deepening, begins and continues, 
in this life, the process of salvation; and the end of mortal 
,t 
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1i£e is but the time o£ a new beginning in a realm of immortal-
ity. 
Added to these inner workings, we have the constant, cre-
ative initiative of God who would speak to the soul. The spirit 
is ever bearing witness to this active hope of God. And God's 
willingness to save, and the love which he brings to the task, 
has been shown, for all souls and £or all time, in the life 
and death o£ the God-Man, Christ. The soul, therefore, to know 
salvation both here and herea£ter, and to play what might be 
called its most mature part in the day-to-day life o£ man, must 
be religious. An aesthetic soul, or an ethical soul are both 
ins u££1c ien t. 
This would be quite enough for Freud to understand Kier-
kegaard's conception of t~ soul. From his general knowledge 
of western thought, springing, so much of it, from Greece and 
Rome and Palestine, Freud woUld understand that the soul or 
the soulish in Kierkegaard was one more interpretation of the 
traditional concept found in the orthodo% teaching of the 
Ohttrch councils, and in the New Testament and in many places 
in the older testament. 
And Freud would reply~ I cannot accept such a defini-
tion; your symbolic statements are about nothing; and your 
signs point to no specific entity or function. For such a 
soul does not e%ist; e%oept, perhaps, as a mistaken concept 
. :· 
in an. illUSory system of belief. God, who is other than a 
projection from yourself, or the wish-projection o£ the race, 
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must go; the eternal, as opposed to, or as existing in or "above" 
---
the ~emporal must be given up; the supernatural, which is con-
sidered to be a realm other than the natural, has no reality. 
And spirit, therefore, being the child of non-existing parents, 
has no existence. 
Take away all this, and the significance and nourishment 
which it has given to the soul, an~ what have you left? Cer-
tain phenomena which we speak of as being more mental than bod-
ily, and which are known, if not directly, then by the effects 
which they produce. For example, the unconscious. But this 
does not make the phenomena in their effects noumenal in their 
oause. Rather, both the effects and the cause are, where they 
are not phe~omenal, epi-phenomenal. They represent a strange, 
late - in the history of life - and, admittedly, important out-
growth upon the body of phenomena, but it does not need, this 
epi-phenomenal addition, religion or the a oncepts of religion, 
to explain its origin or to give it meaning. Rather it has 
come into being and it is constantly maintained through the 
transmutation of somatic energy, and it finds its own meaning. 
And when the source of its energy is cut off, when the somatic 
phenomena change at the drastic moment of death, then the epi-
phenomena, the mental, that which tradition and Kierkegaard 
would call the soulish, simply disappears. If there be any 
conservation it must come in the effect which the epi-phenom-
enal has had upon the phenomenal. 
Freud would therefore reject Kierkegaard 1 S statement about 
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the soul, except as it might refer to the epi-phenomenal which 
he is at pains to discover and work with in his dynamic dealings 
with man. 
And what would Xierkegaard say about Freud at this point? 
First of all, he would realize as he studied Freud's statements 
about the soul, or die Seale, that this was not the concept 
which would require the chief of his comments; rather he would 
see it to be the "psychic apparatus". 
Continuing, Kierkegaard would, I believe, commend Freud 
for his efforts to find methods of exploring this psychic ap-
paratna. And many of Freud 1 s d.escriptive passages, and not 
a few of Freud 1 s summarized insights and interpretations would 
confirm, for Kierkegaard, what he himself had glimpsed or felt. 
For instance, in his Works of Love, Kierkegaard asks, "Is it 
not also dissimulation when a man does not know him.Sel:f?nl 
Freud would rejoice in such a question~ and by his answer, 
which took years to give, would enlighten and justifY Kier-
kegaard. Or think of what the experience of a Freudian an-
alysis coUld tell Kierkegaard who wrote, in 1843: 
"The ethical individual knows himself,.but this 
knowledge is not a mere eontemplation ••• It ~sa re-
flection upon himSelf which itself is an action, and 
therefore I have deliberately preferred to use the 
e ression 'choose oneself 1 instead of know oneself. s~when the individual knows him~el~ he is ~ot tbrou~; 
on the contrary' this knowledge 1S l.D. the h~~es ~. ~e n2 
gree fruitful, and from it proceeds the true 1nd~v1dual. 
But on at least three points Kierkegaard would say 
1. Kierkegaard, WL, 122. 
2. Kierkegaard, E/0 11, 216. 
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that Freud was wrong apout the soul. First, while the soul 
ma.y overlap the psychic _apparatus - t.be two concepts found in 
the thought of the two men -.and while each may be energized 
by. the somatic, the soul can and must be moved more directly 
by its noumenal contact with spirit, and its spiritual con-
tact with the revelation of the incarnate God. 
Second, and contrary to Freud•s opinion, the soul can 
move by willingness and by an existential awareness into the 
realm of the eternal where the "laws" of the phenomenal and 
the epi-phenomenal worlds do not hold, and where obliteration, 
as in the case of the epi-phenomenal at death, is not possible. 
And third, there is more than blind, thrusting energy 
behind the soulish in man; more than an imperative need to 
find £u1filment through expression, whether it be energy 
which seeks to unify or energy which seeks to destroy. There 
is that in man, and in the universe and beyond the time-uni-
verse which is a "taker of initiative". Man, as body-soul, 
is never alone, is never beyond the creative concern of this 
"other-than" which we call God. The spirit of this God min-
isters to the body-soul even in the day-old child and even 
in the hours of sleep, by doing its sy.nthesiBing and per-
suading work. It ministers as it ~an, as it finds a :re-
sponse, by encot:~raging man, through the soulish that is in 
him, to become acquainted with the things of the spirit. 
And it ministers, this same represented eternal one, through 
the Christ, who lived and died and who yet lives, and through 
ways that have not ye~ been made known~ For such is the nature 
of God, and such the importance of ensouled man to God. 
Kierkegaard would, therefore, reject Freud's definition 
of the soul, or the soul-equivalentt as inadequate. Freudts 
methods,. and Freud 1 s findings, :from a purely descriptive point 
of view, woUld have their importaneet their very great impor-
~o-b tance; butAFreud's ~stapsychological interpretations of these 
findings, and his generalized conclusions about religion, and 
the soul, and so, man, wou~d be utterly unacceptable. InKier-
kegaard1s own words, which might have been written after a 
through study of Freud's writings on religion, we have what 
1\ 
might be called a minimum criticism. He says: 
"You are absolutely indefatigable in ferreting out 
illusions in order to smash them •••• However, you have 
not reached the truth, you have come to a stop with 
the destruotion of illusions, and inasmuch as you have 
wrought that destruction in all possible and imaginable 
directions, you have really worked yourself into a new 
illusion: the illusion that one can stop there."l · 
2. Second Request 
This too is a request which we should like Kierkegaard 
and Freud to put to each other. And it is this: will you 
find, in your system of thought, or your thinking, a place 
for the soul-concept which the other has offered, even 
though it may mean that it will have to be put at once 'lll:lder 
the category of unequivocal error. 
We shall not repeat, here, our summary statements about 
1~ Kierkegaard, E/0 11, 66. 
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the ooncept of the soul in Kierkega.ard and in Freud. They 
are given at the beginning of the last section, and they are 
to be found amplified and justified on other pages of this 
dissertation. 
Kierkegaard, as we have already implied, would not ac-
cept Freu.d 1 s rejection of the traditional concept soul. He 
would admit that soul has had many meanings, and he would 
know about the philological associations. He woUld be inter-
ested, too, in the anthropological theories which were advanced 
in Freud's day to account for the concept "soul". Indeed, 
such was Kierkegaard•s genius that he would, I believe, have 
illuminated even this field with insights, seeing relation-
ships between descriptive :fa9ts which no one else had seen. 
But the poverty of reductioniSm, of saying that because we 
find or believe that a certain theory of the soul was held in 
primitive times, therefore any more subtle thoughts about the 
soUl must be no more than early ignorance wearing a heavier 
disguise - this would trouble Kierkegaard. He might give us 
as a protesting analogy, that it would be just as stupid to 
reject all that we now know about the sun, and even the e%iS-
tenoe of the sun, because it was once thought that the sun 
was a god to be worshipped. 
In his ~alk about the soul there is always something, or 
some real no-thing (to speak in noumenal terms} to whioh Kier-
kegaard is referring, and to which he gives, in his concept, 
a olue. So he oou.ld never aeoept, and :fit into his thinking, 
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the soul as utter illusion, as Freud would have it, 
on the other hand, Freud's npsyohio apparatus", the soul-
substitute, could find a place in Kierkegaard. Thoughts pro-
vided by this concept would be of help to Kierkegaard as he 
was attempting to describe the dynamics of the soulish in man, 
and especially in his "natural man". 
For example, and as Mowrer has pointed out, 1 we have 
Freud ts "ambivalence" anticipated by K.ierkegaard 1 s "ambiguity 
of dread"; we have his "reaction formation" elaborated - it 
would seem - in portions of the ol~er thinker 1 s ~onoept of 
Dread; we have, in this same work, Kierkegaard pointing out 
a relationship between sexuality and anxiety; we have a psy-
chological exper~enee described by Kierkegaard which is very 
like Freud 1 s "return of the repressed"; and in the study of .. 
anxiety or dread we have, according to Mowrer, Kierkegaard 
even more in accordance with seeming facts, in certain re-
spects, than is Freud himself. And Mowrer considers Freud 
to be the chief of the contributors to our understanding of 
the problem of anxiety. 
Again, to give a.n e:x-am;ple which Mowrer does not mention, 
"the developing process of reserve" which Kierkegaard discus-
ses in "Guilty?/Not Guilty?", 2 is·eertainly related to the 
Freudian concept of repression. 
Kierkegaard would have found information then, and even 
1. MtYWTe'!', 'LPD, 542. 
2. Kierkegaard, SLW, 389. 
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inspiration. in aertain o£ Freud's hypo~haeas, or in parts 
o£ them - the uneonsoious, the superego, dream-work - but as 
he £ound Freud attempting to tear man £rom the oonte~t o£ 
the spiritual, and e~lain him, and hie failures and aspira-
tions on "natural" lines only, Kierkegaard would have spoken 
sharply and perhaps definitively about Freud. 
Freud, when asked to include Kierkegaard'e oonoept o£ 
the soul in his system, would olassi£y it as unequivocal error 
in so far as Kierkegaard's soul depends for its synthesis e~­
istenoe. upon "spirit", and in so far as it is related to re-
ligion. 
Freud would find a great deal, I am sure, in Kierkegaard's 
impressionistic recording of the dynamics of the soulish. For 
instance, and as we have implied, the concept of dread in 
Kierkegaard would have been su£fioient to make the Freud who 
was seeking to understand a.I'J%1ety, a student of Kierkegaard. 
And as Freud studied Kierkegaard, I believe that he would have 
:found more of the :future of European thought, a legitimate £u-
. . 
ture, in Kierkegaard than has Friedmann - a psychoanalyst who 
has subjected Kierkegaard through his biography and his writ-
ings to an "analysis"; but over the concept "soul" in Kierke-
gaard, Freud would have to shake his head and reject. 
Relevant and realistic statements - realistie in a Frau-
dian sense - which Kierkegaard has made about the movements 
o:f the soul. o:f natural man would be incorporated by Freud in 
his system, but he would translate Kierkegaard•s word "soul" 
255 
into something in his own area o£ discourse. Partly because 
this is the way in which he wished to communicate; but chie£-
ly because "souln in common usage carries a heavy load of re-
ligious association, and as he conceived religion, Freud was 
its hard-hitting enemy. 
These soul-di££erences between Kierkegaard and Freud are 
not pointed up as clearly as one might expect as one asks each 
of them what he means by natural man. F.or Kierkegaard, na~u­
ral man is man unaware, or very dimly aware o:f the synthesiz-
ing agent in himself, the spirit; and o:f the realm of this 
agent. the eternal; and o:f the source and ruler of this realm, 
the eterrial one, God. Kierkega.ard ealls sueh an one, the un-
aware or natural man, the aesthetic man. And by this, as we 
have seen, he does not mean the person who is technically or 
habitually concerned with beauty and its opposite; or with 
the :fine discriminations of, say, a cultured epicurean; but 
by aesthetic or natural man Kierkegaard means the man who 
lives in and :for the world which his senses give him, and 
only this. You can have gross natural men, or tnose who are 
very refined. They are one in the conscious source of their 
"realityn, and one in the practical belief that this sense-
world is the only world; or at least the world to which they 
shoUld give their exclusive attention. Freud, in Kierkegaard's 
definition of the term, would be a natural man who had begun 
to explore the realm, or sphere or stage of the ethical. 
Freud - and this is a conjecture on the part of the author 
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o£ this dissertation - would say that Kierkegaard had de~ined 
natural man accurately~ providing that we include the ethias 
o£ the analysed man; and, moreover, that there is no other 
goal for man that is higher than this. Eut, he would say, 
"natural man" is only a possibility £or most men, and £or most 
it is never realized. For, as we have said, natural man wouldb~ 
analysed man. Almost without exception - and the exception 
is, perhaps, no more than a logical admission - men in our 
time, Freud would say, are less than natural, they are sub-
natural. And one o£ the ehief of the reasons for this is tra-
ditional or any religion; that discipline whioh delights in 
talking about the "soul". 
But religion keeps men ignorant o£ themselves and of 
their real world, and engenders paralysing fear, whether it 
be through an external religious authority or through the 
dogmatic ways of a religion that has been introjeoted, The 
result is that the world has been peopled with sub-natural 
men. Psyehoanalysis, then, has eome to deliver man into a 
state of naturalness, to help man realize# the highest po-
tential that is in him. 
In summary, Kierkegaard's "soul", in so far as it has 
to do with the spiritual, ean ~ind, in Freud, no plaoe eJreept 
that of devastating error. And Freud's soul-substitute, the 
"psyohio apparatus", would be for Kierkegaard an interesting, 
valuable but limited attempt to reveal the soulish workings 
of that man who has not developed beyond the stage of the 
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aesthetic, or at most, the aesthetic tinged by the ethical. 
3. Question one 
We have not made a sharp distinction, in our commenting 
upon reqnests one and two, between the actual and imagined 
opinions of the two men we are studying, and our own about 
these various opinions, but question one is addressed to the 
writer of this dissertation. It is given in the Introduction 
as follows: If the soul-ooneepts are found to be different in 
the two men, which concept is more acceptable, and why? 
We have seen that while there is an over-lapping of "pay-
ohio apparatus", the soul-substitute in Freudt and the soulish 
aspect of that synthesis which is Kierkegaardts man, there is 
also a great difference between them. And this is brought 
home to us as we examine eaoh concept in the framework of its 
own presuppositions and generalized conclusions, 
Freud's "psychic apparatusn is given by the soma, which, 
in turn, has its origin and its sustaining nourishment in the 
real, concrete world nout theren - meaning, in Freud, the 
natural WDrld. The other, Kierkegaard•s "soul", 'is given by 
the act of a creating God, and it is kept in its necessary 
synthesis with the body, and brought to the point of aware-
ness of spirit - unless it make the tragic choice of active 
rejection, or the no-choice of just sleeping on - by this 
same Giver of all that is eternal. 
Philosophy and theology, in their most magnificent and 
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most humble achievements, have given us cause to believe that 
the total world in which we live is not as limited as Freud 
would have it; that we need those categories of the eternal 
which lie beyond Freud•s acceptance, but within the bounds 
of Kierkegaard's most careful thinking, if we would explain 
and put to us~, in the highest sense, those data which come 
into life in other than a sensory fashion. For instance, the 
oonoept of the nparadoxn, or of YTfaitb.n in Kierkegaard. And 
even the sensory requires a more oomprehensive and more co-
herent handling than Freud gives it. Much more is being re-
gistered by the psychic apparatus, and much more is being de-
termined in the psychic apparatus by the extra-personal "field" 
in which it functions than Freud ever realized. 
Many of the facts of the-inner life would seem to be as 
he has described them; we are not as rational as we once 
thought; we are motivated constantly by a part. of us of whioh 
we are ignorant; we carry within us the biddings of the au-
thority :figures of our ohildhood. :But the "Reality" whioh 
he chose and made the all oan never satisfy the open and 
trained metaphysician; and the sou.lish aspect of man can 
have in it the supernatural motivations of the true saint. 
Philosophy, then, and theology, and the existential e-
vents of the religious life ory out for an interpretation 
and, where words fail, for an expression in act, of much that 
belonged to Kierkegaardrs universe of ~isoourae but which 
Freud felt it neceseary to reject. 
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Kierkegaard aooepts the Christian oonoept of the soul 
without question, and he tells us much about the processes 
of this soul whiah, interacting in a revealed world of the 
eternal and with the agent of the eternal, the spirit, make 
for salvation. 
We would look, then, to Kierkegaard•s oonoept of the 
soul for truth that lies beyond the confines of Freud's pay-
ohio apparatus. Where they do not contradict, the one oan 
help the other, but where they do, we must, for reasons of 
ooherenae in the faoe of all the available facts of man and 
his universe, walk with Kierkegaard. For his way of approach 
and of treatment would seem to open the way to all of the 
truth, truth which comes from any dimensio~; while Freud's 
would seem to be that of a specialist who had limited his 
field of vision for his task and had seen the part so clearly 
that he had mistaken it for the whole. 
4. Seoond Question 
As we come to the seoond question, which, like the first, 
is one we would put to ourselves, we shall not only restate 
it, but give a very brief summary of the two culminating "de-
finitions" of the soul and the soul-substitute~ 
The question is: assuming the concepts of the soul, as 
we find them in Kierkegaard and Freud, to be different, what 
would happen to man and to his institutions if the one rather 
than the other concept were believed by the human mind? 
Kierkegaard, as we have seen, believes that man has a 
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soulish as:peet, and it is at this :point, or as this :functions, 
that he can come into touch, through s~irit, with the ground 
o:f the universe, This coming into touch would mean an in-
crease o:f consciousness, with the attending :pain, or, at least, 
the :pain-:potential; it would mean a li:fe, here and now, in 
which God's will can :find increasing expression; and it woUld 
mean an a:fter-li:fe in the realm o:f the eternal. 
Freud, in offering his soul-substitute, the :psychic a:p-
:paratus (though he does not call it a soul-substitute), be-
lieves that this asp eo t o:f man :fnne ti~)ns only as it is ener-
gized by the soma, which in turn draws its sustanance, not 
:from any supernatural world or any attending spirit, but :from 
the common-sense world o:f nature. This soulish as:pect has 
its energizing, controlling, directing, producing work to do, 
and human life as we know it would not be human without it. 
But the psychic or the soulish is, at the very most, only 
epi-phenomenal. It has work to do that is o:f vital importance 
:for the human race, but its only destiny is to sink back as a 
s:pent water-spout into the great impersonal world of nature; 
nature being, :for Freud, the ultimately real, 
The epi-phenomenal, the mental, has, :for a time, the 
reality of an influence in the natural world; but it is only 
nature influencing itself through a special channeling o:f its 
energy, and not an influence, directly or indirectly, :from 
beyond the natural world. 
We see, then, that our assumption is correct. The con-
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eepts of the soul in Kierkegaard and Freud are radically dif-
ferent, and in no way greater than in .the pattern of relation-
ships in which each finds itself. 
We have, in Kierkegaard, a Christian anthropology; that 
is to say, man exists, whether he knows it or not, in God 1s 
world, and there exists in him a spirit sent by God. He is 
meant to know this spirit and to have faith in this God 
tbraugh Obrist. And all that he does is to be conditioned 
by all that he is: Godis creature, and God's potential son. 
In opposing this, Freud would give a natural anthropology; 
one that explained man in terms of his pr~itive antecedents; 
by the thrust of contemporary energy into and through the id; 
and by the sharp teaching of the real world which our senses 
give us when we are being unreal in our responses and our de-
mands. 
Such an anthropology is comparatively simple, and for 
this, and for other reasons, it can be appealing, but, as we 
have said, it does not take into account all of the faots of 
the universe which are available to man, and all of the re-
sUlts of man's tireless thought about these facts. 
There is, in man, not only a wish for another dimension, 
that o£ eternity, but a need for it if he is to be coherent 
and comprehensive in his thinking and if he is to be other 
than stoically successful in his living. Kierkegaard may 
not have solved all of the problems concerning the soul, but 
he is looking more deeply into the matter than is Freud. And 
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if we strive to hammer out a. Christian anthropology- and make 
it our constant frame of referenoe, we shall, I believe, see 
more and do more to a.dva.noe man and his institutions, both in 
sensitivity- and in the kind of mastery- that is permitted in 
suah ·a wa:v of lifE:), than we a an ever do in an anthropological 
frame that is humanistic and natural. 
Kierkegaard takes us inside the world of Christian an-
thropolsg:v, this more hopeful world, and gives us much. But 
he promises even more; promises it as an explorer's longboat 
grating on the sand promises a whole new continent. 
OH4J?TER Vll 
Findings and Conclusions 
Our speaifia topia has been the concept of the soul in 
Kierkegaard and FreUd, and in our study we have learmd much 
about the life and thought of these two men. Each has emerged 
from the processes of research and presentation as a person 
of even greater accomplishments than was heretoforerealized, 
and as a person who merits very close attention. 
Among the more important findings and conclusions rel-
evant to our task we would list the following: 
1. While both Kierkegaard and Freud were, to an extant, 
definite products o:f their time and place, each• cf them·was 
formed more by negative reaction to his environment than by 
a positive acceptance of it. And each of them.transeaaded 
the limitations of his personal surroundings. 
2. Kierkegaard, more than Freud, was shaped and in-
spired by persons; and his ideas, as strong and as far~ 
reaching in their implications as anything produced by 
Freud, kept, nonethelesa, a very individual. tinge. Freud,· 
on the other hand, sought to de-individualize his conce:ptse 
3! The concept soul, as found in the writings of the 
two men, has received almost no attention from students of 
their works, while npsyahic apparatusn, the Freudian soul-
substitute, has called forth a constant stream of explan-
ation and comment. 
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4. In their writingsJneither of the two men develo~s the 
conce~t of the soul. It begins, as it were, fUll-grawn and 
continues as such. Psychic ap~aratus, on the other hand, is 
under constant review. More and more seemed to be discovered 
about it, and it is said by some that at the time of his death 
Freud was about to make, or had seen the need to make, an im-
~ortant shift of emphasis in its delineation; namely, one which 
woUld take the sociological more into account, and the biolog-
ical less. 
5. A study of the soul proper in Kierkegaard and Freud 
does not yield as meaningful material as it is possible to 
find in the thinking of the two men. Kierkegaard acce~ts the 
conce~t too easily and Freud rejects it too summarily. On 
the other hand, a study of Freud 1 s "psychic apparatus" does 
give us the heart of his dynamic teaching; but in the matter 
of awareness of God and of immortality - two of our reasons 
for studying the soul - it gives us only blunt negatives; 
and in its anthropology, only a dwarfed conoe~tion of man. 
6. All of the conoe~ts considered, however, are def-
inite and used with a consistenay of meaning; and no other 
related conce~t, such as self, person or subject, ever be-
comes a serious rival. 
7. Kierkegaard, when asked to consider soul, or~ 
Seale, in Freud, would recognize it as much tbe same as 
soul in his own psychological thinking, but would consider 
Freud as utterly mistaken in dismissing it as ~art of an 
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ill us io:n-sys tem. 
8. Kierkegaard, when a.ske.d to consider npsyehic apparatus" 
in Freud, would recognize it as a.n attempt to bring content into 
that which he, Kierkegaard, would consider to be at least part 
of thE! soul; bu1;, once agai,.n, Kierkegaa:rd would insist that soul, 
in form or in content; as presented whole or as analysed into 
parts, belongs in a dynamic,religious frame of reference. It 
is there :from the very beginning of its existence, and whether 
it knows it or not. 
9. Freud, when asked to eonsiaer nsouln in Kierkegaard, 
wou.J.d~ in so :far as it has a religious :frame of reference, 
dismiss it as error; but in so far as talk about the soul in 
Kierkegaard relates to his own concept of the psychic apparatus, 
Freud would ·give it very careful. consideration. 
10, Given only these two, soul in Kierkegaard and psychic 
apparatus in Freud - or three, if we think also of die Seale 
in Freud - we would choose that which has been offered by Kier-
kegaard •. As we have already said, Kierkegaard has not swept 
aside as of no value the splendid thinking which man has done 
and :recorded in all the centuries, the pre-scientific centuries, 
in which he has been concerned about his own nature and its 
destiny. Philosophy and Theology and :Psychology, up to Kie:r-
kegaard1s day, all spoke to him, and gave him a broader and 
:richer universe o:f discourse that Freud would allow himself. 
Many of the truths or so-called truths of this larger uni-
verse change in the light of later knowledge and more oarefu1 
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thought, and this is as it should be. But, while religion, 
as Freud has described it, has certainly been upon the earth, 
and is still present, there have also been the lasting truths 
of mature religion, whioh have proven themselves by their de-
veloping coherence in the world of thought, and their creative 
productiveness in everyday living. 
And so, for reasons of comprehensiveness, of coherence 
and of' repeated fruitfulness - the fruits of the spirit -
we would, if we had to choose, choose the concept of the soul 
which is o~fered by Kierkegaard; and this, quite apart from 
"' 
any hope of a life after death which the concept implies. 
11. It is our belief that men and their institutions 
could find in Freud's conception of the soul, and so, his 
conception of man, only grim inspiration. An acceptance of 
his soul-beliefs or disbeliefs would lead to that which he 
would eertainly abhore, the machine man in a machine world. 
His conception, even of the psychic apparatus, is saturated 
with pessimism. Ashes to ashes, dust to dust, quite liter-
ally, and nothing more, would be his ultimate teaching. 
This we could accept, and live under with various de-
grees of carelessness or of stocism - if we had to. But we 
do not have to. The facts of life are more numerous and more 
meaningful than Freud could ever believe. Re was a sincere 
man who was caught by the thinking of his century and by 
other circumstances, and he died too soon, Had he lived, 
and had he been as willing to change in the direction of 
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truth as he asked others to do, he would have come into con-
... -
tact with scientists whom he could respect - for instance, 
Alfred North Whitehead, or J.W.N. Sullivan - and in reading 
their works, or in talking with-th~m~ he would have begun to 
realize that he had not said the final word about religion, 
and that he was not even looking in the direction from which 
the deciding truths of religion come. Reductionism, or prim-
itivism, is not, in science or anywhere else, the final au-
thority. Nor, indeed, is the empirical m~thod, when it is 
us.ed exclusively. 
We do not wish, however, to have this our final word 
about Freud. Rather, we would make it one of appreciation 
for a. great and lonelr man. His work was :for truth as he 
conceived it to be, and much that he has done will remain 
to stimulate and to inform students of human nature for 
many generations to come. 
12. This is in part a repetition of what bas already 
been said; and, moreover, it amounts to a criticism of our 
choice made under n1on; and it is the expression o:f a re-
gret. And it is this: we do not feel that Kierkegaard, in 
all his amazing thinking and recording, ques.tioned tbe con-
cept o:f the soul as much as he should have done. He was in 
touch with more comprehensive and more relevant data than 
was Freud, but in speaking o:f the soul, he is both inade-
quate and, at times, confusing. For instance, and making 
every allowance for langua.ge di:f:ficulty, he speaks quite 
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frequently o:f.. tbe soul or the soulish in man as if it were 
phenomenal; but in his total thinking, it must be noumenal. 
Again, h!La :fear o:f :philosophy has ke:pt him too near to 
the teaching of the Lutheran Church of his day in this mat-
ter of the soul. This fear of :philosophy as the final guide 
to truth did not allow him, as it were, to come out into the 
o:pen and enter into a :fruitful discussion of, say, the sur-
vival of the soul.. He assumed) where he could and should have 
disoussed. 
And lastly, his belief in the survival of the body after 
death, held because he believed in the resurrection of Christ 
and in the teaching of Paul. concerning i.I:nlnortali ty, has led 
to a paucity of comment which is to be regretted. For here 
we have a man, possessed, in the time of his fUll strength, 
of a mind tba. t was as daring and diserimina ting as have been 
few in history; a mind that was saturated with sincerit.1 and 
at work within the largest possible frame of reference; and 
yet at times, and for some subjects, and :partieularly in this 
important matter of the soul, he has remained pretty much an 
unquestioning catechumen. 
His belief in the soul may have the moral helpfulness re-
quired by William James as one of the criteria for spiritual 
belief, but it is too little examined to be philosophically 
reasonable; and it does not have, at least for our day, "im-
mediate luminousness" .1 · 
This is, perhaps, unfair to Kierkegaard, for in his be-
1. James, VRE, 19. 
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lief' in revelation, he would not need or accept the criteria. 
of'f'ered by J"ames or a:ny other human being. But unless and 
until it is necessary to believe without the ~a.rtial conf'ir-
- ... • ¥ 
mat ion o-f' human thought and f'ee~ing, '\..re~. shall .go _on seeking. 
The flJ.ea:pfl will no doubt 'be required, but :Let us not begin 
to :Leap unt.il we have c~)me to the outermost rim of' the en-
deavors of even deeply sinful man. 
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ABSTRACT 
The ~urpose o~ this dissertation is to examine the use 
or uses o~ the oona.ept "souJ.n in the writings o:f S~ren Kier-
kegaard and Sigmund Freud. The concept has been chosen be-
cause of the central place which it has occupied in theories 
o~ ~ersonality and dectrines o~ man; because it brings us, 
traditionally at least, to the place o~ man's awareness of 
God; and because it has been a point o~ ~oeus in man's thought 
o~ immortality. And these men have been ohosen because they 
are ~ountainhead ~ersona~ities; because they represent so 
strongly two contrasting anthropologies, the Christian and 
the naturalistio; and because each o~ them, in the last hal~ 
century, has had an increasing influence upon the climate o~ 
western thought. 
The general procedure has been to see each man in his own 
historical, geographical, intellectual and social setting; to 
examine autobiographical and biographical material; to dis-
cover and to summarize previous research in this speoial ~ield; 
to ·study the writings o~ each man in the order o:f their appear-
anoe; to pay particular attention, not only to the acceptance 
~~ the coneept nsouln, but to its rejection, and to the rea-
sons ~or this rejection; and to compare and contrast the two 
resulting concepts. 
On the bas is o~ these ~indings, each o~ these thinkers 
has been asked to comment upon the conclusions o~ the ot.her, 
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and to :find a· place in hia "system" :for the comept offered by 
the other. A choice was then made by the author o:f this dis-
sertation, and the implications o:f accepting eaoh o:f the con-
cepts was discussed. 
The study does not attempt in any full way to relate the 
findings to the long history of the concept of the soUl; to 
deal exhaustively with the contributing factors in the thought-
climate in which each man was at work; nor to study the soUl-
concept in the thought of their respective followers or other 
students of their teaching. 
The soul, for Kierkegaard, was found to be real. It is 
actually in time and potentially - a potentiality which can 
be actualized in this life and for a future life - in eter-
nity. It is known immediately in self-consciousness and by 
God. It is known indirectly by oneself in retrospect, and 
by others as they see its effects in the phenomenal world. 
The degree o:f self-awareness of the soul in its body-soul 
synthesis is in proportion to the degree of the soults a-
wareness of the synthesizing agent of the eternal which is 
spirit. .And the soul is to be valued and lived for in one's 
choices and one 1 S actions as an entity which can have in its 
continuing synthesis, immortal and eternal life. 
We find, in Freud, that while he uses the concept "soul", 
or die Seale, it is only to be :found in reported material 
which is poetical, or pathological - in the talk of a psy-
chotic - or primitive, or illusory in the neurotic sense. 
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Die seel.e has, for Freud, ·no real existence. 
The soul-equivalent in Freud is the upsychic ap;paratus u; 
-the id-ego-superego system which has been brought into being 
by energy i:thich takes its rise from the soma and "l:thich is 
Channeled constantly into and through the two basic instincts, 
the constructive and the destrt.tctive. This apparatus is sha,ped 
from i:lithin, and by its interaction with the real i·IOrld 111hich 
lies outside. It is at most epiphenomenal, arid is entirely 
dependent for its existence u;pon the phenomenal. \·torld. Its 
only i.mnlortality is the effect i:lhich it can have on the 
J)henomenal world during the time of its "life 11 • 
~ each is asked to comment upon the concept offered by 
the other, and fit it, if possible, into his o-vrn thinking, t·re 
have Freud saying: I cannot accept Kierkegaard's definition, 
. -
except, perhaps, as a mistaken concept in an illusor,y sYBtem of 
belief'. Huch of the mental behavior 1:rhich has encouraged the 
concept must be recognized end included in oners thought, but 
no part of it is other than epiphenomenal. 
Kierkegae.rd vrould not acce);lt Freud's sHeeping judgments 
a.bout the soul. H.e 1r1ould see that i:thile it has been necessary 
to correct Emd to refine the definition, and 't·rhile it ma¥ be 
necessary to continue to do so, that 'l.·thich me.n is trying to 
define is real. But he 't·rould most ce:11tainly be interested 
in Freudts "psychic apparatus", and would receive from 
Freud t s \'tritings about it many insights that vrere new and 
many plausible explanations of that vthich he had himself 
obse:rv:1ed in his study of the inner life. But he uould see 
a. need for "spirit" in the concept~ and he ~:ottld s'ay that 
' 
the soulish in man has always been more than phenomenal or 
epiphenomenal. For it ha,s existed in and by and for the 
~ealm of the eternal and the God of eternity. 
Summarized, wur findings and conclusions are as follows: 
i. Negative reaction to environment has been very strong 
in each man, and each has transcended the limitations of his 
personal surroundings. 
2. Kierkegaard's ideas, including the concept of the 
soul, -vtere, throughout, more personal, more individual that 
-v1ere those of Freud the scientist. 
3. The concept "soul" in the tv1o writers has received 
very little attention from scholars, but Freud's ";psychic 
a-pparatus 11 has been eX)?lained and commented upon by an 
increasing number of writers. 
4. The concept nsoul 11 is not developed by either man. 
rt begins, as it were, full-grm·rn, and continues as such. 
on the other hand, "psychic a;p:paratus n as a concept has 
undergone constant development. 
5. A study of the soul concept does not give the most 
meaningful material that is to be found in the ti.,TO writers. 
Kierkegaard accepts the concept too easily and Freud rejects 
it too summarily. A study of Freud's "psychic ap;paratus 11 
gives the heart of his teachings, and shovrs, !?~S vrell, his 
limitations. 
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6. These eoncepts, however, are definitely and consis-
tently present, and there is no related concept whieh eould 
begin to take their place. 
7. Kierkegaard would reeognize Freud's die Seele as 
bei:ng closely akin to his own c.oncept of the soul, but would 
disagree utterly with the Freudian claim that it belongs to 
an illusion-system. 
s. Kierkegaard would welcome all talk abont Freud's 
"psychic apparatus" as having possible bearing on his con-
cept of the s oulish part of man, but he would insist that 
it must be seen in a religious frame of reference. 
9. This religious frame of reference, insisted upon 
by Kierkegaard, would be Freud's reason for rejecting Kier-
kegaard1B 11 soul". And yet talk about the soul by Kierkegaard 
would be studied by Freud to see its bearing on his own con-
cept, the psychic apparatus. 
10. It is our opinion that philosophy and theology and 
science itself have given us cause to believe that the total 
world in which we live is not as limited as Freud would have 
it; and that we need categories, if we are to come to the 
best possible conclusions, which are at least akin to those 
of Kierkegaard, though rejected by Freud. And one of the 
chief o:f these is the concept "soul".· And so, for reasons 
of coherence alone, coherence in the light of all the known 
facts and grounded theories, we would, if we had to choose, 
accept Kierkegaard's thinking about these matters rather than 
Freud's. 
11. It :f'ollm>Ts :from this the.t \'re would choose the 
Christian anthropology of Kierkega~rd rather then the 
naturalistic anthropology of Freud; and this, not merely 
because it takes into account. more of the knm·rn facts of 
life and o:f' the enveloping universe, but because there is 
in it a recognition o:f' the essential value of man. In 
Freud there is, i:then "~Jte question him about the PUll'ose and 
destiny of man, only a deep-lying, inescapable pessimism. 
12. In his speaking about the soul, ho'Vtever, Kierkegaard 
is both inadequate and confusing; for he never gave it enough 
thought. He spoke o:f' it, :for the most part, quite casually, 
and at times as if it were a phenomenon among phenomena. He 
remains, in this :point, too much the child of the Lutheran 
. . 
catechism of his day. ..And as a consequence, neither his 
doctrine of man, nor his belief in immortality are sharpl-Y 
presented. It is to be regretted that a man ""Vrith his pat·rer 
of thought and his concern for truth should not have spoken 
more definit~ly about the soul. 
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I 
John Dixon Oopp, the son of Edgar Maitland Oopp (M.D.) 
and Dormer Dixon Copp, was born in Saakville, New Brunswick, 
Canada, on January 31, 1908. Re graduated from High School 
in 1925t was for three years a clerk in the Royal Bank of 
Canada, and in 1932 graduated with a major in philosophy 
from Mount Allison University in that same town. 
In 1935 he received a Diploma in Theology from Eman-
uel Oollege in the University of Toronto, and in that same 
year was ordained a Minister in the United Church of Canada. 
As part of ~is required training he spent, in tbe summers 
from 1931 to 1934, twenty months as a frontier missionary 
in Saskatchewan and Alberta. In 1935 he married Jean Evans 
o:f Toronto. 
From 1935 to 1937 he was a travelling secretary in the 
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Student Christian Movement ofrOanada, with special responsi-
bility :for the colleges and universities in the Maritime Prov-
inces o:f New Brunswiok, Nova Sootia and Prinae Edward Island. 
In 193!7 he completed work whiah had been begun in Emanuel Col-
lege and received the degree o:f Bachelor of Divinity. The 
Thesis topia :for this was "A Stuay of the Beginnings .of Cer-
tain Student Christian Movements: a Comparison of their Ideals 
and Methods, and a Discovery of their Significant a.nd Perma-
nent Values." 
In 1937 he orossed the Atlantic and spent two years in 
England and on the Continent. In 1938 he received a Post 
Graduate Diploma in Aaademio Psychology from King•s College 
in the University of London, and dttring the academia terms 
of these two years he spent two voluntary days a week in the 
Psyahalogioal Laboratory of Bethlem Royal Hospital. The re~ 
sult of this was a paper delivered before The British Psy-
ahologiaal Soeiety on "The Terman-Merrill Revis~on (of the 
Stan:ford-Binet Test of Intelligence) and Adul.t Mental Pa-
tients." The summer of 1938 was spent teaohing English in 
a private school in Franae. 
In 1939 he sailed; via Suez, :for the South Paoi:fio to 
take a post with the London Missionary Soaiety in Samoa. 
After time in Australia and New Zealand, he proceeded to the 
island o:f Upolu to beoome the Headmaster o:f a boys 1 boarding 
school (native). He remained here until 1947, with, however, 
a furlough of six months :for study in New Zealand. In 1945 
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he received from the University of New Zealand a Master of 
Arts degree in Philosophy (Psychology). His thesis for this 
was nAn Introduction to the We-Psychology of Dr. Fritz Kunkel: 
an Examination of- its Matter and Methods." With the help of 
a native sohoolboyt material was gathered in Samoa for a book 
which was published in 1950 by the Beaoon Press in Boston. 
It was oalled. The Samoan Danae of Life, with its sub-titl.e, 
"An Antbropologioal Narrative." The Preface was contributed 
by Dr. Margaret Mead. 
Three ohil.dren were born in Samoa, David Ril.ary (1941), 
twins, Brian Evans and Barry Dixon (1946), and in 1.947 the 
family returned to Canada. In the second semester of the 
1947-48 year, he entered the Graduate Sohool of Boston Uni-
versity as a candidate for the degree of Dootor of Philosophy 
in the field of Clinical Psyohol.ogy, and in the first semes-
ter of the 1948-49 yea.:r changed to the Department of the Psy-
chology of Religion in Boston University Sohool of Theology. 
In February, 1948, he was employed as Young Peoples 1 
Worker in the Memorial Congregational Church in South Sud-
bury, Massachusetts, and he settled with his family in that 
town. Early in 1949 he beoame a full-time Boys' Work Secre-
tary in the Young Mens• Christian Assooiation in Newton, Mas-
sachusetts; he left this in July of that year to begin work 
as Associate Registrar in Boston University School of Theo-
logy. With the second semester of the 1949-50 year he became 
the full-time Registrar in this institution, and at this same 
time the Acting Minister o£ the Memorial Congregational 
Churah in South Sudbury. 
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In the £all of 1951 he left the work o£ Registrar to 
beaome a part-time Instruotor in the Department of the Pay~ 
ahology of Religion in Boston University School of Theology, 
and his responsibilities in the Department were inareased in 
t~e 1952-53 aoademia year. With the opening of the Pastoral 
Counseling Service of Boston University Sahool of Theology, 
. he was appeinted to be one of the Counselors. It is e:xpected 
that with the aompletion of this Dissertation, he will reaeive 
the degree of Doator o£ Philosophy in the Department of the 
Psyahplogy of Religion, sever his offioial connections with 
the Memorial Congregational Chu:rah in South Sudbury, and go 
into full-time teaching. 
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